Doc's Talk: BUILDING REGIONAL PEACE: IRAQ AND THE KURDS

Monday, September 21, 2009

BUILDING REGIONAL PEACE: IRAQ AND THE KURDS

By Ofra Bengio *
Meria Journal

"For 35 years, Israel was a major target for rhetorical, ideological, and military attacks by the Ba'thi regime.[1]Yet with the collapse of the Ba'th and the many changes that have occurred in Iraq, Baghdad’s posture toward Israel has changed significantly. The harsh anti-Israel rhetoric has all but disappeared. Similarly, the vocal and actual commitment to the Palestinian cause has been reduced considerably. " This article is based on a paper presented at the June 8-9, 2009 conference entitled "Israel and the Arab States: Parallel Interests, Relations, and Strategies," jointly held in Jerusalem by the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The article discusses Israeli-Iraqi relations in the post-Saddam era, arguing that Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism and adopted a more pragmatic and moderate posture. Still, close ties between Iran and Iraqi Shi'a groups in particular threaten the chances for normalization between Jerusalem and Baghdad, while the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Also discussed is the positive Kurdish-Israeli relationship and areas of potential cooperation. At the same time, however, there exist Kurdish fears of negative reactions from non-Kurdish Iraqis and the Arab world and Israeli fears of antagonizing Turkey and jeopardizing its strategic partnership with it.

A CHANGING ATOMOSPHERE IN BAGHDAD

For 35 years, Israel was a major target for rhetorical, ideological, and military attacks by the Ba'thi regime.[1]Yet with the collapse of the Ba'th and the many changes that have occurred in Iraq, Baghdad’s posture toward Israel has changed significantly. The harsh anti-Israel rhetoric has all but disappeared. Similarly, the vocal and actual commitment to the Palestinian cause has been reduced considerably.

These changes were related to various tactical and strategic factors. An analysis of these factors must begin with Baghdad’s need to devote all of its energies to domestic issues: the atomization of the political system, which allowed for different foci of power to develop their own agendas; Baghdad’s ongoing inability to develop independent and clear-cut foreign policy lines; and Iraq’s frustration with many Sunni Arab regimes, which chose to ostracize Iraq in the years after Saddam’s fall. The deeper causes of the changes in Iraq’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict are directly related to the American presence in the country and its moderating influence on its partners there; the urge of the present government in Baghdad to rid itself of Ba'thi influence, including the Ba'th’s ideological baggage; the more liberal, pluralistic, and open society and polity that has been developing in Iraq in spite of opposite currents; and most importantly the strengthening of the Kurds in their autonomous region and, especially in Baghdad.

Having been Israel’s tacit ally from 1965-1975, the Kurds could now become an important moderating factor vis-à-vis Israel. The fact that since the establishment of the new regime the post of foreign minister has been in the hands of a Kurd, Khoshyar Zibari, is in itself very important. The same is true for the presidential post, which is manned by Jalal Talabani. Indeed, the Kurds have been playing an important role as a moderating force with regard to the Iraqi stance toward Israel, both in the parliament and in the government. Yet, without belittling this role, it must be stressed that on the whole, the toning down of the anti-Israeli mood in Baghdad has either been due to the American influence there or because there were more burning issues to deal with.

On the political level, then, a certain change in atmosphere has been noticeable through some small, individual gestures and in direct and indirect moves by the Iraqi government. Thus, for example, in 2004, then Prime Minister Iyad Allawi shook hands with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom at the UN.[2] Allawi later explained that he acted out of politeness, but if one recalls Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s refusal to shake hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, one could say that the handshake was not without significance. Another famous handshake was that between Talabani and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in July 2008 at a conference in Greece. Subsequently, Talabani attempted to downplay the gesture, describing it as a "civilized social act" without special significance. He further stated that he was acting as leader of his Kurdish party and deputy president of the Socialist International, not as Iraq's president: "It does not mean any obligations for the state of Iraq,” he emphasized.[3] Still, one could have never expected such a gesture from President Saddam Hussein. Moreover, Talabani’s explanation is very interesting since it justifies in a roundabout manner relations between the Kurds and Israel.

The visits to Israel in September 2004 and September 2008 of the head of the Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation and member of the Iraqi parliament Mithal al-Alusi is another case in point. Upon his return from Israel, the Iraqi parliament voted to remove Alusi’s parliamentary immunity, and the minister for parliamentary affairs even sought to prosecute him for “visiting a country that Iraq considers an enemy," a crime which could carry the death penalty.[4] However, Alusi appealed to the Supreme Federal Court, which overturned the lifting of his immunity, ruling that it was unconstitutional, as no crime had been committed.[5]Thus, more than the visit itself, the parliament’s ruling was of the utmost significance, establishing a precedent that could be used by other Iraqi politicians wishing to follow in Alusi’s footsteps.

On another level, Iraq’s reaction to the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006 and the war in Gaza in early 2009 was not as harsh and as vitriolic as those of other radical Arab states or even non-Arab Turkey. It is true that the parliament condemned the wars, as did AyatollahAli al-Sistani,[6] however, there was no attempt to mobilize the wars for domestic purposes. Another indication of the more moderate Iraqi stance was that it did not participate in the March 2009 Arab summit in Qatar, which convened to discuss Israel’s war in Gaza. As such, Baghdad aligned itself with the more moderate Sunni Arab countries, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which did not participate either. All in all, Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism, adopting a more pragmatic and moderate posture.

These positive developments should be weighed against more negative ones. Most troubling are the ever-deepening ties between Baghdad and Tehran in post-Saddam Iraq. In fact, Iraq is now moving in the orbit of Iran, which will do its utmost to frustrate any cooperation between Baghdad and Jerusalem. Understandably, as long as the United States is in Iraq, Iran’s negative influence can be contained to some extent. However, one should also remember that the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Similarly, there are limits to Washington’s willingness to promote relations between Israel and Iraq. Thus, for example, on June 5, 2008, a non-binding resolution demanding Iraqi recognition of Israel was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, gaining the support of more than 60 congressmen, including several senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee.[7] However, considering such a move risky for the Iraqi government, the White House did not press for its adoption and let it die a quiet death. Similarly, the new Obama administration’s move to open a dialogue with Iran might also further reinforce Teheran’s position in Iraq and thus frustrate any possible overtures by Baghdad to normalize relations with Israel.

The dangers emanating from Teheran to Israel are likely to increase over the longer term, especially once American troops are no longer present in Iraq. Iran is likely to increase its ideological, political, and religious pressure on Iraq--especially on the Shi'a--to join what the Bush administration called “the axis of evil.” Worse still, Iran might use Iraq as a launching pad for attacks against Israel. Close ties between Teheran and certain Iraqi Shi'i groups are the best vehicle for such a move. Another negative factor is the urge of the radical Shi'i groups--especially that of Muqtada al-Sadr--to bandwagon with Lebanon’s Hizballah. On another level, the Israeli war in Gaza dealt a blow to budding economic and people-to-people contacts. Finally, the fear of acting in opposition to a supposed consensus in Iraq and the Arab world regarding ties with Israel is still an important consideration for Iraqi policymakers.

Notwithstanding these negative factors, Israel should take advantage of the improved atmosphere and changing balance of power in the region to develop ties with the more moderate forces in Iraq. Thus, in spite of the growing Iranian influence in Iraq, or even because of it, official Israel should not antagonize Iraq’s Arab Shi'a by unduly emphasizing the dangers of the Shi'i crescent. Instead, it should...
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*Prof. Ofra Bengio is a Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University.

NOTES

[1] For a discussion of Ba'thi discourse on Israel, see Ofra Bengio, “In the Eyes of the Beholder: Israel, Jews and Zionism in the Iraqi Media,” in Tudor Parfitt and Yulia Egorova (eds.), Jews, Muslims and Mass Media (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004) pp. 109-119.
[2]“Minister Shalom and the Prime Minister of Iraq Shook Hands” (Hebrew), Ynet, September 21, 2004, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-2979898,00.html (accessed June 29, 2009).
[3]“Iraqi Leader Shakes Barak’s Hand,” BBC News, July 1, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7483844.stm (accessed June 29, 2009).
[4] AP and Herb Keinon, “Iraq May Execute MP for Visiting Israel,” Jerusalem Post, September 22, 2008.
[5]“Iraq: Parliament Member Who Visited Israel Wins” (Hebrew), Ynet, November 24, 2008, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3627884,00.html (accessed June 29, 2009).
[6]See Aswat al-Iraq, December 28, 2008, http://ar.aswataliraq.info/?p=117953; The Official Website of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, December 27, 2008, http://www.sistani.org/local.php?%20modules=extra&eid=2&sid=136 (accessed June 29, 2009).
[7]Nathan Guttman, “Bill Presses Iraq to Recognize Israel,” The Jewish Daily Forward, June 12, 2008.
MERIA Journal Staff

Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
Site: http://www.gloria-center.org/ - Email: info@gloria-center.org

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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