Bassem Sabry
A look into Egyptian minds following the attack on the Israeli embassy.
CAIRO: It is Friday, around 5:30 PM, as I stand in Tahrir during the “Friday Of Course-Correction” protest, with everything appearing as calm as ever. Everyone seems quite content with the size of the attendance, how all the rumours of “planned attacks” against the protest turned out to be hyperbole or possibly intentional leaks aimed at dwindling attendance, while also being very ecstatic just with the general spirit of the event. As I leave shortly later, I begin to hear reports of some people trying to break into the Ministry Of Interior, only to be stopped by fellow protesters in a move that was lauded by more than those who derided it. Eventually, they graffiti parts of the wall of the ministry with slogans and curses, and also take down much of the official signage covering the widely unpopular ministry, all of which is hardly breaking news anymore, and is usually received with at least a tiny bit of silent glee even by those who publicly disapprove. Less than half an hour later, however, I receive a call telling me some protesters arrived at the Israeli embassy to protest once more the death of (as of now, following the most recent death of Emad Abdel-Malak) six Egyptian soldiers during the fire-exchange at the border.
The story of what actually happened at the embassy later on, and how events escalated to lead to 13 civilian deaths and 1049 injuries within a single night, as well as 45 soldier injuries, remains blurry at best. Most agree that the original intention of the demonstration was divided between those who wanted to protest once more the death of the Egyptian soldiers who died during a fire-exchange at the Egyptian-Israeli border, and those who also wanted to bring down the “provocative” new government-constructed “protective-barrier” surrounding the embassy-housing building. It was after that when the story began to take a confusing turn, especially with baffled speculation regarding why it was relatively so easy to actually get into the building and the embassy’s storage facility. Theories range from those who believe the army and the police were simply reluctant at first to use the necessary force to stop the protesters to avoid possible excessive violence and national provocation, to your standard conspiracy theories. Later on as security reinforcements arrived and embassy documents rained from the Cairo sky, the narrative continues, security forces engaged with the protesters to disperse them, and a catastrophic night for everyone unfolded. As people followed the events, a wide spectrum of passionately conflicting opinions began to emerge.
The majority believed it was right, perhaps necessary, to continue protesting by the embassy, especially with the disappointing and poorly executed response by the Egyptian Government to the deaths of the soldiers, a view further emboldened by Erdogan’s recent moves against Israel. Many even sympathized and quietly cheered as the barrier was demolished, and even went to the site to claim a piece of the torn down wall as a souvenir of sorts. A modicum of division in public opinion appeared as young men decided to scale the embassy building to bring down the Israeli flag once more, eventually succeeding (most saw and cheered the move as a non-violent act of protest, others were uncomfortable fearing the repeated climbings as a possible prelude to something more dramatic). The clearest dividing line was the break-in itself. Some viewed it as a poignant & necessary grassroots retaliation in light of the failure of the Egyptian & Israeli Governments to provide a satisfying response (and even saw those involved as national heroes); others, that it was not something they would have agreed to, but felt emotions ranging from schadenfreude to jubilation that it actually did happen; and some even wholeheartedly supported the storming of the embassy building out of belief that an Israeli embassy should not even exist on Egyptian soil, and that the Camp David Accords themselves were unacceptable in their entirety. And many among those who participated or approved of the break-in, and who also weren’t necessarily opposed to the presence of the embassy itself in principle, believed that any illegality in breaking into the embassy was irrelevant with everything that had happened over the past few weeks, particularly the lack of apology from the Israeli government for the deaths of the Egyptian troops. Of course, others were more ambivalent and undecided over what should have happened and how to feel and respond about what has taken place.
On the other hand, many espoused a traditionalist view that an embassy, regardless of whom it housed, had the right to be protected. There were also those who, regardless of whether or not they actually cared about the embassy, outright described those involved with the break-in as “vandals” and “definitely not Egypt’s revolutionaries.”
Some also were worried of retaliation against the Egyptian embassy in Israel by locals; others were worried of a possible ensuing “chaos”, whether locally or even at the border with Israel; some spoke of “foreign hands” that were behind what was happening (a view later adopted by the government in explaining the escalations); while others were simply worried of accepting the principle of “allowing a group of people to impose their vision by force, regardless of what that vision was”, adding that the January Revolution was essentially a peaceful affair, where violence was initiated by the other side. The main concern of those promulgating the latter viewpoint was the fear of other groups following suit, particularly of Islamist groups gaining encouragement by such an event and principle to attack establishments they disprove of and find abhorrent, such as bars and nightclubs. Ironically, Islamists on the other hand responded either with silence, some even with surprising condemnation against breaking into the embassy, while quite a few floated the idea of an “intended conspiracy” designed to postpone the parliamentary elections (while keeping the final blame vague, with words that could be interpreted as either pointing fingers against the military junta or against the supposedly more secular political forces associated with the Friday protests.)
