Bilal Y. Saab
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati surprised very few when he resigned
on Friday, causing the technocratic government that he created with
Hezbollah’s blessing two years ago to collapse.
This final chapter of Mikati’s tenure seemed to be written well before
he took the post in January 2011. Mikati, a prominent Sunni politician
and millionaire businessman with international
contacts, knew very well that Hezbollah, which effectively controls
Lebanon’s government, would make life very difficult for him.
Nevertheless, he accepted the challenge, perhaps naively believing that
he could do something that no politician has been able to do since
former prime minister Rafiq Hariri was killed on February 14, 2005:
bring stability and normalcy to a country seemingly always on the verge
of sectarian strife. In the end, though, he could not.
To fulfill his ambitious plan, Mikati sought to create a moderate
center in Lebanese politics that could mediate the ongoing feud between
Hezbollah, the party accused of killing Hariri, and Saad Hariri, the son
of Rafiq and prime minister between 2009 and 2011. He convinced Michel
Suleiman, the serving president, and Walid Jumblatt, the influential
Druze leader, to join his coalition. Then, for added credibility, Mikati
sought political backing from regional powers, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Even Iran and the United States, which had been fighting a cold war in
the Middle East (often through proxies on Lebanese soil), gave their
blessings to Mikati’s plan.
For its part, Hezbollah, the dominant party in
Lebanon’s politics since Rafiq Hariri’s assassination and Syria’s
forced exit shortly afterward, judged that it could afford having Mikati
in charge of the cabinet as long as he did not cross any red lines that
threatened Hezbollah’s security. To be sure, the Shia party kept
putting Mikati in some very uncomfortable positions. First, in 2011,
Hezbollah’s leaders rejected calls for Lebanon to support the United
Nations’ special tribunal on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Mikati
threatened to resign if Hezbollah kept obstructing. Grumbling, Hezbollah
decided to cut its losses and agree to cooperate, despite the fact that
the international body was about to implicate the group in Hariri’s murder.
Second came the assassination in October 2012 of Wissam al-Hassan, the director of the intelligence branch
of Lebanon’s internal security forces (the Hariri camp believes that
Hezbollah and Syria are behind the killing). With ties to the Hariri
family and Saudi Arabia, he was a major Sunni figure in Lebanon’s
sectarian politics. He was, in effect, the country’s intelligence tsar,
the man who knew the state’s most intimate secrets. Supposedly, one of
those secrets was evidence of a spate of assassinations of anti-Syrian
individuals by Hezbollah, starting with Rafiq Hariri in 2005. And that
knowledge had made him a target. The political shock and (limited)
sectarian violence that followed Hassan’s death made Mikati think
seriously about resigning — he even informed the cabinet of his decision to quit. But Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and the United States counseled Mikati to soldier on for the sake of
Lebanon’s stability. So he did, but the political costs for him of
governing above an unpopular Hezbollah-controlled government were
starting to pile up. Among his main support base, which is Sunni, he was
losing ground.
Hezbollah
threw a third wrench into the works this year, when it announced its
opposition to extending the term of Ashraf Rifi, the general director of
the internal security forces, and to the creation of an oversight body
for the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for June of this
year. Rifi, who is loyal to Hariri, is due to retire early next month,
and Hezbollah cannot wait to see him go. Of course, for Hezbollah, this
has less to do with Rifi than with the ongoing battle between Hezbollah
and Hariri (and their regional patrons) over the control of Lebanon’s
security and intelligence agencies. Hezbollah controls state security
and has influence over the military intelligence services. Hariri still
commands the loyalty of the internal security services, especially its
intelligence branch, which now employs more than 2,300 officers. If Rifi
goes, Hezbollah is hoping, it will be able to replace him with one of
their own, thus placing all of the country’s strategic levers of power
in its own hands.
But Hezbollah is misreading its own position.
For one, Hezbollah is
on the verge of losing one major regional ally if Bashar al-Assad goes
in Syria. Further, a confrontation between Iran and Israel and the
United States over the nuclear issue could spell doom for the Shia
party. In that respect, it does make some sense for Hezbollah to try to
fortify its position in Lebanon by eliminating its opponents. But what
the party seems to have neglected is that it can never rule Lebanon
alone or with an iron fist, given the country’s sectarian makeup
and its inbuilt and enduring checks and balances — nor can any other
party, for that matter. The Christian Maronites tried to govern alone in
the past, for example, but the attempt led to a 15-year civil war.
Hezbollah might be attempting the same now, but it is losing public
support as it does so.
For Hezbollah, a more intelligent, though admittedly
counterintuitive, play would be to bring Hariri back to government and
extend Rifi’s term. This would kill several birds with one stone. With
Hariri back, Hezbollah could start the long-term process of reconciling
with the Sunnis and nip the spread of Salafism in Lebanon. With those
concerns out of the way, it could concentrate more on its first-order
priority: resistance of and preparation for possible war with Israel.
Yet such maneuvering does not seem in the offing. When Mikati
threatened to resign this month, this time over Rifi, Hezbollah
essentially called his bluff. In addition, although Hezbollah has become
more independent from Syria and Iran over the years, it still has to
consult with them on certain critical decisions
such as sanctioning Hariri’s return. Although Tehran might entertain
such a scenario because it would not really hurt Iranian interests in
Lebanon, Damascus would categorically reject it, since it sees Hariri as
being in the same league as the rebels in its own country.
For now, then, Hezbollah’s hands seem tied. But as the country loses
its balance, the party might end up with no choice but to impose its
domestic preferences on its backers, including seeking a compromise with
Hariri. Part of Iran and Syria’s strategic axis or not, Hezbollah’s
mere existence is at stake.In Lebanon, governments and prime ministers
come and go, but Mikati’s departure signals a sad end to what was a
worthwhile political experiment in moderate centrist politics. Had
Mikati succeeded, his effort could have been emulated across the Middle
East. With his failure, though, Lebanon’s fault lines will continue to
deepen — and absent necessary Sunni-Shia reconciliation, the country
could slide into another civil war.
Foreign Affairs
* BILAL Y. SAAB is executive director and head of research of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America.
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