Doc's Talk: ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE CAN HELP

Monday, September 21, 2009

ISRAEL-ARAB RELATIONS: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE CAN HELP

Panel Discussion. *

On June 8-9, 2009, the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung jointly held a conference in Jerusalem entitled, "Israel and the Arab States: Parallel Interests, Relations, and Strategies." Brief biographies of the participants can be found at the end of the article.

Shimon Stein: Our topic is how third parties can play a crucial role in promoting efforts to improve relations between Israel and non-radical Arab states, given that these states share parallel interests as well as vital strategic relations with the United States and the European Union. . There is a feeling that a window of opportunity in the region may create new opportunities for interaction between Israel and non-radical Arab states. And the window of opportunity is, first and foremost, the result of the Iranian threat, which is of a multidimensional nature: nuclear, terror, ideological, psychological, and the attempt of Iran to undermine certain regimes in the region. Iran is not only a threat to Israel, but also to the so-called moderate Sunni and pro-Western regimes.

And the assumption is that a common threat could constitute a platform for cooperation in an effort to curb that threat. It is assumed that one major result could be a willingness on the part of non-radical Arab states to engage with Israel in confidence-building measures in the framework of renewed efforts to resume the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Based on my reading of the Arab reaction to the growing Iranian threat, I do not see any intention on the part of the non-radical Arab states to confront the Iranian threat together with Israel, at least not overtly. My answer will be that the chances are not great unless the United States and the European Union--together with Russia--are willing to change their traditional modes of operation.

The reason for the assumption, which shouldn't come as a surprise, is the non-Arab states’ attitude toward Israel. Since they believe that the only issue that matters to the Arabs is the Palestinian issue, there is no incentive for non-radical Arab states to change their behavior. After all, if the Obama administration creates some sort of a link between the Iranian nuclear issue and the Palestinian issue, while pressing Israel for an end to construction on settlements, why should Arab states do anything different or take any other issue into consideration? The same applies to EU policy.

What is required, then, is for Western states to broaden, rather than narrow, their approach. Consider an alternative example: the Madrid Process that took place during the early 1990s after the Kuwait war.

In the framework of this process, there was a multilateral track of talks with five working groups between Israel and the Arab world, which is still relevant for today. It is my belief that it can serve as an example as to how Arabs and Israelis can engage. The window at that time was the outcome of the Gulf War.

The Bush administration had articulated its goals, and was determined to implement them, pursued by a very determined and focused secretary of state, Jim Baker, who did not shy away from resorting to pressuring the parties that felt that they stood to lose by defying the United States. It took more than eight months of an active shuttle diplomacy to bring the parties to start the process.

The lessons to be derived from the success and failure of the Madrid Process were, first, that you need a window to serve as a catalyst; second, you need to have a superpower with a clear understanding as to how to use the event in order to transform the region; and third, you need personalities determined to implement the goals set forth.

You have to consider the project a high priority so that leaders in the region will realize you are serious. Fourth, don't shy away from putting pressure on the parties, otherwise they will always find a way to procrastinate and wear you out.

Bringing the parties to the table is one thing, but trying to change their mindsets is another. There is only so much a superpower and the international community can do to help the parties, but if the parties are unwilling to take tough decisions, there is no way to make them do it. I do not believe that an imposed solution is a realistic option.

So, do we find ourselves today in a similar situation to that in the months leading up to the Madrid conference? Well, we have the Iranian threat, which could serve as a trigger. The question remains about the other elements I have outlined: whether the United States--which is no longer a superpower--and the international community would be as determined, setting clear goals, trying to pursue them, and pressuring the parties. These are preconditions for a success.

Regarding the EU position, I believe that the EU shares the overall concern regarding the Iranian threat in its different manifestations. As to coping with the nuclear threat, the EU advocates the dialogue approach, accompanied by sanctions that so far haven't been successful. What makes us believe that sanctions will be successful in the future then is another question.

At this stage, I don't see an extra effort being taken by the EU to establish such a regional group bringing together Israel and the non-radical Arab states; I'd be happy to be proven wrong.

As to the Palestinian issue here, I would say that there is almost no difference between the EU attitude and the Arab attitude concerning the centrality of the Palestinian issue and as to the link between progress on the peace process and enhancing or upgrading relations with Israel. That doesn't mean, of course, that the EU would be against Arab states' gestures or even meaningful steps toward normalization. What I mean is that I haven't seen an EU effort to push to decouple the link.

Examples of the EU attitude could be found as early as when the European Community began in the European political process in the late 1960s and early 1970s. More recently, putting a real effort toward this rather ambitious goal was something said to be behind the launching of the Barcelona Process back in November 1995, which was not meant to substitute the peace process but to complement it.

The Europeans discovered that any progress on non-conflict related issues was taken hostage by the Palestinian issue, with the EU unable or unwilling to do something to stop the Arab states from undermining the process--which I found unfortunate, as did many Europeans. EU-Israel relations have also to a large extent been driven by progress in the political process and Israeli behavior. When Israel behaved on the Palestinian issue in a manner pleasing to the EU, it was rewarded; whenever the EU was frustrated by the Israel policies, it was reprimanded by an unbalanced megaphone diplomacy and by suspending previous decisions to upgrade EU-Israel relations.

The most recent example was statements made by unnamed EU foreign ministers and a public statement by Commissioner Frau Waldner, when following the Gaza operation she called for freezing relations with Israel--as if the EU were doing Israel a favor by upgrading the strategic dialogue with us. So, before turning to the Arabs and asking them to take steps that would enable us to reciprocate, it would be helpful if the EU would not subject political relations with Israel solely to its behavior on the Palestinian issue.

As a strategic partner, we are entitled to a balanced attitude. Before addressing the steps that the EU could take, let me say, that the Arab perception of the EU is of an entity lacking...

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES*

Zvi Rafiah is a consultant to major Israeli industries and a frequent commentator on Israeli radio and television on the U.S. domestic scene and U.S.-Israel relations.He served 21 years in the Israeli diplomatic service, ending his career as minister-counselor at the Israeli embassy in Washington (1973-1979).

Shimon Stein is the former Israeli ambassador to Germany. From October 2007, he has been on a leave of absence from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is working as an international consultant, as well as holding lectures and publishing articles in the German press.

Ruprecht Polenz is Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the German Bundestag (tbc).
MERIA Journal Staff

Publisher and Editor: Prof. Barry Rubin
Assistant Editors: Yeru Aharoni, Anna Melman.
MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary University.
Site: http://www.gloria-center.org/ - Email: info@gloria-center.org

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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