Doc's Talk: Samaria’s Strategic Value

Monday, January 03, 2011

Samaria’s Strategic Value

Jamie Glasov

Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Michael Gottlieb, an oleh (immigrant) from the US who is a man on a mission. After moving from New York’s suburbia to Israel’s bucolic Samarian (Shomron) heartland region, he has joined the battle to save the Land of Israel in general and the Shomron in particular. His weapon of choice: his Shomron Central blog.

FP: Michael Gottlieb, welcome back to Frontpage Interview. It was a pleasure to speak with you in our previous two interviews. (Part I, click here, Part II, click here)

Gottlieb: Thanks, Jamie.

FP: Your blog’s lead-off page explores the immense strategic value of the Samarian mountain range to Israel and her citizens. Share with us its main points and arguments. Gottlieb: Its main points are the advantages to Israel of Samaria’s strategic heights, territorial depth and airspace, without which her borders would be indefensible.

Samaria straddles Israel’s Central Mountain ridge, running north-south for 70 kilometers right down the middle of the country. This ridge runs parallel to that part of the coastal plain which is the most heavily populated, including the Tel Aviv Metropolitan Area. It is staggering to think that the western side of this ridge dominates a section of the coastal plain that is home to 70% of Israel’s population and 80% of its industry and infrastructure, not to mention numerous military installations, most major traffic arteries and its sole international airport. Were an enemy to control the Samarian heights, Israel could be shut down overnight. Moreover, the eastern side of the ridge overlooks and controls the strategic Jordan Valley, widely considered essential to Israel’s security.

People don’t realize that pre-1967 Israel, without Samaria, is just 15 km wide at its narrowest point. An enemy tank can traverse that in under 18 minutes. That’s not a defensible border. Once that weak link is broken, Israel is cut in half. Samaria serves as a buffer to the country’s nerve centers along the coast to the west and provides territorial contiguity with the Jordan Valley to the east. Its depth provides Israel with the crucial reaction time needed to mobilize forces and repel a ground invasion. It also allows her to deploy her air defense systems from forward positions along the Samarian hilltops and not from the crowded coastal plain. Short-range radar and early-warning systems positioned on the plain would have their line-of-sight blocked by the mountain ridge.

The airspace overhead is no less crucial to Israel’s security. It takes just three and a half minutes for an enemy fighter bomber to cross over the Jordan River and reach the Mediterranean. Under two minutes to reach Jerusalem. Without Samaria, Israel would lack the minimum reaction time needed to intercept enemy aircraft or deploy anti-aircraft missiles. Without this airspace, she would be defenseless.

FP: Would trading the strategic high ground of Judea and Samaria for some kind of “peace deal” in the future ever be worth Israel’s risk?

Gottlieb: That all depends on what kind of peace deal you mean. While it is theoretically possible for Israel to get the kind of deal it needs to safely and permanently decouple from Judea and Samaria, I doubt that will happen in our lifetimes, if ever. There isn’t a shred of evidence to suggest that such a deal is likely to materialize. The Arabs won’t compromise; their intransigence is legendary. And the gap between what could be an acceptable deal and what’s possible today is vast and growing. The Palestinians’ best offer is so far from one that Israel can afford to accept, that the odds of a mutually acceptable, successful and lasting peace deal is virtually nil. The Two State Solution has hit a dead-end.

In light of this, Israel must get off the fence and make some tough decisions now. She could capitulate and withdraw to the Green Line, but then the resultant Palestinian state would be final and irreversible. An ensuing state of war would be inevitable. Or Israel can assert full control over Judea and Samaria, undo past mistakes and keep open all her options. The latter is a lot less risky.

In any case, one thing is for sure: peace deals and regimes are transient. They can be abrogated and toppled. The strategic high ground, however, is forever and unchanging; it will always protect its possessor.

FP: You refer to the “Mountain Ridge Shield”. What is that?

Gottlieb: The Samarian mountain ridge dominates Israel’s western and eastern flank. Israeli control over the western slope provides a protective shield for the country’s major transportation arteries in the exposed coastal strip to the west. This is crucial during a wartime mobilization. Three-quarters of the Israel Defense Forces are reservists who need quick, unfettered access to the roadways during a call-up. Materiel must also be moved quickly from various points throughout the country to the fronts. An enemy presence on these heights will disrupt and delay a mobilization. But that won’t happen if Israel controls the Samarian heights.

The mountain ridge is also the world’s most effective natural tank barrier. Its steep, 1200 meter high eastern slope overlooks the Jordan Valley depression and is virtually impenetrable. There are only five east-west crossings over the length of the entire ridge. Strategically positioned at these crossings, Israel can block a large easterly invasion with a relatively small force, buying herself valuable time to mobilize.

There’s a lot of misinformation going around regarding this issue. Two-state solution advocates claim that Israel can afford to relinquish control of their Judean and Samarian land assets. Their rationalization is that the high ground is less relevant in today’s age of ballistic missiles and sophisticated weaponry. I disagree. In fact, just the opposite is true. The more advanced and destructive the Arabs’ weapons become, the quicker Israel needs to mobilize. That can’t happen if the enemy is disrupting Israel’s transportation network from the Samarian heights. Also, while missiles do destroy, it’s the tanks and troops that conquer and occupy. To defeat an enemy, there is still no substitute for a ground invasion, as was borne out by the 2002 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq campaigns. Israel’s control of Samaria will deter such an invasion.

Remember, the next Mideast war will likely be multi-frontal. Israel’s control of the high ground will greatly improve her odds of repelling an invasion and that will free up the army to deal with the other fronts. Without the Mountain Ridge Shield, Israel’s would be defenseless.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk