Doc's Talk: FREEING GILAD SHALIT: THE COST TO ISRAEL

Friday, October 14, 2011

FREEING GILAD SHALIT: THE COST TO ISRAEL

David Makovsky
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3409

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Although the Shalit deal may help Netanyahu, the massive prisoner release will backfire on him if there is a spate of terrorist attacks.

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On Tuesday, Israel and Hamas announced a two-phase prisoner exchange that would secure the release of Sgt. Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier kidnapped in 2006 and held for more than five years in Gaza. In return, Israel would release 1,027 prisoners, including 280 who are serving life sentences for their involvement in terrorist acts. The deal was initially mediated by Gerhard Conrad, a senior German official with expertise in the Middle East who has overseen prisoner swaps between Israel and Hizballah since the 1990s. But it was Egyptian intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Murad Muwafi who played the pivotal role in recent weeks. According to reports of the deal, Israel will first release the most controversial 450 prisoners, in exchange for which Hamas will hand over Shalit to Egypt. Israel will then choose an additional 550 or so ostensibly non-Hamas prisoners for release. The group's leader -- Khaled Mashal, based in Damascus -- has reported that the first release will occur within a week and the second within two months. After on-and-off negotiations since Shalit's capture, new circumstances have apparently made a deal possible.

THE CALCULATIONS OF HAMAS

Recently, Hamas has watched Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of its rival, Fatah, enjoy an enormous domestic boost as a result of his UN statehood bid. The group's popularity was already low because of its failure to deliver a better quality of life for the people of Gaza. When Palestinians flooded into the streets of Ramallah to cheer Abbas's UN appearance, Hamas suddenly seemed politically irrelevant.

Seeking to reestablish itself, the group finally agreed to compromise with Israel, relenting on demands made during 2009 negotiations with the Olmert government regarding the release of two arch-terrorists: Abdullah Barghouti, a bombmaker responsible for the deaths of scores of Israelis, and Ahmed Sadat, associated with the 2001 assassination of Israeli cabinet minister Rehavam Zeevi. Hamas also agreed that 164 of the released prisoners would be exiled from the West Bank to Gaza. Forty others will not be allowed to live in either Gaza or the West Bank and will instead be exiled abroad -- a measure that Hamas initially rejected in its entirety.
The deal is certain to boost the group's popularity despite such compromises. After all, Hamas secured the release of more than 1,000 prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli. Second, the names and crimes of those being freed are significant. Although Israel has often agreed to release prisoners in the past as a gesture to Abbas, it has not freed such "big fish." Third, many of those being let out are Hamas officials. Their release not only replenishes the group's ranks, but also sends a strong message that Hamas will not abandon its rank and file. Mashal has stated that these officials "will return to...the national struggle." Fourth, in securing the release of six Israeli Arabs, Hamas has succeeded in pushing Israel across a line that it has refused to cross in the past, in terms of conducting negotiations that involve Israeli citizens.

In addition, Hamas is likely to view the Egyptian mediation as an achievement in itself. The group seeks to improve ties with the "new" Egypt and its military, which previously partnered with Israel in enforcing a blockade on Gaza. This desire is rooted not only in the group's expectations that the affiliated Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood will be a growing force in Egyptian politics, but also in the changing regional landscape. Hamas is now distancing itself from Syria's onslaught against its own people, including fellow Sunni Muslims. There have been reports that this shift has led Iran to curb its funding of the group, forcing Hamas to seek political and financial backing elsewhere.

ISRAEL'S CALCULATIONS

Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu's acquiescence to the prisoner exchange is surprising, as he railed against a similar proposal during Ehud Olmert's final days in office. Indeed, in a televised national speech on July 1, 2010, Netanyahu argued that it would be irresponsible for Israel to swap large numbers of prisoners for Shalit, as many of those whom Israel released in the 1980s have since returned to terrorism. Following this week's announcement, Netanyahu's own brother-in-law, a settler on the West Bank, criticized him on Israeli television yesterday, charging that the Shalit deal contradicts the prime minister's past statements against compromising with terrorists.

The international community may question whether Israel is wise to put such a premium on one life when the exchange may endanger many other lives. Yet the Israeli ethos that has evolved over the years holds that the state should be willing to make sacrifices for any individuals whom it expects to make sacrifices for the state. Furthermore, because of Israel's policy of universal conscription and the sense that a captured soldier could be anyone's son, public pressure on the issue has been overwhelming.

In his remarks at the start of a late-night cabinet session on October 11, Netanyahu stated that the deal was struck because a "window of opportunity" was closing. This was an apparent reference to forthcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections, which may give the Muslim Brotherhood unprecedented power and potentially hamstring future mediation by Cairo. Israeli officials have also claimed to be haunted by the memory of unsuccessful negotiations for Ron Arad, an airman captured in 1986 and now believed dead.

Other factors seem to have played a role in Netanyahu's thinking as well. First, given recent bilateral tensions stemming from shootings in the Sinai and the Egyptian mob assault on the Israeli embassy, the deal helps both countries. For Cairo, mediation demonstrates to the world that it remains a key regional actor willing to work with Israel, while showing the Egyptian people that, unlike Hosni Mubarak, it is willing to mollify Hamas.

In the wake of the Palestinian Authority's UN statehood bid, Netanyahu's decision may be interpreted as a warning to Abbas that Israel is also capable of unilateral action, though it risks validating Palestinian conspiracy theories that Israel favors Hamas as a counterweight to the PA. This could lead some to press Abbas into resuming unity talks with Hamas. At the same time, the fact that Hamas has successfully concluded negotiations with Israel will now make it more difficult for Abbas to claim that he cannot.

Domestic political calculations also loomed large. This summer, Netanyahu was targeted by a massive social protest movement, which argued, among other issues, that the country is paralyzed by political gridlock. Moreover, Israelis see no sign of diplomatic progress with the Palestinians, and indications of regional isolation amid the recent Arab upheavals are increasing. As Israel's Channel 10 reported last week, Netanyahu's approval rating had fallen to 36 percent. But, although the Shalit deal will likely give him a boost in the polls, it will dissipate if the massive prisoner release leads to renewed terrorist attacks.

CONCLUSION

If the deal is successfully concluded, Netanyahu may believe that the prize is worth the price. But if there is an increase in terrorist violence attributable to Hamas, the deal will backfire.

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David Makovsky is the Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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