Doc's Talk: The Declaration of Palestinian Statehood: An Unparalleled Political Opportunity?

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

The Declaration of Palestinian Statehood: An Unparalleled Political Opportunity?

Reut Institute

Executive Summary
1. This paper offers a framework for an Israeli political initiative on the Palestinian unilateral motion to get United Nations recognition of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an independent state (hereinafter "recognition of a Palestinian state") and to accept the Palestinian entity as a full member state of the UN. Israel should seize the Palestinian campaign as an opportunity to:
 Enter into negotiations with the U.S. and the international community regarding the terms upon which the UN Security Council (UNSC) recognizes the Palestinian state.If Israeli prerequisites are met, it would also be able to recognize the Palestinian state, and to turn the Palestinian plan, which seems to have aimed primarily at embarrassing Israel, into a transformative breakthrough;
 Shape "the day after" UN recognition of a Palestinian state, emphasizing that the Palestinian entity then constitutes the sole legal and political Palestinian representation of its citizens and residents, entailing inherent rights, duties, and responsibilities that are clear and bound by international law.
2. The principal potential benefits of such Israeli initiative are:
 Anchoring the principle of 'two-states-for-two-peoples,' which strengthens the recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people; guaranteeing security interests; diluting Palestinian refugee issue; breaking the deadlock in the negotiations; fortifying the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel; and improving relations with the U.S.;
 Positioning Israel as an asset to its allies, rather than a liability, against the backdrop of regional instability and uncertainty; rising tensions between Israel and Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan; and the U.S. administration's frustration with its failure to achieve significant progress in the Israeli- Palestinian political process;
 Lowering the prospects of confrontation between the IDF and the Palestinian population that may escalate into a strategic upset for Israel, as a result of a combination of lack of unity in Israel and the Jewish world behind the government‟s policies, high regional turbulence, and rising tensions with the Israeli Arab citizens and Bedouin populations;
The detrimental effects of such confrontation could be significant and long lasting, and include an escalation of the assault on Israel's legitimacy; a rift between Israel and the Jewish World; a crisis between the Government of Israel (GOI) and the U.S. administration; considerable constraints on Israel's ability to use its military force for self-defense; a domestic crisis in

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Israeli society within the Jewish population and with Israel's Arab and Bedouin citizens; and the dissolution of the PA and the paradigm of 'two- states-for-two-peoples.' These potential effects are distinct from, but may aggravate, the ongoing enmity with Iran, Hezbollah, and others. Thus, Israel may be walking into a political collision, which will at first seem a local and containable conflict against a relatively weak and unorganized opponent, but can in practice develop into a strategic setback.
3. These potential benefits are conditioned upon the consolidation of a political deal, which will enable Israel to waive its rejection of the recognition of the Palestinian state in the UNSC and of its reception as a full-fledged UN member state. This deal must be based on close coordination with the leading countries, primarily with the U.S. and ideally also with the Palestinians, on the essence and language of the UNSC resolution. Such a deal would enable the U.S. not to exercise its veto power.
4. The proposed political initiative of Israel is based on the following principles:
a. The Palestinian state will be established and recognized by the world, including by the U.S. and Israel, and accepted as a full member state of the UN, which requires a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR);
b. The principle of 'two-states-for-two-peoples' will be anchored by the UNSCR and would clearly refer to the „Jewish state‟ or „nation-state of the Jewish people‟ parallel to the „Arab / Palestinian state,‟ or, at the minimum, to the principle of 'two-states-for-two-peoples';
c. The Palestinian state will inherit the PA, with all the powers and authorities accorded it in the Oslo accords and subsequent agreements. The Gaza Strip is part of the Palestinian state, but recognition of the Hamas regime would be conditional upon its fulfillment of the Quartet's demands and resumption of participation as an integral part of the Palestinian state;
d. Attributes of sovereignty of the Palestinian state will be upgraded, except from outstanding issues that have been agreed to be negotiated. For example, the Palestinian state could issue its own currency and conduct international trade agreements, but its final borders and security arrangements with Israel would be negotiated on a state-to-state basis in the future (see below);
e. Borders and territories: The initial territory of the Palestinian state would be that of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, and its permanent borders would be determined in negotiations. The illegitimate Hamas regime in Gaza would not be recognized by Israel and the international community. The U.S. could note the Palestinian demand for borders based on the June 4th 1967 Lines, which it has already done;
f. Security arrangements: The U.S. would guarantee to Israel that in Permanent Status, agreed-upon security arrangements – primarily on the perimeter of the West Bank, in coordination with Jordan, and on the territories of the Palestinian state – would be established. Gaza would not be

