Doc's Talk: Israel-Turkey storm will blow over

Tuesday, September 06, 2011

Israel-Turkey storm will blow over

Victor Kotsev

Last Thursday, the New York Times published a leaked copy of the United Nations report addressing the takeover of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara by Israeli commandos on May 31, 2010, which resulted in the death of nine people and the injury of over 50 more.
The leak ended a prolonged diplomatic intrigue as well as a concerted effort to smooth over the accompanying Turkish-Israeli donnybrook and to tone down the report. Yet this crisis is fairly insignificant compared to the larger context of instability in the Middle East, and it is unlikely to be decisive in Turkish-Israeli relations in the long term. he Palmer report, named after Geoffrey Palmer, the former prime

minister of New Zealand who headed the United Nations inquiry panel into last year's incident, concludes that the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip is justified, but characterizes the Israeli use of force as "excessive and unreasonable."

It makes several important points, accepting the Israeli claim that January 3, 2009, was the staring point of the naval blockade, and differentiating between the latter and "the land crossings policy". It blames Turkey for not doing enough to stop the run on the blockade, but also criticizes Israel severely. It claims, among other things, that Israel conducted an overly secretive operation, and failed to issue all the recommended warnings due to a desire "to avoid publicity".

Turkey reacted furiously, rejecting the report. At least in the short term, it truly looks as if Israeli-Turkish relations have hit their lowest point in 30 years, as several analysts put it. (In 1980, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, and Turkey reacted with similar rancor).
Following the leak of the report's findings and Israel's refusal to apologize over the Mavi Marmara raid, the Turkish government expelled the Israeli ambassador from the country, reducing the diplomatic relations between the two countries to the lowest possible level, severed all military ties, and announced that it would take a series of additional measures.

These would include supporting lawsuits against Israeli soldiers and commanders involved in the operation, challenging the legality of the Israeli blockade in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and even providing military escort to future attempts to run the blockade. Reports in various media have it that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan may even be planning a visit to Gaza. [1]

There are a few more spicy details surrounding this scandal, such as, for example, the uncertain identity of the person who leaked the report to The New York Times. According to reports, Turkish officials point a finger at some of their Israeli counterparts who are firmly opposed to an Israeli apology (Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman is a vocal member of this camp). Israeli journalist Barak Ravid cites anonymous diplomatic sources as saying that the leak came just as United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had managed to secure a further delay of the publication of the report as a "personal favor to her". [2]

It is important to have in mind that one of the main goals of the report was to facilitate a reconciliation between the two countries, which conducted extensive negotiations in order to iron out the matter privately. Thus, its publication had already been delayed a few times by their mutual agreement, and recently there was talk about a further delay.

This time around, Turkey was opposed to extending the deadline, standing by its demand for an Israeli apology in an ostensible attempt to put pressure on the Israeli government. There were also signs of considerable American pressure on Israel, and a number of senior Israeli officials had come out in support of such an apology.

In fact, the Israeli government reportedly agreed to express "regret" and to compensate the victims, as in fact the final version of the Palmer report recommends. It seems remotely possible that somebody in Israel may have been worried about further concessions, and decided to forestall them by forcing its publication.

There are more factors at play, however. The immediate future of Turkish-Israeli relations appears dicey at best, irrespective of this particular crisis. Tensions near the Gaza Strip are high, and an Israeli operation against Hamas would almost certainly provoke more Turkish wrath (in fact, the current downturn in the relationship between the two countries started with Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009).

But there is a larger context to the growing regional instability as well, and it features prominently the Arab uprisings (especially in Syria) and the Iranian standoff. There is even a possibility of a larger war in the Middle East war in the near future - on Monday, a senior Israeli general issued the most recent warning about this possibility. [3]

In this context, the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, seems to have given up hope in winning Erdogan back, while Erdogan likely sees it safer to keep a distance from Israel in these turbulent times. For Turkey, this is also an opportunity to emphasize rhetoric and to try to win some popular support in the Muslim world, where it has long sought to gain a leading role.

In this respect, and to the extent that the Palestinian issue continues to draw a lot of sympathy among Muslims, the Mavi Marmara incident was a golden opportunity to pick a loud symbolic fight with Israel.

Another important detail is that Turkey seemingly attempted to be more assertive in its regional policy, for example by taking a hard line against the bloody methods that the Syrian regime used to put down the popular protests (and subsequent uprising) in the country.

Up through July, the Turkish media were actively discussing the possibility of a Turkish military intervention in Syria. [4] Coincidentally - or not - Israeli-Turkish ties seemed to be on their way to recovery during this period. The Erdogan government, for example, was instrumental in clipping the wings of this year's 'Freedom Flotilla' (see Gandhians come thundering, Asia Times Online, July 8, 2011).

A little over a month ago, however, the top brass of the Turkish army resigned in protest of its treatment by the country's political leadership. The move may well have been timed to scuttle any military operation and to humiliate Erdogan; certainly, the Syrian regime seemed encouraged by it, as it launched the most brutal wave of repressions shortly afterwards, ignoring Erdogan's threats and condemnations. Very soon afterward, the Turkish leadership turned the heat on Israel, perhaps tweaking the old principle of politics that those who can't do much in practice, resort to making noise.

It seems very likely that in the immediate future, Israel and Turkey will take their own separate paths navigating the stormy waters of the Middle East. Clashes are likely in the diplomatic arena, though much less so as far as the two militaries are concerned (this is despite the Turkish rhetoric about providing military escorts to future convoys). Yet the two countries have a long history of friendship, which has survived several previous crises; their relationship is seen as a strategic asset by many on both sides, and it is likely that forces pulling them toward reconciliation will emerge again.

Turkey left "room for rehabilitating relations in the future - via low-profile, secretive talks mediated by the US," observed Israeli analyst Ron Ben-Yishai. "Perhaps even in the near future."

It is important to have in mind that the two countries share important military as well as political ties, and despite the Turkish government's rhetoric, it would be hard to sever those ties completely without causing major damage to both. In the words of Israeli journalist Yaakov Katz, this military cooperation is greater than "meets the eye." [5] Turkish officials are also reportedly worried that the fight with Israel might degrade their capability to fight terror. [6]

In brief, it is likely that Turkey and Israel will be friends again, although it may take some time.

Notes
1. 'Erdogan visit to Gaza would hurt Turkey-US ties' , Jerusalem Post, September 4, 2011.
2. Israel-Turkey ties worsened due to leak of Gaza flotilla report, diplomats say, Ha'aretz, September 4, 2011.
3. IDF general: Likelihood of regional war growing, ynetnews.com, September 5, 2011.
4. For example, "A Turkish Buffer Zone Inside Syria?" , Hurriyet, July 3, 2011.
5. More to lose in crisis with Turkey than meets the eye, Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2011.
6. Rift with Israel may hinder Turkey's anti-terror fight, Hurriyet, September 4, 2011.

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk