Mahan Abedin
As the street-level opposition to the Syrian regime shows no signs of abating, there is growing pressure on strategic planners in Tehran to prepare for all scenarios, including one that doesn't involve current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as the lynchpin of Syrian politics.
The perceived gravity of the problem, reinforced by region-wide changes, should force the entire Iranian foreign policymaking establishment to re-think and re-imagine the deepest dimensions of the country's regional diplomacy, including the very idea of the so-called "resistance axis". here are deep fears in Tehran that the downfall or emasculation of Assad and the Alawite-led Ba'athist regime in Damascus will at
the very least complicate the intricate set of relations that Iran maintains with Lebanese and Palestinian non-state actors, notably Hezbollah and Hamas, and effectively set the Islamic Republic on the back foot in the great strategic rivalry with the United States over influence and hegemony in the Middle East.
While this anxiety is understandable and partly reflects the genuine balance of forces and interests on the ground, it is ultimately myopic and the product of unimaginative strategic thinking. The partial and (in the case of Libya) total collapse of several Arab regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, is a harbinger for a profound re-alignment of the strategic map of the region, and specifically one where diplomacy is set to become more complex and entail greater involvement by indigenous powers.
In this scenario, the so-called "resistance axis" will have to be re-configured to respond to more complex diplomatic and strategic challenges, for while it may not be rendered totally redundant, its rhetorical power may not be so easily invoked to reduce all regional dynamics to a competition between Iran and the United States.
Defining the resistance axis
In the journalistic and increasingly academic discourse, the resistance axis in the Middle East is generally defined as an anti-Israeli and to some extent anti-American political, military and diplomatic alliance between key states and highly capable non-state political-military organizations.
The non-state actors, chiefly in the form of Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, assume the frontline burden of the nexus by directly confronting Israel and heightening the Jewish state's threat perception; thus undermining its ability to respond to more subtle and long-term challenges.
Syria is often described as the state with the most proximate relationship with these groups and the country which forms their primary line of defense. Syria in turn is described as being sustained and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose material, political and spiritual support is all-important to the preservation of the resistance axis.
From this point of view, both the software and hardware resides in Tehran, and it is the Islamic Republic's political, economic and ideological might that enables and empowers this nexus of resistance.
Most analysts describe the ultimate functionality of this resistance axis as a proxy war between Iran and Israel and a suitable vehicle for both states to avoid direct confrontation. More astute observers see it as a great game between Iran and the United States, to determine the political and ideological direction of the region.
What is remarkable is that Iranian, Arab and Western analysts are united in their description of the form, nature and functionality of the resistance axis.
The most immediate consequence of this unity of perception and analysis is that it skews understanding of the wider and deeper diplomatic nuances and dynamics of the region by ignoring several existing and emerging factors that shape regional diplomacy, including demographics, shifting public opinion and democratization.
The notion of a resistance axis - and by extension a counter-axis - reduces the region's diverse political and ideological forces to neatly defined pro-Iranian and anti-American camps.
While there is more than just a kernel of truth to this description - and there is no denying the fierce rivalry between Iran and the United States - the region's political future is determined by a wider range of factors and state actors like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and even the tiny Persian Gulf states cannot be viewed solely as enablers of American foreign policy.
The Arab Spring, and the expected resulting shift in political and diplomatic orientation, will bring the notion of a resistance axis, and the analytical frameworks that sustain it, under greater scrutiny. In particular, the gradual emergence of Egypt as a political, diplomatic and possibly even ideological power in its own right will significantly complicate regional diplomacy and might conceivably lead to the re-definition of the relationship between Iran and America.
Strategic planning requires a clear definition of goals and means. In this case, the most important question is why does the Islamic Republic of Iran support non-state actors in the region? Officially, Iran supports Lebanese Hezbollah and to a lesser extent Palestinian Hamas for primarily ideological motives and as part of a broader ethical foreign policy which prioritizes values over interests.
Unofficially, Tehran-based foreign policy experts produce a more sophisticated and comprehensive defense of this policy, and one that takes sufficient stock of the balance of power in the region, and the extent to which popular non-state actors can tilt that balance in Iran's favor.
But the gradual emergence of more independent-minded regional powers, and by extension the relative decline of American influence, call into question the wisdom of extending considerable support to non-state actors indefinitely.
Rethinking regional diplomacy
As the noose gradually tightens around Assad's neck, there is increasing indication that influential voices in Tehran are beginning to think about contingency planning. But the essential problem remains Iran's inability to imagine a Syria without the existing power structures and supporting ideology.
A recent interview with the well-informed and well-travelled Iranian lawmaker Sirous Borna Baldaji, which appeared in the influential Iranian Diplomacy website, is indicative of the depth of confusion that prevails in Tehran. Entitled "If Assad goes the Salafis will seize power", the interview is based on Baldaji's extensive recent field research in Syria.
The latter's insinuation that the cutting edge - if not the controlling brain - of the Syrian demonstrators are hardline Salafi extremists, is not only indicative of poor research but lack of imagination in terms of viewing a post-Assad Syria.
Baldaji's argument appears to be that once these so-called Salafis seize control of the reins of power in Damascus they will proceed to limit ties with Iran and cut off the vital support line to Hezbollah. It is an argument that is not only devoid of a deep understanding of Syria's strategic profile, but one that takes insufficient stock of broader regional dynamics.
In view of these regional dynamics, namely the empowerment of potentially pro-Iranian Islamists in Cairo and the emergence of a volatile and inexperienced regime in Tripoli, Iran should look to cultivating deeper ties with these states and by extension de-emphasizing the relationship with non-state actors.
The resistance axis needs to be rethought and reconfigured to adapt to emerging political and strategic developments and ultimately tied to a more lucid definition of Iranian national interests.
If Iran's primary national interest in the region is the expulsion of foreign military forces from the Persian Gulf area, then the emergence of more democratic regimes, whose chief sensitivity is their own public opinion, is supportive of this long-term strategic goal.
From this point of view, the downfall of Assad, however unlikely it may appear at this stage, is not necessarily the disaster imagined by many in Tehran's policymaking circles.
Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Middle East politics.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings)
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