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Introduction: Iran in China’s Strategic Calculus
There is a paucity of research on Sino-Iran relations in the international security literature, yet this relationship has important implications for East Asia and Middle East regional security. Historically, Sino-Iran relations span back thousands of years, and their modern partnership began in the 1970s, first with the Shah and then continuing with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, coupled with the Shah’s fear of Soviet misadventures in Iran and the Gulf, paved way for Sino-Iran rapprochement. This was further reinforced by their shared sense of history as great ancient empires that were humiliated by the West.[1] From 1858 to 1860, Russia seized large swaths of Siberia from China, while throughout the 1800s, European powers carved up China and Iran.[2] Currently, on a pragmatic level, China is paving a new energy silk road with Iran to meet its energy security-driven foreign policy goals and to hedge against U.S. domination over their energy supply in the Persian Gulf.
China’s Persian Gulf Strategy
In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and is now the second biggest energy consumer in the world, after the United States. However, China’s peer competitor, the United States, with its formidable naval power, controls sea lanes of communications (SLOC) for oil supplies that may be cut off over a potential Taiwan clash. As such, in 2000 a Chinese article in the influential Strategy and Management Journal recommended that China’s strategy in the Persian Gulf should be to align with Iran.[3] In the article, the author posits that since the United States already controls the west bank of the oil-rich Persian Gulf via its pro-American proxies (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states), the Gulf is in effect an “internal sea” for the United States, and challenges to that position are likely to fail. However, if China and Russia expand relations with Iran, they could maintain a “minimum balance” to thwart U.S. moves. Since securing oil imports from the Gulf requires both the U.S.-controlled west bank and the China/Russia-supported Iranian east bank, this axis would block U.S. efforts to impose oil embargoes against other countries. Should the United States and China ever have a military clash over Taiwan, the United States would not shut off China’s Gulf oil supplies since China, Russia, and Iran control the Gulf’s east bank.[4] Indeed, in 2001, China followed this strategic vision and formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with a Sino-Russia-Iran axis to counterbalance perceived U.S. hegemony.[5]
Iran-Iraq War
China’s Persian Gulf Strategy of aligning with Iran played out during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Similar to its current stance towards Iran, China maintained neutrality while voting against the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution for sanctions, stating that sanctions intensify conflicts. China also refused to move Resolution 552 (passed in 1984) that prevented attacks on neutral commerce in Persian Gulf to sanctions. Moreover, China supplied arms to Iran; in 1982, U.S. officials charged China and North Korea with supplying 40 percent of Iran’s arms, and by 1987 this figure had increased to 70 percent.[6] In 1986, Iran began attacking neutral Kuwaiti vessels. U.S. satellite imagery in 1987 indicated Iran was installing Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles along the Strait of Hormuz. The United States responded by reflagging Kuwaiti vessels, yet the United States and China almost went to war over Iran when in October 1987 a Silkworm struck a U.S. reflagged tanker. U.S. forces retaliated by striking and destroying an Iranian oil production platform in the Gulf, followed by another round of U.S.-Iran military conflict in April 1988, when a mine nearly sank a U.S. frigate. This was followed by subsequent attacks between Iran and the United States Navy. As tensions escalated, China became concerned about developing a negative perception that it was perpetuating the war by arms proliferation to Iran and by helping Iran to militarily challenge the United States.[7] Finally, the Sino-Iran fear of escalation into full war with the United States prompted Iran to accept Resolution 598 for ceasefire in July 1988. During this war, Iran perceived China to be a reliable partner, and thereafter China became a key interlocutor for Iran.
Nuclear Iran
China’s Persian Gulf strategy is continuing to be played out in the current stalemate over Iran’s illicit nuclear program. China is emerging as the key impediment to new UNSC sanctions, given its past history and its strategic interests in Iran. China signed a $40 billion deal in July 2009 to refine Iran’s oil,[8] and it surpassed the EU to become Iran’s number-one trading partner, with bilateral trade at $36.5 billion, in 2009 (compared with $35 billion for European states), mainly in the energy sector.[9] Some pundits expect that energy-hungry China would not support sanctions, whether to maintain their trade relations or for fear of Iranian retaliation by corking the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck; however, this appears to be a relatively minor concern to China. Although one-third of China’s oil imports flowing through the Hormuz seems to be a large figure, by disaggregating the data and looking at China’s overall energy mix, it can be seen that oil consists of only 20 percent of its total mix, while 70 percent of China’s economy is fuelled by its abundant domestic supply of coal (see Figure 1).[10] Thus, one-third of 20 percent yields just 6.6 percent of China’s total energy use coming through the Strait of Hormuz, a reason for Beijing’s reluctance to flag the Hormuz Strait as an issue.[11] Another reason is having Iran as a key node in the land-based energy silk road....
*Dr. Christina Y. Lin is a researcher with Jane’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Intelligence Centre (JCBRN) at IHS Jane’s and former director for China affairs in policy planning at the U.S. Department of Defense.
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