Tuesday, June 01, 2010

Predictable Israeli fiasco

Avi Trengo calls for Barak’s dismissal over miserable handling of Gaza-bound flotilla

Avi Trengo

05.31.10, 18:05 / Israel Opinion

The Gaza-bound protestors would not dare behave that way vis-à-vis the Turkish, American, or even Italian Navy. Despite Israel’s immense power, the Jewish State repeatedly finds itself in situations where it refrains from using its force wisely.


In a previous article, I urged Defense Minister Ehud Barak to weigh his steps carefully and utilize the Gaza flotilla in order to secure a diplomatic achievement: End what is mistakenly referred to as “the Israeli occupation of Gaza.” However, Barak was too arrogant. He thought he could have the cake and eat it too, thereby ordering the IDF to adopt an impossible policy: Stopping the flotilla using force, while doing it without using force. We see the result before us now. So how would any other navy enforce a naval blockade? First, a clear warning in English: Turn back or we shall fire. Next, A shot across the bow – a last warning to show the seriousness of our intentions. Finally, firing at the vessel’s propeller, in a bid to paralyze the ship’s sailing and steering capabilities.



Only then, and only after allowing the ship to be tossed from side to side under the sun, the time would come for taking over the vessel using massive force: Clearing away the decks using water hoses, splashing oil on its windows, ramming into the vessel, and finally staging the takeover.



This is how any self-respecting Navy would conduct itself. However, there is only one problem here: The utilization of force and fire, which is precisely what Barak wanted to avoid. He feared the images, and therefore ordered the takeover to get underway at early morning hours, much before the ships crossed into Gaza’s territorial waters.


What did you expect, Barak?

The approach chosen by Barak is weak and conveys a sense of a weakness. This was the case in previous military clashes, for example, during the period of time ahead of Operation Cast Lead. Barak threatened to seal off the Gaza Crossings, but opened them a day later.



Israel needs a defense minister who can decide when to use force and when not to use it. Israel needs a defense minister who would order the army to use the kind of force that conveys deterrence. It makes no sense to send Navy commandoes to carry out such operation – this is not the mission they were trained for.



When Israel conveys a sense of weakness is it any wonder that a mob would charge at a commando and attempt to lynch him? What were you expecting, Barak? What kind of impossible mission did you send these troops to carry out?



In the face of this weakness, various organizations are daring to rise up against Israel at this time. The continuation of the Barak policy invites provocations on the part of Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and even Arab Israelis. What exactly will Barak do if the next aid mission to Gaza is accompanied by the Turkish Navy? Will Barak launch a war against Turkey? We already know the answer.


Recipe for regional disaster

The result of using force in the wrong case and to the wrong extent and the outcome of ordering soldiers to conduct themselves “sensitively” create the complete opposite – Israel loses its deterrent power, Israeli troops are perceived as weak, and when they encounter real distress the immediate response is the utilization of violence that makes us look very bad.



Yet what looks like Israeli brutality and stupidity has strategic implications: It creates a situation whereby Israel would not be able to use its force effectively. In the long run, it’s a recipe for regional disaster.



Yet Barak is not the only guilty party. We also have a confused Israeli government (thanks to Netanyahu) and the sense within the Arab world that the US is abandoning Israel (thanks to Obama.) Those who wish to fully grasp the implication of such dangerous combination can look at what happened at sea this morning. And this is merely the preview.





However, it’s not too late yet. Netanyahu can announce the immediate dismissal of Ehud Barak. He is at fault for the incident. Netanyahu can also announce a change in Barak’s policy of a Gaza blockade: A final and real disengagement from the Gaza Strip. If Egypt wishes to impose a siege on Gaza, it’s not Israel’s business.



Just like we do not impose a blockade on Syria or on Lebanon, we shall know where the limits of our power lie, and when we choose to use it, we won’t do it with one hand tied behind our back. Meanwhile, it would also be good to make President Obama aware of where his policy is leading to.



From: Paul Vallely [mailto:standupamericaceo@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 3:28 PM
To: 'NNN'
Cc: 'Scott Winchell'; 'Thomas Smith Jr.'; Thomas G McInerney; 'Bob Rohrer'; 'Col Wayne Morris USMC (Ret)'
Subject: FW: Why was Israeli raider force unprepared for violent resistance?



Come on Israel….You can do better than this regarding a special ops raid…Just between us…..You always must plan for a worst case scenario.



Paul E. Vallely

Chairman - Stand Up America USA

www.standupamericaus.com

www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

www.veterandefenders.org

E-Mail: standupamericaceo@gmail.com

Fax: 406 837 0996



From: CapitalNet@aol.com [mailto:CapitalNet@aol.com]
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 3:53 PM
To: capitalnet@aol.com
Subject: Why was Israeli raider force unprepared for violent resistance?



Why was Israeli raider force unprepared for violent resistance?
DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis May 31, 2010, 11:33 PM (GMT+02:00)



Turkish activists were fully prepared, Israel troops not

More questions than answers came from the IDF video shots of the violent reception for Israeli naval commandos when they raided the Turkish ship early Monday, May 31 to prevent the pro-Palestinian flotilla from reaching Gaza Port and breaking the Israeli blockade on the Hamas-ruled territory.
Prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who cancelled his trip to the United States and is flying straight home from Canada, will have to fill in the gaps left by his official spokesmen.
Released finally 12 hours after the event, the IDF shots failed to explain the big mystery of how soldiers armed with paint balls and pistols managed to kill 9 pro-Palestinian activists (Ankara claims 15 Turkish dead) and injure at least 34 aboard the Turkish Marmora.

Together with six injured soldiers - two in critical condition - the wounded activists are being treated in Israeli hospitals.
Israel's chief of staff Lt. Gen. Gaby Ashkenazi, and Navy commander, Maj. Gen. Eliezer Marom, reported that a fierce clash developed aboard the ship as the soldiers dropped on deck from helicopters and were mobbed by passengers. The activists fired pistols, but it is not clear if the guns were in the peace activists' luggage or snatched from the soldiers.
Neither is it clear how civilian protesters were able to disarm elite fighters of the Navy's Shayetet 6 unit.
The soldiers performed their mission of preventing the flotilla from docking in Gaza Port and opening the door to large-scale weapons deliveries - but at what cost?

Surely the operation's planners must have taken into account that the 600 mixed nationals aboard the Turkish vessel, the hard core of international Palestinian agitprop against Israel, would not receive the soldiers with flowers and white flags, any more than the demonstrators at Iblin and Naalin hand out to the Israeli Border Police breaking up their riots week after week.
The Border Police was bettered qualified to handle themselves against the arsenal the activists aboard the Turkish vessel used against the navy men, of firebombs, stun grenades, broken glass, slingshot, iron bars, axes and knives - and with far less risk of loss of life.
Also underestimated was the number of troops needed to commandeer the Turkish ship, control the wheelhouse and turn it round to Ashdod port. Each commando who shinnied down the ladder from a helicopter was besieged and separated from the unit, then beaten, stabbed and assaulted with flying objects. Some were pushed down into the hold and stripped of their anti-flak vests first. The soldiers reported they barely escaped lynching or possibly being taken hostage.
Any Israeli police officer dealing with Palestinian rioters knows that the first rule is never to get separated from the main force. The Shayatet 6 elite troops lacked this experience.
This error was compounded by the planners seriously underestimating expected resistance and sending the men in armed only with paintballs and pistols with orders to shoot only if their lives were at risk. They did open fire, but only after half a dozen of their number were badly hurt.
The entire episode bespeaks faulty intelligence on what was going on aboard the six vessels bound for Gaza, although the information was available from daily live broadcasts and easy access to visitors.
And another question: The IDF is famous for its innovative electronic warfare capabilities. So why were the signals and images coming from the convoy not jammed as promised and allowed to reach world TV screens hours before the authorities responsible for Israeli information woke up?
And finally, why did the interception take place 80 miles out to sea in international waters, thereby fueling the complaint that Israel broke international law? The blockade zone is 20 nautical miles deep from Gaza. An Israeli raid at that limit would have been easier to justify.

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