Doc's Talk: Troubling Times for Once Mighty Hizballah

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Troubling Times for Once Mighty Hizballah

Paul Alster
Special to IPT News
March 27, 2013
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3958/troubling-times-for-once-mighty-hizballah

Haifa, Israel – Hizballah's continuing alliance with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has the notorious Shia political and military movement navigating choppier waters than at any other time in recent memory.

Led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah – the Iranian-backed preacher rarely seen in public these days for fear he might be assassinated – Hizballah had been the unquestioned Shia force in Lebanon. But cracks have begun to appear as both internal dissent and external pressures have been brought to bear and reveal a vulnerability that had rarely, if ever, been seen before.

President Obama – angry at Hizballah's continued support of the Assad regime – didn't mince his words in Jerusalem March 21: "Every country that values justice should call Hizballah what it truly is – a terrorist organization."

That's a much more direct statement than administration officials previously were willing to make. In 2010, then-National Security Advisor and current CIA Director John Brennan spoke of trying "to build up the more moderate elements" of the organization.
It's a fast fall from Hizballah's previous high-point of influence, Mordechai Kedar, an Israeli scholar of Arabic specializing in Islamic movements and ideology, told the Investigative Project on Terrorism. "Hizballah was the most popular organisation in the Arab world after the 2006 Lebanon War [against Israel], but now their image is as bad as it could be because Hizballah is considered as a collaborator with the most vicious of regimes [Syria]. They have lost much of the image they gained after the 2006 war."
In a December report, the United Nations confirmed that Hizballah was fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria.
"From the outside point of view, they [Hizballah] are supporting Assad by sending hundreds of combatants to Syria in order to preserve the regime, because they know that if they are not loyal to their friend, no-one will be their friend in the future," Kedar explained. "Secondly, they need the Syrian regime as the bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It would be very hard for them to function without Syrian mediation between Lebanon and Iran when it comes to supplies, logistics, missiles and all the weapons that they need."
Having been supported by both Syria and Iran for many years, Hizballah determined that it must stand by the Syrian regime even though it appears to be fighting a losing battle. Failure to do so could cost it financial support from Iran, leaving Hizballah – once Assad has gone – with no significant nation state supporting their cause.
But according to Kedar – who specialized in Syria during his 25 years in Israeli military intelligence – Hizballah faces no lesser difficulties from within Lebanon, and is gradually coming under more pressure from within its own ranks.
Shia leader Mohammed Ali al-Husseini accuses Nasrallah of "dragging Lebanon into the abyss and that the Shiites in Lebanon, and Lebanon itself, will pay a high price for this behavior," Kedar said. "But also from inside Hizballah there are voices today – not out loud, but behind the scenes – which claim that gambling on the Syrian horse is gambling on the wrong horse, and Hizballah will be associated forever with Assad's regime, especially its last brutal stages of life. This will hurt Hizballah and could even persuade Europe to place them on its list of terror organizations."
Iran's support makes Nasrallah "immune, because not only does he have their political support, he has the money and the control over the resources of Hizballah, and most importantly of all, the backing of Ayatollah Khamenei [Iran's Supreme Leader]."
Al-Husseini is the leader of the Arabic Islamic Congress (AIC) and one of a growing number of high-profile Lebanese Shia who believe that Hizballah is wrong for their community and wrong for Lebanon. The U.S. has allegedly reached out to al-Husseini as a potential partner in undermining Hizballah. Al Husseini's reputation has suffered a number of setbacks however, including being tried and later acquitted of being an Israeli spy, while U.S diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks in December 2011 cast doubt on just how genuine his rift with Hizballah really is.
"AIC headquarters are located on the Beirut airport highway, a Hizballah-dominated area," the cable noted. "Contacts in the Beirut southern suburbs observed that Hizballah has neither harassed nor interfered with AIC."
The long-standing Amal movement (another allegedly courted by the U.S.), is also seen as a more moderate Shia force and gained 13 seats to Hizballah's 12 in the 2009 Lebanese general election. But Amal, led by Nabih Berri, has endured years of in-fighting while claims of nepotism and corruption have so far negated its political effectiveness. Despite opportunities to increase their influence amongst the Shia population those groups opposed to Hizballah have failed so far to make any real impression in gaining ground on the "Party of God."
If Hizballah's influence wanes it will be due to blindly supporting Assad in Syria, its reduced ability to function and provide the social support to its community that has come through its financial alliance with Syria and Iran, and possibly because of the emergence of a new political Shia force in South Lebanon.
On March 20 Israel's Ynet.com reported that "a new political movement is gathering followers right in the Hizballah stronghold of Beirut's southern suburb... Hizballah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah, once the undisputed stars of the Arab world, are rattled by surprise opposition from within their own ranks."
The recently formed Movement for the Lebanese Citizen (MLC) is led by Imad Kamiche, a former Hizballah "operative." Ynet.com – the online version of Israel's highly regarded daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot – suggests MLC is "attempting to present an alternative to the rigidly Shiite framework represented by Hezbollah and Amal, and place the Lebanese citizen at the forefront, regardless of ethnicity."
Hizballah suddenly appears keen to portray itself as tolerant of dissenting voices. "The fact that opposition elements are still residing in Beirut's southern suburb is a testimony to the group's tolerance," a spokesman said. The article cited sources who added that "Hizballah actually wishes to absorb the opposition and their criticism, even contacting them for that purpose." MLC founder Kamiche, however, hinted that he had been given clear "advice" to stay out of the political arena, a thinly veiled hint that Hizballah will only tolerate his opposing voice to a certain point.
This is supposed to be an election year in Lebanon. Sheikh Nasrallah and the Hizballah leadership will surely be aware that their intervention in the Syrian Civil War could cause a backlash at the ballot box and significantly reduce their share of the vote. Matt Levitt, director of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, suggested recently that Hizballah still has to nail its colors to the Iranian mast to the exclusion of almost all other political and military considerations.
"What we see now is that Hezbollah is going to do things today that are in Iran's interest even if they expressly run counter to the interests of Lebanon and Hezbollah's own interest there," Levitt argued. "People tend to misunderstand the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran, which has changed over time but is now extremely close. The U.S. intelligence community has publicly described this as a 'strategic partnership.' But people don't fully appreciate Hezbollah's ideological commitment to the concept of 'velayat-e faqih,' or guardianship of the jurists, which holds that a Shiite Islamic cleric should also serve as supreme head of government. For Hezbollah, this means the Iranian leadership is also their leader – not for every foot soldier, but for Hezbollah's senior leaders, absolutely."
Hizballah's reputation had already been seriously damaged in the eyes of many EU states by its role in Syria, but the EU has thus far proved reluctant to officially designate it a terrorist organization. The recent confirmation by the Bulgarian government investigation that Hizballah was responsible for the bombing of a bus of Israeli tourists at Burgas last year was another blow to the Shia force's credibility and may finally persuade the EU to act.
The EU's argument that such a designation might destabilize the fragile Lebanese political status quo was left null and void on Friday evening when the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati – which included Hizballah – resigned, citing irreconcilable positions between the various factions over scheduling elections. Mikati's spokesman, Fares Gemayyel, simply said, "The prime minister cannot work in such conditions. He needs to respect the constitution."
A day earlier in Cyprus came the first conviction of a Hizballah member by an EU state as a court in Limassol found Hossam Taleb Yaacoub guilty of "being a member of a criminal organization." Because the EU has not yet designated Hizballah a terror organization, the original charges of "being a member of a terrorist organisation" had to be amended to obtain a successful conviction under current Cypriot and EU law. Yaacoub was found guilty on five out of eight charges before the court.
"The United States applauds the government of Cyprus for its professional investigation and successful conviction in court today of Hezbollah operative Hossam Taleb Yaacoub on a range of charges involving his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets," said State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland. "Today's verdict underscores the need for our European allies – and other governments around the world – to crack down on this deadly group and to send a strong message that Hezbollah can no longer operate with impunity, at home or abroad."
Writing on February 6 for the Washington Institute, Matt Levitt, taking into account the EU position and Hizballah's support of the Syrian regime, came to the following conclusion:
"The 'Party of God' has turned its 'weapons of resistance' not on Israel, but on fellow Muslims. This, more so than the UN indictment of four of its members for the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and more so than the exposure of Hizballah operations in places like Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Thailand, and Turkey, is what now threatens Hizballah's standing as a Lebanese political party and social movement."
Paul Alster is an Israel-based journalist who blogs at paulalster.com and can be followed on Twitter @paul_alster

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk