Eric Trager
New Republic
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Given the opposition's growing rage and the Brotherhood's increasingly
confrontational stance, the upcoming nationwide protests are unlikely to
end well.
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The Middle Egypt governorate of Beni Suef, an agricultural province
located 70 miles south of Cairo, is an Islamist stronghold. Islamists
won 14 of Beni Suef's 18 seats during the first post-Mubarak
parliamentary elections in December 2011, and Muslim Brotherhood leader
Mohamed Morsi won nearly two-thirds of Beni Suef's votes in the second
round of the 2012 presidential elections en route to an otherwise narrow
victory.
Yet Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, who teaches in the
veterinary school of Beni Suef University, hasn't visited his home in
the governorate since late March, when activists hoisted
anti-Brotherhood banners and surrounded the mosque where he was
scheduled to deliver a Friday sermon. "The people planned to attack him
and hold him in the mosque," Waleed Abdel Monem, a former Muslim Brother
who owns a socialist-themed cafe up the street from Badie's home, told
me. The Supreme Guide's son now holds down the fort, and Brotherhood
cadres are occasionally called upon to protect his home whenever
demonstrations are announced on Facebook.
The anti-Brotherhood backlash that has forced Badie from Beni Suef is
the product of mounting popular frustrations regarding the
organization's failed governance of Egypt during Morsi's first year in
office. Rising food prices, hours-long fuel lines, and
multiple-times-daily electricity cuts -- all worsening amidst a
typically scorching Egyptian summer -- have set many Egyptians on edge,
with clashes between Brotherhood and anti-Brotherhood activists now a
common feature of Egyptian political life. And this low-grade unrest may
soon intensify: On June 30, the anniversary of Morsi's presidential
inauguration, opposition activists will launch nationwide protests under
the banner of "Tamarod," or "Rebellion."
The "Tamarod" campaign claims to have collected nearly 15 million
signatures (take those numbers with a massive chunk of salt) on
petitions that list Morsi's many failures -- such as "the economy
collapsed" and Morsi "follows the Americans" -- and demand early
presidential elections. If this demand sounds unrealistic, well, it is:
There is no legal basis for using a petition drive to force an elected
president of Egypt to call for early elections.
To be sure, this is something that many "Tamarod" supporters recognize,
which is why they have another goal in mind: channeling popular
exasperation with Morsi's presidency into mass protests that will force
him and his Brotherhood-dominated government from power. "We will leave
our homes [on June 30] and not go back unless the regime steps down, or
we will die," said Abdel Fattah Sabry, the chief organizer of "Tamarod"
in the Nile Delta city of al-Mahalla al-Kubra. Sabry anticipates
millions pouring into the streets -- "this revolution will break all
records," he told me -- and forcing Morsi's ouster. Thereafter, he said,
the military will appoint an interim presidential council largely
comprised of non-Islamists, which would administer new elections.
Of course, this is equally improbable. The only foreseeable way that
mass protests could topple Morsi is if things get so violent after June
30 that the military is impelled, against its better instincts, to
intervene to stop what would have to be unprecedented bloodshed. But it
likely wouldn't end there: An intervention of this sort would bring the
military into direct confrontation with Islamists, some of whom would
take up the very arms that they were prepared to use exactly a year ago,
when they believed that Egypt's then-ruling junta might deny Morsi the
presidency. This scenario is one that the military knows and desperately
wants to avoid, which is why Morsi will probably still be Egypt's
president on July 1.
But that shouldn't be a source of consolation to either Morsi or the
Brotherhood because, political titles aside, the country may fall
entirely out of their control. "Marches will start from different
places, and will reach the presidential palace," said Mohamed Haikal,
one of the five "Tamarod" founders. "We will also surround other places:
governorate offices and even Egyptian embassies abroad, including in
Washington." The activists intend to sit in these locations
indefinitely, perhaps fortifying their position by parking hundreds of
cars at the various protest grounds. Meanwhile, labor activists in
Egypt's industrial areas are planning major strikes to shut down the
economy until Morsi goes. "The atmosphere is ready because workers are
ready," a labor leader at a major textile factory in Mahalla told me.
"On June 30, factories will turn off, and we are organizing in factories
all over the country."
Whether or not the June 30 protests achieve the numbers that "Tamarod"
anticipates -- and it's impossible to know, because the average person's
decision to join an uprising is typically an in-the-moment kind of
thing -- the basic, anti-Brotherhood rage that their plans reflect is,
indeed, widespread.
The Brotherhood, however, is in complete denial of this. Brotherhood
leaders and members contend that Morsi has been a mostly successful
president, and they view the planned protests as validation that their
long-term project of building an Islamic state in Egypt is progressing.
"[Brotherhood founder] Imam Hassan al-Banna told us this would happen 70
years ago," Mahmoud Rashad, the Brotherhood party's media chief in the
Nile Delta governorate of Gharbiya, told me. "So I am not worried, but
confident that we are on the right track."
At the same time, the Brotherhood views "Tamarod" as a conspiracy by a
small, though vocal, minority -- one that it wants to expose by
counter-mobilizing more emphatically, and earlier. "We will go even
before June 28 in all governorates all over the country to celebrate one
year of a legitimately elected president," said Reda Ghanem, another
Brotherhood media official in Gharbiya. Indeed, the Brotherhood
announced on Friday that it would hold a "series of million-man marches
to protect the sharia" during the week leading up to June 30, and it has
repeatedly signaled its willingness to confront "Tamarod" directly. As
Brotherhood party secretary-general Hussein Ibrahim recently declared,
"the people will not allow their will to be assassinated...and will
defend their will with everything they own." In this vein, at its mass
protest on Friday, the Brotherhood ominously featured Islamist youths
performing martial arts.
Of course, the Brotherhood has confronted its opponents violently before
-- and the results were disastrous. On December 5, 2012, the
Brotherhood dispatched cadres to attack a mass opposition protest
outside the presidential palace in Ittahadiya. As the New York Times
reported, Muslim Brothers "captured, detained and beat dozens of
[Morsi's] political opponents...holding them for hours with their hands
bound on the pavement outside the presidential palace while pressuring
them to confess that they had accepted money to use violence in protests
against him." Seven people were killed in the fighting, and many
activists contend that the ruling party's use of violence against its
opponents was the point at which they decided they could no longer
tolerate Morsi's presidency.
Yet Muslim Brothers still see their December 5 mobilization as the right
move. "The MB...saw that what's happening around Ittahadiya as sort of
taking off the rule and trying to end the legitimacy of the president,"
former Brotherhood party spokesman Ahmed Sobea, who now runs the Cairo
bureau for the Hamas-owned al-Aqsa network, told me. "So the people went
to protect -- to defend -- the palace." Will the Brotherhood once again
send its cadres against anti-Morsi protesters? "What the organization
or the Muslim Brotherhood [leaders] see is right, we will obey," Sobea
said.
Meanwhile, rather than working to calm the political atmosphere at this
critical moment, Morsi is doubling down on confrontation. Consider, for
example his most recent round of gubernatorial appointments, in which he
bucked opposition demands for more inclusive rule by granting
governorships to seven more Muslim Brothers. Most astoundingly, Morsi
appointed a member of al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization, to govern Luxor, which was the site of a horrific 1997
al-Gamaa terrorist attack in which 58 tourists were murdered.
Predictably, these appointments set off immediate -- and often violent
-- demonstrations, which ultimately forced the governor to resign on
Sunday.
Yet, from Morsi's perspective, the al-Gamaa appointment might have been
worth the blowback. Two days later, al-Gamaa leader Assem Abdel Maged
announced that "the Islamists will face violence with violence on June
30," warning that his organization would respond to violence by
declaring an Islamic state from Tahrir Square. And lest one thinks that
these are idle threats, take heed: Abdel Maged was imprisoned from 1981
to 2006 for providing "moral and material" support to the assassins of
former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and he previously shared a prison
cell with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
So this is where most Egyptians find themselves on the eve of yet
another planned mass demonstration: between an enraged opposition
seeking a new uprising whose "success" depends on its ability to foment
unprecedented chaos, and an utterly incapable, confrontational ruling
party that now counts some of Egypt's most violent political elements as
its core supporters. Whatever happens on June 30, it can't end well.
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Eric Trager is a Next Generation fellow at The Washington Institute.
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