There were three other debates that also resurfaced. The first is over how security forces, struggling with a reputation of excessive violence since the days of the previous regime, should have responded to that incident, and how they should respond in general to threats against them, government or public property, or against any other action that is nominally illegal. A caller on an Egyptian talk show summarized it best when she confronted a panel of Egypt’s top intelligentsia that was condemning the lack of decisiveness in stopping the protesters by saying: “Fine. I agree with you. But had security forces actually done what was necessary according to you, today all of you would have been sitting here condemning them for being brutal, especially in defending the Israeli embassy of all places. Whatever had happened, we would have been sitting here criticizing the army and the police.” Others have also debated concerns over how what appeared to be an intentional clashing with security forces and the MOI could actually contribute to the restructuring and transformation process of the ethos of those institutions. On one side, some argued that these clashes might help break down the spirit of being “above the law” that characterized many in law-enforcement throughout the previous decades, while others argued they would only serve to further radicalise the anti-revolution elements within the Police and even weaken Egyptian law enforcement and the state as a whole.
The third and final debate is one about the growing gulf between the wider majority of less politically involved Egyptians on one hand, and the views that motivate many of the oft-described “revolutionary youth” and some of their strategies on the other, as well as the perceived general decline in public excitement regarding the revolution in general. Many now see the necessity of bridging that gap as more urgent than before, especially if activists are to retain the capacity to mobilise people into the streets in defence of revolutionary demands when necessary, and if civil liberties are not be curtailed once more in the name of urgent security needs in a country where security concerns remain a widespread cause of deep frustration. Rhetoric once more became loud in demanding public faces to the revolution, an ability to communicate with protesters and better understand them, and with calls to activists to better keep in mind a politically conservative majority of the population, one that is generally distrusting of radical acts, even after the revolution.
Nevertheless, and regardless of any possible balance between the different opinions over the Israeli Embassy incident and the ensuing debates, one thing seems to be subject to unanimous agreement: everyone felt something needed to be done to show Israel the extent of Egyptian national anger, beyond the very opaque series of responses that had already taken place.
To be sure, Cairo may have a Peace Treaty with Tel Aviv, but many Egyptians themselves are hardly at peace with Israel. An all too well-known combination of decades of warfare, an overwhelming sympathy with the suffering of Palestinians, empathy with the struggles of the Lebanese and Syrians, the current and general right-wing spirit of Israeli politics, the status of the Peace Process, as well as a deep dissatisfaction with how people perceive the terms of the Camp David Accords, have long made many Egyptians very unwelcoming of the embassy that resides on top of the nondescript building at the heart of Cairo, or at least what that embassy might represent or stand for. Perhaps while we debate what happened at the embassy, what might be even as essential, if not more, is for Israel to consider what it truly needs to maintain a genuine peace with its most critical and powerful neighbor. If israel is to have an embassy, in any Arab country for that matter, one that doesn’t need to be hidden far from street access, it will have to abandon its decades-old strategy of top-down peace with powerful regimes. It must realise that this is an era where it needs to make such peace directly with the actual Arab streets from which future civilian & democratically-elected governments are to come from, and that the only way for Israel to achieve that is by listening and responding more seriously and urgently to the Arab people themselves. The fact is, if anything, it is quite clear that right now Israeli politics continue to gain Tel Aviv more and more enemies than friends in the Arab World.
PostScript:
Many have been asking me how I personally thought the majority felt about what happened. As two days pass, my personal estimate is that the clear majority is quite vehemently and vociferously against the break-in. While deeply unsatisfied with the Israeli response to this moment to the border tragedy, and while many have different ideas over how the Egyptian government should have responded, the majority preferred any method of peaceful protest and any range of official governmental diplomatic response and pressure, and found the whole break-in incident and the act of “breaking in” itself, regardless of target, to be “anarchic”, “vandalistic” and “counterproductive to what Egypt needs after the revolution”, the three most touted statements I have heard used by people I have spoken to and in the media. The mainstream media itself also seems generally aligned with this viewpoint. That is my “own reading” of the situation.
** Bassem Sabry is a media executive, producer and writer on Egypt and current affairs. He blogs at An Arab Citizen and you can also follow him on Twitter.
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