Doc's Talk: After the Quartet Statement: Is Abbas the Odd Man Out?

Thursday, September 29, 2011

After the Quartet Statement: Is Abbas the Odd Man Out?

David Makovsky

In the wake of the UN speeches and Netanyahu's acceptance of unconditional talks, Abbas now seems to be the odd man out, though renewed Israeli construction in east Jerusalem could alter that dynamic.

The Quartet for Middle East peace -- consisting of the United States, European Union, Russia, and the UN secretary-general -- recently issued a long-awaited statement calling for the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians "without delay or preconditions," toward the goal of reaching a peace agreement by the end of 2012. The statement was issued on September 23, immediately after Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu delivered opposing speeches on the Palestinian application for full UN membership. Netanyahu has made clear that he accepts the Quartet's proclamation. Yet while Abbas has declared that a Palestine Liberation Organization panel in Ramallah will consider the statement, he has publicly preconditioned his acceptance on an Israeli settlement freeze. At its core, the Quartet failed to draft a statement on substance because its members could not agree on issues such as explicit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. They opted instead for a statement on process because they could agree on calling for unconditional and direct negotiations between the parties. In the wake of the UN speeches and Netanyahu's acceptance of unconditional talks, Abbas now seems to be the odd man out, though renewed Israeli construction in east Jerusalem could alter that dynamic.

What the Statement Included and Excluded

Expected as far back as July, the Quartet's statement was delayed due to various differences between its members, resulting in certain issues going unmentioned. For example, the final product did not include a call for a settlement freeze. Contrary to some reports, however, omitting such a call has been the norm over the past six Quartet statements, not the exception. The last statement to mention a freeze was issued in February, and even then the Quartet limited itself to expressing concern that the ten-month settlement moratorium was not extended rather than issuing a fresh call for a freeze.

Instead of mentioning a freeze, the new statement calls on the parties to "refrain from provocative actions if negotiations are to be effective." It also mentions the 2003 Quartet Roadmap, which did call for a settlement freeze. Taken together, such language could be interpreted as a new reference to settlements. Yet Israel could just as well interpret "provocative" as referring to Abbas's move at the UN, which it sees as a breach of Palestinian commitments under the Oslo Accords.

Going forward, it remains unclear whether Israeli construction on 1,100 new units in the southeast Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo -- located on the Palestinian side of the Green Line -- will have any effect on the Quartet's stance. The United States and Europe immediately condemned the move, and EU foreign policy chief Lady Catherine Ashton called on Israel to reverse the decision. Although Israel does not regard new housing in east Jerusalem as "settlements," Europe does. Privately, U.S. officials have indicated that they will urge Israel to avoid any serious expansion of settlements in order to avoid a confrontation.

Other major issues were also missing from the Quartet statement. As mentioned previously, there is no reference to Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people, apparently due to European and Russian fears of antagonizing the Palestinians. Accordingly, the statement also omits explicit mention of the major concession expected of Israel, namely, territorial withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines with land swaps. Absent such parameters, the new statement cannot be taken as terms of reference for the resumption of negotiations. Instead, it employs more general language such as the following passage: "The Quartet reaffirmed its statement of 20 May 2011, including its strong support for the vision of Israeli-Palestinian peace outlined by [the U.S. president]," referring to Obama's past remarks detailing the "pre-1967 borders plus land swaps" approach. Furthermore, by using the word "vision" rather than explicitly mentioning Obama's May 19 speech, the Quartet also accommodates his related May 22 speech, which hinted at slightly larger land swaps to facilitate Israeli retention of larger settlement blocs. The size of potential land swaps was a key point of Quartet debate this summer, with Obama's minimalist May 19 reference to "agreed upon swaps" pitted against his May 22 statement that swaps should "account for the changes over the last forty-four years...including new demographic realities on the ground."

New Deadlines

To address Palestinian sensibilities, the Quartet put forth a deadline of December 2012 for the conclusion of a peace agreement. Yet unlike the statement that immediately preceded the September 2010 negotiations, the new Quartet proposal calls for an unspecified agreement. Last year's statement called for resolving all "final-status" issues -- an umbrella term that includes Jerusalem as well as Palestinian refugees -- and many commentators viewed such expectations as unrealistic.

In contrast, the new statement's mention of a peace agreement appears in a paragraph focusing on borders and security, suggesting that any accord would be based on those particular issues. Moreover, for the first time, the Quartet has provided a timetable for dealing with borders and security, calling on the parties to field proposals within the next three months and insisting on substantive progress within six months. The statement also calls for a preparatory meeting between the parties within the month to "agree to an agenda and a method of proceeding in the negotiations." According to a German spokesman, Chancellor Angela Merkel phoned Abbas on Monday and urged him to reply favorably.

UN Calculations and Miscalculations

Although the Quartet statement does not take a stand on the Palestinian application for UN membership, focusing instead on the resumption of peace negotiations, it is difficult to divorce the two issues. In the end, Abbas will likely reject the Quartet's call for talks out of fear that it will derail the international and domestic momentum he has built for the UN bid, despite Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's role in approving the Quartet statement. Abbas is more likely to interpret the statement as a possible alternative course of action for UN Security Council (UNSC) members who remain undecided as to how they will vote on the Palestinian application.

Yet Abbas seems to have miscalculated the direction of the Quartet and the UNSC member countries. Although his speech received extensive applause in the General Assembly, his bid to gain UNSC approval is losing momentum. Per the council's rules, full admission to the UN requires affirmative votes from nine of the fifteen UNSC members, barring a veto by a permanent member such as the United States. Hoping to avoid casting its veto, the United States has held consultations with most of the other council members. Thus far, only six UNSC states have openly supported the Palestinian bid: Russia, China, Lebanon, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Although the United States, Germany, and possibly Britain and France are the only members who seem poised to vote against it, several other countries -- namely Portugal, Bosnia, Nigeria, Colombia, and Gabon -- have refrained from voicing support and could abstain from the vote altogether.

Meanwhile, French president Nicolas Sarkozy has publicly urged the Palestinians to appeal for upgraded status at the General Assembly that would fall short of full membership. Abbas may well change gears in the coming weeks and pursue that option if he realizes that the UNSC is a losing proposition. In that case, he may decide he is tactically better off postponing talks with Israel still further.

Although the momentum of the UN bid has stalled internationally, it has bolstered the domestic standing of both Abbas and Netanyahu, whose approval ratings have improved considerably in the wake of their UN speeches. This could afford them the political cover they need to return to negotiations, if they are willing. Upon his return to Ramallah earlier this week, Abbas received a hero's welcome for his speech, which was telecasted live in one of the city's squares and focused largely on reiterating the Palestinian narrative of the conflict and presenting the plea for UN membership. According to the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 83 percent of Palestinians favored the UN move despite their expectation that it would change little on the ground.

For his part, Netanyahu has welcomed the Quartet statement because it raises the possibility of resuming peace talks, which he has long favored. Moreover, a Haaretz-Dialog poll conducted in the aftermath of the UN speeches revealed that the Palestinian gambit has bolstered his standing. Both Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Yaalon -- the Netanyahu cabinet's greatest skeptics toward peace talks -- have called for a favorable Israeli reply to the Quartet statement and the resumption of negotiations.

As for the content of his UN speech, Netanyahu came closer than ever to supporting President Obama's peace plan, stating: "American officials have put forward ideas to restart peace talks. There were things in those ideas about borders that I didn't like. There were things there about the Jewish state that I'm sure the Palestinians didn't like. But with all my reservations, I was willing to move forward on these American ideas." In a variety of media interviews during his UN visit, Netanyahu confirmed widespread assumptions regarding past tensions with the Obama administration, but he also indicated that his relations with the administration over the past four months have been better than ever.

Conclusion

Abbas's UN initiative may have attracted widespread media coverage, but he has miscalculated the sentiment of the international community, which favors the resumption of peace negotiations. Although the Quartet's failure to agree on the substance of such negotiations speaks to the lack of international unity on certain issues, the United States and Israel can be satisfied with the Quartet's focus on unconditional, direct talks between the parties.

David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk