Doc's Talk: Hamas Outreach: Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood in Crisis

Wednesday, June 09, 2010

Hamas Outreach: Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood in Crisis

Cole Bunzel and David Schenker

Last month, a power struggle between rival factions in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) came to a head when the Hamas-aligned "hawks" attempted to install their preferred candidate as secretary-general of the organization's political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), over protests from the "doves." Reconciliation efforts have thus far failed, and it increasingly appears that Jordan's Islamists will emerge from this crisis divided and weakened. Although King Abdullah and others would no doubt welcome this outcome at first glance, the trend toward increased militancy among the Jordanian -- and Egyptian -- Muslim Brothers suggests that ideological contagion from Hamas continues to have an impact on the region's Islamists.

Background
The conflict between the doves (the more moderate, proregime Islamists of primarily East Bank origin) and hawks (their more hardline counterparts, mainly of West Bank origin) has been ongoing for some time. In recent years, and especially since Hamas's 2006 victory in Palestinian elections, the hawks have gained the upper hand within the Jordanian MB. Last month, however, the doves began to fight back.

On May 6, the MB's Shura council convened to nominate a new IAF secretary-general, choosing Zaki Bani Irsheid -- known for his close ties to Hamas -- over his dove rival, Salem Falahat, by two votes. Officially, the IAF's own Shura council elects the secretary-general, but by tradition the MB chooses the sole nominee for the IAF to rubber stamp. Yet during the IAF Shura council meeting two days later, the doves initiated a campaign to derail the MB council's decision, with some boycotting the session and the remainder reading a statement criticizing Bani Irsheid's nomination and demanding a completely separate and open election for the secretariat. The hawks pressed forward, however, and subsequently elected a new hawkish leadership for the council's permanent bureau, the administrative unit in charge of internal affairs within the party.

In the aftermath of the meeting -- and with Bani Irsheid's candidacy pending -- some IAF doves filed an official complaint with the Ministry of the Interior asserting illegal MB interference in the party's internal matters. MB spiritual guide and prominent hawk Hamam Said publicly denounced this gambit, describing the election result as "compulsory upon the members of [the MB]; none is permitted to contravene it."

Philosophical Differences
The controversy surrounding Bani Irsheid dates back to his first stint as IAF secretary-general in 2006, when he angered the doves by supporting the right of Hamas-affiliated Palestinians residing in the Gulf states to serve on the MB Shura council. The doves opposed the policy, and in May 2009, after three years of infighting, he was forced to resign.

In general, the doves are known for their commitment to the Islamist movement's exclusive Jordanian identity. They agreed with King Hussein's 1988 decision to sever ties with the West Bank, and with King Abdullah's 1999 decision to expel the Hamas leadership. Seeking a more transnational (i.e., Palestinian) and antimonarchy identity for the movement, the hawks opposed these decisions. Indeed, Supreme Guide Said has maintained that the monarchy is not Islamic, issuing an edict banning MB members from taking executive positions in government, which was once a routine occurrence.

Given this confrontational stance, it came as little surprise that the hawks elected Ali Abu al-Sukkar -- former head of Jordan's "Anti-Normalization [with Israel] Committee" -- as president of the IAF Shura council during last month's contested meeting. In this capacity, al-Sukkar convenes and directs all meetings of the IAF Shura council -- a major advantage for the hawks. Back in 2006, Abu al-Sukkar was jailed for attending the wake of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former head of al-Qaeda in Iraq and a sworn enemy of the Jordanian monarchy.

At the beginning of May, the dispute over the Jordanian MB's relationship with Hamas briefly seemed close to resolution, with Said indicating that his group would consent to end official Hamas representation -- in favor of an advisory role -- in the Shura council. But this concession clearly failed to resolve the central issue of Hamas's role in the organization. Not only did the hawks move to install Bani Irsheid, they reportedly brought senior Hamas official Ibrahim Ghosheh to the May 6 Shura council meeting.

By the end of May, the ten most prominent doves -- including current IAF secretary-general Ishaq Farhan -- threatened to resign from all leadership positions in both the MB and IAF unless Bani Irsheid's nomination was withdrawn. The hawks conceded to the request, and on May 29, the IAF Shura council reconvened to elect the party's internal leadership. At the meeting, Abu al-Sukkar was again confirmed as council leader, but the more controversial elections for secretary-general (the main leader of the party) and his deputies were postponed indefinitely.

Although Abu al-Sukkar touted the postponement as a conciliatory gesture, the doves were not convinced. For one thing, some press reports have suggested that Bani Irsheid's replacement nominee could be Murad al-Udayala, another prominent -- and polarizing -- hawk. Moreover, MB official Nabil al-Kofahi described the hawks' behavior during recent meetings as "alienating" and claimed that they violated their commitment to nominate only consensus candidates for top posts. Meanwhile, until elections are held for the new secretary-general, the Jordanian Islamist movement will remain in a state of limbo.

Implications for Amman and Washington
How the intra-Islamist power struggle plays out will depend, at least in part, on how the Jordanian government handles the crisis. Popular support for the hawks has grown in recent years, not only due to their embrace of Hamas, but also because of the regime's increasingly heavy-handed measures against Islamists after 2006." For example, in July 2007, the IAF withdrew from Jordanian municipal elections alleging massive government fraud. Then, in November of that year, a divided IAF suffered a stunning setback in national elections, leading it to cry foul again -- a claim bolstered by some credible exit polling suggesting irregularities. More recently, government arrest and torture campaigns against Islamists led Freedom House to downgrade the kingdom's 2009 rating from "partially free" to "not free."

Today, regime repression appears to be contributing to growing support for a more confrontational stance in the MB. Given the current environment, however, even the doves could decide to boycott this year's parliamentary elections, marginalizing the kingdom's only coherent political opposition.

For Amman, the Islamist split will be seen as good news. For its part, Washington should be watching these internal developments carefully rather than simply celebrating. It's possible that Jordan's situation may serve as a barometer of things to come in Egypt, where the MB has also recently split along ideological lines -- instigated in part by the government -- with the hawks seemingly emerging on top. Although the particulars differ in Cairo and Amman, one factor is constant: traditional Islamists in states bordering the Palestinian Authority are contending with a virulent challenge from a more militant form of Islamism.

For the United States, neither the hawks nor doves are particularly appealing: both factions, for example, call on King Abdullah to abrogate its peace treaty with Israel. But if Jordan's Islamist opposition is decimated, some analysts believe that more militant and nihilistic Islamists -- such as al-Qaeda and Hizb al-Tahrir -- will be the beneficiaries. Although this proposition remains untested, coping with increasingly disaffected and Hamas-aligned Islamists will remain a challenge for both Jordan and Egypt.

Cole Bunzel is a research assistant at The Washington Institute. David Schenker is the Institute's Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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