Jonathan Spyer *
The U.S. diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks include a considerable number of communications by American diplomats stationed in Israel, and an even larger number dealing with Middle Eastern issues of direct relevance and interest to Jerusalem. In a few cases, the revelations are of genuine and deep significance, offering a real addition to the understanding of the political and strategic processes in Israel and the broader Middle East. This article considers the cables directly focusing on Israel and the discussion they have provoked both in Israel and internationally.
The U.S. diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks include a considerable number of communications by American diplomats stationed in Israel, and an even larger number dealing with Middle Eastern issues of direct relevance and interest to Jerusalem. In a few cases, the revelations are of genuine and deep significance, offering a real addition to the understanding of political and strategic processes in Israel and the broader Middle East. This article considers the cables directly focusing on Israel and the discussion they have provoked both in Israel and internationally. It should be borne in mind throughout that the cables are not a gateway to the unchallengeable “truth” regarding regional processes. Nor do they represent the totality of possible interactions between the countries concerned, nor the highest possible level. Direct contacts between heads of state, the level at which key strategic decisions are likely to take place, will not be recorded in the reporting of U.S. diplomats back to the State Department in Washington. Still, the cables represent insight into the nature of U.S. reporting from the region, and some contain new information and evidence of real significance.
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTIANS
Surprisingly few of the cables released so far have focused directly on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. A number of cables do, however, depict the importance Arab leaders attach to a solution of the conflict. An article by Matt Duss provides examples of cables in which Arab leaders directly related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.[1] Yet it is worth noting that four out of the six articles cited herein in fact discuss the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of a discussion on Iran and how to counter Iranian efforts to build its regional influence. A considerable number of cables, however, focus on the Hamas enclave in Gaza and its relations with Israel. In this regard, the cables have yielded nothing truly ground-breaking, but help cast further light on processes that had previously received little media coverage.
Among the most important revelations to have emerged from the leaks is the fact that Israel sought to coordinate its far reaching military operation in Gaza in late 2008 with both Egypt and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority. In a confidential telegram sent from Tel Aviv, then Deputy U.S. Ambassador Luis Moreno noted that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak told a visiting congressional delegation that Israel had asked both Egypt and the PA if they would be willing to take control of the Gaza Strip once Hamas was defeated. Barak noted that both had declined. PA officials denied this version of events.
An additional cable quoted Shabak (Israel’s security agency) head Yuval Diskin as saying that in 2007 Fatah had asked for Israel's help in countering the growing strength of Hamas. Diskin told U.S. officials, "They are approaching a zero-sum situation, and yet they ask us to attack Hamas…. They are desperate." He also praised his organization's "very good working relationship" with Mahmoud Abbas' security services, which involves substantial intelligence sharing.
An additional revelation concerned the issue of Iranian arms supplies to the Hamas enclave in Gaza. A cable dated January 22, 2009, contains details of a request from the U.S. government to Sudan to stop flights entering their country carrying Iranian military equipment bound for Hamas.[2] It was later reported that in January, Israeli aircraft mounted a long-range bombing mission against an arms convoy in Sudan's Red Sea province. A number of additional cables reveal evidence of Egyptian fears of smuggling into Gaza and the Iranian role in this. One such cable describes then-Egyptian President Husni Mubarak as possessing a visceral hatred for Iran because of its attempts to “destabilize Egypt and the region.”[3]
The cables indicate that at least some in Israel's security establishment did not view the prospect of a Hamas-ruled Gaza with unadulterated dread. One cable revealed details of a conversation between then-U.S. Ambassador Richard Jones and then-Military Intelligence Head Amos Yadlin. Yadlin argued that a Hamas takeover might have positive effects, since Israel would then be able to relate to Gaza as an unambiguously hostile entity. Yadlin also assumed that Israel would be able to deal successfully with a West Bank PA run by Fatah.
The cables also give some hint as to the measures Israel is taking in order to weaken the Hamas entity in Gaza. One cable noted a plan devised by Counterterrorism Bureau Chief Danny Arditi, according to which a new Palestinian intelligence monetary unit would be established to receive additional funding from the United States and the EU, while the amount of funds transferred monthly to the Gaza Strip would be downsized. Another noted Israeli intentions of keeping the Gazan economy under pressure, without ever causing its absolute collapse. The cable dealing with this issue, dated November 3, 2008 (i.e., immediately prior to Operation Cast Lead), defines the goal of the Israeli blockade as keeping the Gaza economy "at its lowest possible level without getting a humanitarian crisis." Of course, the blockade has since been substantially eased.
Additional cables point to what is apparently an accusation of corruption at the Karni Crossing into Gaza in the period prior to Hamas’ seizure of power in the Strip. According to a cable published by the Norwegian Aftenposten newspaper, the United States had serious concerns that Israeli officials were asking U.S. distributors “special fees” at the crossing to pay in order to be permitted to take merchandise into the Strip. A cable authored by then-U.S. Ambassador to Israel Richard Jones maintained that U.S. businessmen were asked to pay more than $3,000 to transfer merchandise into the Gaza Strip. These “special fees,” according to Jones, constituted as much as 75 times the standard processing fee as quoted by Israeli government officials. According to the document, the individuals seeking the bribes were not Israeli officials, but rather were representatives of “companies working as middlemen for military and civilian officials at the terminal.”
ISRAEL, IRAN, AND HIZBALLAH
A number of cables focus on Israeli policy vis-à-vis Iran, and some new details have been made available. It has of course been widely noted that one of the most significant aspects of the Wikileaks cables was the very large amount of evidence yielded regarding the deep concerns felt by Saudi Arabia and a number of Gulf Arab countries toward Iran and its regional ambitions.
Many Israeli commentators and officials have seen the cables showing regional concerns regarding Iran as offering a certain vindication of the Israeli stance on the region, which locates the Iranian threat as the central dynamic of the Middle East. Following the release of the first cables, one Israeli columnist, Sever Plocker, wrote, “If WikiLeaks didn't exist, Israel would have had to invent it." Plocker specifically focused on what he regarded as the gap between the public pronouncements of Arab leaders, which more often than not highlighted criticism of Israel, and the discussions revealed in the cables, in which Iran was the focal point...
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