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connected to the West Bank through a safe passage until similar arrangements are established on its border with Egypt;
g. Self-defense and legal defense: Israel's right to defend itself from any threat emanating from the Palestinian territory would be recognized, as would the legitimacy of Israel‟s judicial system to oversee its actions so as to validate the Complementarily Principle that protects from prosecution and procedures in international tribunals;
h. Representation: The Palestinian state would exclusively represent its Palestinian citizens, and would bear responsibility and be accountable for everything that happens in its territory according to international law. Israel and the Palestinians would establish mutual reciprocal diplomatic missions in Ramallah and Tel Aviv; all countries would be invited to establish an embassy to the Palestinian state in Ramallah, and their Jerusalem consulates would cease to cover the West Bank and Gaza; and Palestinian embassies around the world would serve the Palestinian state instead of the PLO;
i. Elections in the Palestinian state: The Palestinians would conduct elections in the West Bank (and in Gaza if possible) in order to establish a Palestinian leadership that legitimately represents its citizens and residents;
j. Resumption of the political process on a state-to-state basis, while focusing on issues under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian state, such as borders, security, economy, trade, environment, and even management of the Jerusalem area. The 'historic issues' that emanate from 1948, or issues that are resonant for the entire Palestinian people (for example, the refugee issue or the holy sites in Jerusalem), would be negotiated only at a later stage, and following the resolution of the crisis of Palestinian representation (see below);
k. Release of Palestinian prisoners to the West Bank as a goodwill gesture.
5. An Israeli initiative may generate additional benefits:
a. Diluting the refugee issue: Palestinian refugees would be able to return to the Palestinian state (subject to Israeli specific security considerations). Israel could press for the cessation of the UNWRA presence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the transfer of its responsibilities to the Palestinian government. In addition, Israel could campaign to change the reality in which certain individuals are both Palestinian refugees and citizens of third countries;
b. Receiving a unique and tailored security package from the U.S. that would guarantee Israel's capacities to confront future challenges arising from the Palestinian state and the dramatic changes in the Middle East. Examples include building a security fence along Israel's border with Egypt and Jordan, or acquiring Iron Dome systems to protect Israel's urban center;

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c. Releasing Jonathan Pollard: An Israeli political initiative that spares the U.S. from using its veto power may lead to mutual goodwill that would pave the way for the release of Jonathan Pollard.
6. Now is the ideal time to launch such an Israeli initiative for the following reasons: (a) Israel may fail to circumvent the Palestinian bid for statehood, and experience a diplomatic defeat in the UN that will embarrass its allies and primarily the U.S.; (b) An Israeli political initiative that accepts Palestinian statehood places the 'burden of proof' on the Palestinians to meet Israel‟s concerns; (c) The assembling of the General Assembly (GA) creates an opportunity for intensive dialogue between Israel and the world's leaders; (d) Such a political initiative could not have been launched earlier given that the Palestinian's guiding logic in this campaign is confrontational, i.e. had Israel supported it, the Palestinians would have probably withdrawn from it.
Introduction
7. This month, the Palestinian leadership is planning to request UN recognition of a Palestinian state and acceptance as full member state in the UN. At this point, the specific nature of the Palestinian motion is unclear, such as whether it will be presented to the General Assembly or also to the Security Council.1 In any case, it is already apparent that the Palestinians will enjoy the support of most countries.
8. The Palestinian campaign creates a dilemma for Israel: Despite Israel's support for the principle of 'two-states-for-two-peoples' that is based on creating a Palestinian state, it objects to UN recognition of a Palestinian state and is working to obstruct it.2 This stems from concerns of:
1
2
 A unilateral UN position on permanent status issues such as the 1967 borders;
 A narrowing of Israel's political and military room for maneuver in light of the inherent rights of the Palestinian state within its land, airspace, and maritime territory;
 The International Criminal Court in the Hague gaining jurisdiction over the Palestinian state's territory, which would influence the legal status of IDF soldiers and of settlements and settlers;
 Hamas taking over the Palestinian state;
The options that have been brought up as of late are an attempt to gain acceptance as a full member in the UN through the Security Council (which can be vetoed by any of the permanent members), to pass Security Council decisions that support an independent state but do not entail UN membership, to seek recognition of a Palestinian state from the General Assembly, to hold a special General Assembly conference using the pretext of Uniting for Peace, and to demand the implementation of Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan). Jerusalem Post, 6/12/11
See for example the plan the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to Israeli embassies abroad to obstruct the campaign for UN recognition of a Palestinian state. Haaretz, 6/10/11

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 A popular national Palestinian uprising that would directly confront the IDF under the inspiration of the Arab Spring;
 A collapse of the PA if the Palestinian campaign fails, which could bring about a renewal of full Israeli control over Palestinians in the West Bank;
 The establishment of a Palestinian state that does not recognize the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.
9. This contradiction stems from a clash between two logics:
 Israel’s security logic calls for staying in the West Bank – This logic stems from the concern that the West Bank would turn into hostile territory like Gaza, placing Israel‟s population centers under fire. Such a threat increases when the Palestinian state controls its airspace and borders. According to this logic, controlling and monitoring critical parts of the Palestinian territories are essential security needs;
 Israel’s political logic calls for withdrawing from the West Bank – This logic stems from the threat that Israel‟s continued control over the Palestinian population will become an unbearable political, diplomatic, and economic burden. Therefore, the continuation of Israel‟s control over the Palestinian population is a strategic threat.3
Indeed, in the past fifteen years, Israel has swung between the two logics.
Each attempt to contend with one of the threats amplifies the other. On the one hand, the political logic shaped Oslo Accords, as well as the Camp David Summit, the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Olmert government's Convergence Plan, and the Annapolis process. On the other hand, the security logic shaped Israel's policy in advance of the Wye River Memorandum, and in the days of Operation Defensive Shield and Operation Cast Lead.
10. Israel also swings between the logic of negotiations and the logic of unilateralism. Though Israel has reconciled with the need to end control over Palestinians, in practice, both political avenues open to Israel – negotiations and unilateral moves – encompass complex structural problems:
3
 The path of negotiations turns Palestinian political will and their capacity to govern into a pre-condition for progress. However, the combination of a weak Palestinian political system and the widespread view of Palestinians that time is „on their side‟ in practice brings about an escalation of demands, a lengthening of the negotiation process, and an expansion of the agenda;
 The path of unilateral moves strengthens radical elements and provides them 'veto rights,' exercised through violence, to obstruct progress.
Thus, on the one hand, the logic of negotiations shaped the Oslo process, the Road Map, and Annapolis; on the other hand, the logic of unilateralism shaped the
See here Abbas' threat to dissolve the PA.

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withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Prime Minister Olmert's Convergence Plan for the West Bank (which was ultimately buried).
11. Israel is at risk of a political, security, and military crisis unprecedented in its complexity as a result of the confluence of regional and global developments and trends:
 Crises and tensions with Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey – The temporary crises and tensions between Israel and countries that were, until recently, its three most important regional allies fundamentally changes Israel‟s geo- strategic status and ability to politically and militarily maneuver in ways that Israel has yet to understand;
 Mounting U.S. frustration exemplified in public statements by the Secretary of Defense Gates – President Obama is committed to the agreed- upon establishment of a Palestinian state by 2011, which would be a strategically significant U.S. achievement. The U.S. veto of recognition of such state may 'boomerang' on Israel, if Israel fails to put forth a credible initiative that exposes Palestinian rejectionism;
 Lack of support from many in Israel and in the Jewish world, who support the Palestinian bid for statehood, and therefore view a confrontation around this issue as unnecessary. In many Jewish communities, Israel has for some time turned into a polarizing and divisive issue;
 Tensions in relations between the Government of Israel and Arab citizens of Israel and especially with Bedouins in the Negev, that may erupt on the occasion of clashes with the Palestinians;
 A Delegitimization Network mobilized against Israel, which has demonstrated its ability to turn out hundreds of thousands of people to the streets of European capitals;
 A civilian uprising may pose an unprecedented challenge to the IDF given the unique condition of the West Bank and the dispersal of the settlements. Many Palestinians are encouraged by the success of popular uprisings in other countries in the Middle East (with the exception of Iran and Syria, which deploy brutal force).
12. Hence, confrontation with the Palestinian population in September may deteriorate into a large-scale strategic event with broad implications and unprecedented complexity. Such an event may cause the collapse of the PA and the Two-State Solution; an escalation of the assault on Israel's legitimacy; a rift between Israel and the Jewish world; a crisis in the relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments; constraints on Israel's ability to use military force; and a domestic crisis within the Israeli public. While Israel is operating as if on the cusp of a limited, local confrontation with a weak and unorganized civilian enemy, it may, in effect, be drawn into a confrontation with strategic and far-reaching implications.

