Doc's Talk: New Ottomanism Taps the Palestinian Venue

Monday, September 05, 2011

New Ottomanism Taps the Palestinian Venue

Yisrael Ne'eman

Everyone promised September was to be an interesting month in the Middle East and there are no disappointments so far. Libya is shaping up for its last battles with Qadaffi forces, unrest continues in Syria, Egypt is said to have elections, the Palestinians are expected to declare their state with UN support and Israel on Saturday night had its largest socio-economic protest demonstration ever. But the biggest crisis is brewing with PM Recip Tayyip Erdogen's Turkey. Ankara expelled the Israeli ambassador when Jerusalem refused to apologize for the deaths of nine Islamist IHH Islamist activists during last year's attempt by the Turkish registered Mavi Marmara to break the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. The UN investigated and its Palmer Report declared the blockade "legal" while chiding Israel for using excessive force by its naval commandos when seizing control of the vessel. The report also cast doubt on the innocence of the IHH militants. Over the past year Israel and Turkey engaged in talks to clear up the issues but to no avail. Israel was willing to express regret over the loss of life but refused to issue an apology. The Turks are furious, sent Israel's ambassador packing (there is no Turkish ambassador in Tel Aviv), are threatening a full break in diplomatic relations, have stated in general that Ankara supports the national rights of all peoples in the region and are considering turning to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague to declare Israel's blockade of Gaza illegal. Two points before moving on: Do the Turks include the Kurds when speaking of the rights of all peoples? And if so why the Turkish intensification of attacks against them in southeast part of the country and bombings of Kurdish forces in northern Iraq? Continuing in the same vein, will the Turks acknowledge the rights of Greek Cypriots to full independence and end their occupation of northern Cyprus begun in 1974? As for the second point, the International Court can be expected to side with Ankara against Israel no matter what the evidence and in spite of what the Palmer Report advises.

Turkish foreign policy in the last several years can be described as a new Ottomanism – an attempt to re-unify the Middle East around a bold activist Turkish outreach. Call it a throwback to the 400 years of Ottoman imperial sway in the Middle East (and the Balkans) but without military conquest. Only a few years ago Erdogen hoped to rally the Sunni Arab states around the Turkish lead (hegemony?) said to be for the benefit of all. Obviously neither Israel, the Kurds nor the Cypriots can fit into such a scheme but to succeed would be a major diplomatic, regional and global success for Ankara. The Iranians are also a problem, Erdogen preferring to keep them engaged with one hand while holding them off with the other. Since the beginning of 2011 his policy became more of a shambles with each passing month. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya faced uprisings while the nurtured ally, Bashar Assad's Syria, is repressing its citizenry with overwhelming military force, bringing condemnation not only by the West, but by Erdogen himself.

The Palestinians remain the only real flashpoint whereby the Turks can score points, yet here the Turkish leadership, themselves considered "moderate" Islamists, must decide between the Jihadist Hamas in Gaza or the secular western leaning Palestinian Authority led by Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). The Turks want both. Contradictions do exist since Hamas fully opposes a permanent two-state solution and will accept only a "hudna" or Islamic cease-fire for a specified amount of time and then proceed to Israel's destruction. Abbas is said to be committed to a two-state solution attesting to Israel's legitimacy, but the conditions for such are still to be negotiated – most importantly the Palestinian demand for full refugee return, including descendents, leading to Israel's practical destruction as a Jewish State. It is just not clear if the PLO/Fatah would agree to recognition of Israel's legitimate right to national expression as the nation state of the Jewish People.

The Turks are apparently gearing up to support both Palestinian movements simultaneously, they are insisting on breaking the naval blockade on Gaza and can be expected to begin a diplomatic offensive in demand of Palestinian statehood within the framework of the two-state solution. Israel as the adversary of both Hamas and the PLO is a unifying "bad guy" and here the Turks have an opportunity to gain influence with both the Islamic and more secular nationalist Palestinian movements at the same time. Ankara's policy is to outmaneuver and then lead the Arab world. Egypt is still hunting Islamist terrorists in Sinai whether they be Hamas, the Islamic Jihad or Al-Qaeda types while the Jordanian regime wants moderation for all, fearing for its own stability. Turkey no longer has a Syrian policy, the pro-Iranian Assad regime being so brutal that Erdogen can find little common ground with them and is demanding regime change, one that may bring the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and should that be so, an accompanying civil conflict/war. In Iraq Turkish moves are interpreted as anti-Kurdish and not particularly pro-Shiite as that religious faction generally leans more towards Iran.

Supporting the Palestinian client at the expense of Israel scores points in the Arab World. The risk is minimal, none will oppose the move. The question is "How far to go?" Breaking diplomatic relations with Israel and projecting a naval show of force in the Mediterranean will be bad enough but what options does Israel have should Erdogen decide to send the Turkish navy to breech the internationally legal Gaza blockade and/or decide on a visit himself to the Strip as he has threatened to do on occasion. How would he get there? Would he pass through the border crossing at Rafiah or prefer one of the tunnels? (And how would the Egyptians feel about this?) Or would he be part of a Turkish naval flotilla on its way to Gaza? Israel would need to decide whether to physically confront the Turkish navy with PM Erdogen on board, or not. Either way Jerusalem loses, at least in the short run.

The Erdogen government backed itself into a corner with the failed new Ottoman foreign policy initiative at the time of Arab World uprisings. To be fair, they like everyone else were surprised and cannot be blamed as such. They did however overplay their hand with the Mavi Marmara by acting as its patron. Hoping to get an Israeli apology and the lifting of the Gaza blockade never happened and now Ankara finds itself limited with one way out, the Palestinian route at Israel's great expense. Not that this appears to be such a terrible option.

Could such an outcome have been avoided by Israel? Apparently the Americans worked on a formula with a less than full apology, PM Netanyahu was inclined to accept but Foreign Minister Leiberman and others persuaded him to decline. But even with such an apology and compensation for those killed the Turks continued to insist on Israel's lifting of the Gaza blockade. Would they have backed down in light of an agreement? Most are doubtful but it certainly would have been more difficult for the Turks to press their claims on the diplomatic front and appeal to the ICJ in The Hague. Internationally the case would be seen as closed although Erdogen could push an adversarial line whenever he deemed it necessary. Any which way this scenario would turn out leaves Israel as the loser.

Now the question is one of degree. How much will Israel lose in its relationship with the Turks and as a result much of the Arab/Muslim World. Defending one's sovereignty has its costs and at times payment must be made. But the Turks are also exposed. Their NATO allies and especially the US may attempt to call them to order and/or begin a re-evaluation of policy towards the "moderate" Islamic regime in Ankara. They too may have an outstanding bill to settle, but only after the dust settles in the more distant future.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk