Thursday, January 20, 2011

Lebanon in Crisis


Stratfor

Summary

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal announced Jan. 19 that the Saudi kingdom is withdrawing from its mediation efforts in Lebanon, leading many to believe that civil war is on the horizon. Saudi Arabia is facing an immense challenge in trying to both work out an understanding with Syria and place limits on Iran’s presence in the Levant, but Riyadh is not abandoning its strategic position in Lebanon. The fate of Lebanon’s stability comes down to an understanding, however temporary, between Syria and Saudi Arabia, with Syria holding the upper hand. Analysis

Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri spoke on the telephone the evening of Jan. 19 with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal after the foreign minister said on Al-Arabiya television that the Saudi kingdom had abandoned its mediation efforts in Lebanon. Al-Faisal said the situation in Lebanon was “dangerous” and warned that “if the situation reaches separation or partition of Lebanon, this means the end of Lebanon as a state that has this model of peaceful cohabitation between religions and ethnicities and different groups.” The Saudi statement follows the Jan. 17 delivery of the first indictment (likely incriminating Hezbollah) to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri.

The media largely have interpreted al-Faisal’s statements as Saudi Arabia abandoning its allies in Lebanon, leaving the fractious country to be dominated exclusively by Iran and Syria and dooming the country to civil war. However, this is an inaccurate reading of the situation. As it tries to contain Iran’s spreading influence in the region, Saudi Arabia remains heavily invested in Lebanon, a traditional proxy battleground for influence between Riyadh and Tehran. The challenge Saudi Arabia (and by extension, the United States) faces is how to shape Syria’s position in Lebanon so that it effectively limits Iranian leverage in the Levant and contains Hezbollah (and thus Iran) in the process. Syria, unwilling to sign onto all of Riyadh’s terms, has the upper hand, as it could use Hezbollah to threaten a crisis in Lebanon if its demands go unanswered. Yet there are still very real constraints on Hezbollah’s ability to ignite a civil war in the country.

Saudi-Syrian Talks

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia and Syria were engaged in negotiations, dubbed the Saudi-Syria initiative, designed to facilitate and recognize Syria’s reclaimed hegemonic position in Lebanon while limiting Hezbollah as a proxy force for Iran. Those negotiations, while extremely trying, reached a pivotal point in July 2010 when Saudi King Abdullah and Syrian President Bashar al Assad visited Lebanon together — a deliberate display of Saudi approval of Syria’s return to Lebanon. Tensions between Syria and Iran naturally escalated as a result, but Syria mitigated Iranian and Hezbollah blowback to this diplomatic initiative by assuring its Iranian allies that Hezbollah would remain intact in Lebanon and by quietly supporting Iranian interests in Iraq.

Syria’s intention was not only to dominate Lebanon but also to strategically position itself in the region to negotiate a strategic rapprochement with the United States. As long as Iran held a large stake in a country where Syria wielded significant influence, Damascus theoretically could be assured that Washington would ask it for help in containing Iran and its militant proxy allies. From Syria’s perspective, the Saudi-Syria initiative for Lebanon was the first step in this broader diplomatic process envisioned by Damascus.

The process broke down, however, when Saudi Arabia (allegedly influenced by a number of U.S. intelligence reports on Syrian intentions for Lebanon) came to realize that Syria was attempting to excise Saudi influence in Lebanon altogether while giving quiet assurances to Iran. A Saudi diplomatic source explained to STRATFOR that Riyadh could not tolerate the Syrian government’s attempts to replace al-Hariri’s political and security team with its own loyalists through the issuance of arrest warrants in connection with the so-called false witnesses in the al-Hariri assassination probe. Syria and Hezbollah claimed that several witnesses interviewed in the investigation produced false testimony implicating Hezbollah and Syrian officials. Syria then used this claim as justification to demand their arrests and removal. The same source also said the Saudis are frustrated with the double game Syria allegedly played in Iraq, where Damascus overtly supported (Saudi-backed) Iyad Allawi’s prime ministerial candidacy, in support of Iraq’s Sunni faction, while (according to the source) colluding with Iran to undercut Allawi and improve Nouri al-Maliki’s chances of running the new government. In short, numerous Saudi leaders (most notably Saudi Prince Bandar) argued that the Syrian president could not be trusted in this Lebanon initiative and thus (along with the United States) instructed al-Hariri to reject Syria’s and Hezbollah’s terms regarding the false witnesses, the impending indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the al-Hariri murder and the overall makeup of the Lebanese government.

Syria’s response was the Jan. 13 collapse of the Lebanese government. According to STRATFOR sources in Syria and Lebanon, the decision for 11 ministers representing the Hezbollah-led March 8 Coalition to resign their Cabinet positions and drive al-Hariri out of office was engineered in Damascus. The move likely was made in coordination with the Iranians. Not only does Iran have an interest in derailing the Saudi-Syrian initiative in order to retain its stake in Lebanon, it also would not mind a distracting crisis in the run up to its own negotiations with the P-5+1 group slated to take place Jan. 21-22 in Istanbul.

A New Lebanese Civil War?

With Lebanon’s stability hanging in the balance, speculation is rampant over whether the country will again descend into civil war. Several factors could escalate tensions further, but there are also several critical arrestors to keep in mind.

The first is that Saudi Arabia has not given up on Lebanon, despite various interpretations of al-Faisal’s statements. Saudi Arabia has a stake in containing Iranian influence in the region, and Lebanon remains a key battleground in this affair.

The second is that Syria has already made its big move in the collapse of the Lebanese government. In traditional Damascene mercantilist bargaining mentality, the Syrian government is now watching and waiting for the Saudi royals to return to the negotiating table, with the threat of civil war ignited by Hezbollah being carefully mentioned as a reminder of the consequences of allowing this crisis to fester. Syria still has an interest in keeping Hezbollah contained overall and in demonstrating its control over Hezbollah. A meeting between al Assad and Lebanese army commander Gen. Jean Qahwaji on Jan. 18 in Damascus was a deliberate public signal from Syria that Damascus is working with the army to keep the situation under control.

The third is that Hezbollah itself faces real constraints in trying to instigate widespread sectarian strife in Lebanon. The organization remains vulnerable to the Syrian intelligence apparatus’s pervasive presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah is also wary of creating a situation in Lebanon that spirals out of control and gives Syria an excuse to militarily intervene in Lebanon and thus place even greater limits on the militant group.

Several STRATFOR sources in Lebanon have reported that Hezbollah activists are deliberately planting rumors threatening a protracted conflict. Many families are keeping their children at home from school and are refraining from nonessential activity as a result, with pressure growing on the regional powers to work out a solution to this crisis. This apparent campaign to organize street rallies and spread rumors seems to be more indicative of Hezbollah’s unpreparedness to resort to wide-scale violence than a sign of imminent action. Still, the organization is taking care to publicize its preparations for a worst-case scenario, with reports leaking out about Hezbollah military drills and indicating potential targets at vital highways, seaports, airports and U.N. institutions.

Meanwhile, quiet negotiations likely will resume between Syria and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to prevent a larger conflagration. So far, one indictment has been issued to The Hague, but with Syria holding more leverage in these talks and the Lebanese government now in a state of collapse, the two sides can once again debate the indictments while Syria bargains to reshape the Lebanese government in its favor. Turkey and Qatar are also seizing a public relations opportunity by entering the fray and attempting to mediate a resolution, but the influence of these countries is still limited in Lebanese affairs. This is a negotiation that still comes down to Syria and Saudi Arabia, with Syria holding the upper hand.

Lebanon is a fractious country with a violent history. With so many variables and players involved, a protracted conflict cannot be ruled out. At the same time, these factors have also made Lebanon well-versed in accommodationist politics. A resolution, however temporary, to the current crisis is not out of sight yet.

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