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Three Approaches to Shaping Permanent Status: Agreement, State-First, or Constructive Unilateralism?
13. There are three approaches to shaping Permanent Status of Israeli-Palestinian relations, but only one that is relevant:
 A comprehensive agreement aimed at achieving end-of-conflict and finality-of-claims – This approach, which was adopted in the Oslo process, during the Camp David Summit and in Annapolis, advocates seeking one comprehensive agreement that resolves the historic outstanding issues between Israel and the Palestinian people; precipitates the establishment of a Palestinian state in permanent borders; and establishes the relations between the two countries. The traditional Palestinian position supported this approach, and now claims that the UN campaign will hasten a process of negotiations that will lead to such an agreement.
There are significant obstacles to this approach: There are substantive gaps between Israel and the Palestinians regarding outstanding issues such as refugees and Jerusalem; this approach pushes the sides into an 'all-or- nothing' dynamic in which even a historic agreement on borders and Jerusalem cannot materialize in the absence of an agreement on the refugee issue. The complexity of each issue and their interconnectedness present a significant obstacle to reaching a comprehensive agreement.
Furthermore, Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip and aspires to control the entire Palestinian national movement through the PLO, objects as a matter of principle to such an agreement that would bestow legitimacy upon Israel's existence. Its control of Gaza represents an additional obstacle to reaching a comprehensive agreement.
Finally, the Palestinian constitutional crisis, which manifests in Hamas's exclusion from the PLO and in its challenge to Abu Mazen's mandate to reach an agreement with Israel, presents a structural obstacle to this approach. As such, in the current reality, this approach cannot succeed.
Therefore, the calls by Israel, U.S., and the E.U. to renew negotiations toward such an agreement are hollow, as the Palestinians cannot be partners for such a political process due to their constitutional crisis. In recent speeches, Prime Minister Netanyahu presented far-reaching opening principles for negotiation, and invited the Palestinians to negotiate a Permanent Status agreement. However, the Palestinian refusal to do so, based on a demand to resume negotiations from the point where they were left, was actually a cover for the fact the Palestinian‟s leadership lack of internal legitimacy and institutional crisis, which obstruct it from making any historic concession to Israel.
 An interim agreement that establishes a Palestinian state in provisional borders (PSPB) based on the Road Map – This approach aims to establish a Palestinian state with provisional borders through negotiations. The
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permanent status would subsequently be shaped primarily on the basis of relations between Israel and this state, leaving the key outstanding issues for a later phase. The key advantage of this alternative is that it anchors a reality of 'two states for two peoples,' and it dismantles of the 'all-or- nothing' dynamic by allowing to shape Permanent Status through multiple 'small' agreements (see below).
The obstacles: The Palestinian constitutional system lacks the capacity to carry even such an interim agreement due to the crisis that has endured since Hamas victory of 2006. Moreover, although less complicated than a Permanent Status Agreement, a PSPB still entails complex political and legal problems requiring Israeli and Palestinian agreement.
Finally, the clear objection to establishing a PSPB expressed by Abu Mazen and the Fatah since 2005, and their view of such an approach as a „trap‟ (02/05), is the central factor rendering this approach unrealistic;4

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk