Kamel Daoud
Aaron Y. Zelin and Charles Lister
Foreign Policy
June 24, 2013
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Although Washington and Saudi Arabia have increased their support for
the mainstream Syrian opposition, jihadist factions and their Qatari and
Egyptian backers are asserting themselves as well.
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Hezbollah's victory in Syria in the Battle of Qusair was a wake up call
for many pro-Islamist actors in the Arab world. In response, Qatar --
through Yusef al-Qaradawi and Al Jazeera as well as key Egyptian Islamic
leaders -- has gone on the offensive. These players have publicized key
Islamist factions, especially the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), as well
as called for jihad as a necessary duty for all. Through these actions,
one of the key winners has been the SIF, a Salafi umbrella formation,
which is arguably the best fighting force within the opposition.
The SIF, led by its principal constituent force, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham
al-Islamiya (HASI), coordinates extensively with the al Qaeda affiliate
Jabhat al-Nusra (and though skeptical of the Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham, coordinates with it in Aleppo), but also with all other Syrian
rebel groups. While it is more than willing to fight alongside groups
loyal to the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian National
Coalition, it expressly rejects their rights to represent the entire
Syrian opposition. The SIF's insistence in a future Syria becoming an
Islamic state ruled by sharia contradicts the objectives expressed by
the wider moderate opposition. Although it has not issued any direct
threats outside Syria, the SIF is opposed to any external intervention
in Syria by any Western state, and its leader has threatened attacks on
any foreign military force entering Syria, supportive or opposed to
President Bashar al-Assad.
In the past two weeks, the SIF's leader, Hassan Aboud Abu Abdullah
al-Hamawi, has publicly appeared for the first time in an Al Jazeera
interview, attended a conference of senior Muslim clerics in Cairo
calling for jihad (the only Syrian rebel leader present), and spoke on
the Egyptian Salafi TV station al-Nas. It appears that key players with
vested interests in Qatar and Egypt's clerical community are attempting
to anoint the SIF as the leaders of the Syrian revolution.
The SIF announced its formation in a video on December 22, 2012. In it,
its senior spokesman Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Suri framed the SIF as "a
comprehensive Islamic front, representing Islam as a religion, a creed, a
guiding path, and a conduct." Upon formation, the SIF consisted of 11
distinct militant Islamist groups dispersed across 12 of Syria's 13
governorates. Through two mergers and two other outside Islamist
factions joining the SIF, it has consolidated into eight forces.
HASI, whose principal armed force first emerged in January 2012, has
since become arguably the most powerful individual armed group in the
entire Syrian opposition. Its leader, Aboud, is also the SIF's
commander-in-chief, and several of its senior figures have all
maintained leading roles in the SIF command structures.
According to the SIF's political charter, released a month after the
front's formation on January 20, 2013, it seeks "to construct a
civilized Islamic society in Syria, ruled by God's law." The SIF's
position on democracy is complex. While it has expressly rejected the
idea as a concept, its charter does maintain the idea of using a voting
system to elect political leaders "as long as it is regulated by sharia"
and only candidates whose policies "are bound by sharia" are involved.
This suggests they are okay with voting so long as it does not lead to
leaders then creating legislation, which contravenes God's law.
Placing the SIF in the current context of ongoing conflict, it expressly
rejects any political solution and any form of international
intervention. As such, at the June 13 Cairo conference, Aboud called for
jihad, stating, "Any invading force that sets foot on Syrian territory
under any pretext, whether to support the regime or to allegedly stop
aggression, will be treated as an occupying force." Though he later
qualified it when speaking to al-Nas as it related to potential U.S.
military support: "We look at its decision to arm the opposition with
suspicion...but we are happy that there will be an extra force to fight
against the criminal Assad. But we want to warn our brothers not to let
America interfere with what we want for our own country."
Aboud's presence in Cairo at the jihad conference and the al-Nas TV
interview on the heels of his first public appearance on Al Jazeera a
few days earlier speaks volumes to the respect he and his group have
garnered from key outside power brokers. Over the past half-year, the
SIF and HASI have proven themselves as not only crucial elements on the
battlefield, but also showing signs of competence in governance. These
factors are likely an important appeal for what appears to be the
crowning of this movement as the face of the revolution by some in the
region.
HASI is arguably the most strategically powerful individual player in
Syria today. Its forces have been involved in every major rebel victory
since at least September 2012, including leading a tightly-commanded
coalition of Islamist forces in seizing the only governorate capital to
be taken in the whole revolution so far: Raqqa, on March 4.
Militarily, HASI is amongst the best-armed insurgent groups in the
country, regularly deploying tanks and mobile artillery (T-72s, T-62s,
T-54s, and 2S1 Gvozdikas), anti-tank guided missiles (AT-3 "Saggers" and
AT-5 "Spandrels"), and occasionally 1990s-era Croatian rocket and
grenade launchers. While its initial operations in early 2012 were
primarily sporadic improvised explosive devices (IEDs) -- among the
first to utilize Iraq-style IED tactics -- and small-arms ambushes, the
group quickly assumed a lead role in large-scale sustained assaults on
multiple fronts (Hama, Idlib, Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, Deir al-Zour and
Daraa). More recently, it has formed a "Technical Division," which has
been responsible for cyber attacks on websites affiliated with the
pro-Assad Syrian Electronic Army and Addounia TV.
SIF activity, though, is not limited to military operations. It has also
pumped extensive resources into humanitarian and other social
activities. Part of this has been subsidized in cooperation with
government-funded NGOs from Turkey (Turkish Humanitarian Relief
Foundation) and Qatar (Qatar Charity). The SIF has acknowledged this in
video releases highlighting such patronage.
HASI currently runs extensive networks of food, water, and fuel
provision across northern Syria and even operates Raqqa's largest water
pumping station, several dams, and also a road and bridge repair
"company." SIF also places significant emphasis on the free provision of
Islamic education to children and often releases videos showing such
schools operating in Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama.
On June 8, Aboud took part in a 48-minute interview with Al Jazeera's
Tayseer Allouni. This was the first time that Aboud's real name and
identity had been revealed. Prior to that, his identity had been
shrouded in secrecy. This alone made the interview a significant
development in the SIF's evolution, not to mention his concluding line
in which he expressed his determination "to destroy by our hands the
walls of the Sykes-Picot [Agreement]."
Unsurprisingly, Aboud denied any structural links between his forces and
those of al Qaeda, although consistent with previous statements on
Twitter, he noted that "we do a great many joint operations" with Jabhat
al-Nusra and "we only see honesty in their work as well as toughness
and bravery...The US designation [of JN] will not stop us continuing to
work with them." However, there are key differences between JN and HASI.
Aboud, in the interview, points out "we agree with them that Islam is
our primary order of business, but we may disagree on some of the
provisions."
Unlike JN, HASI is more locally oriented and is also distinguished by
not being involved with attacks on civilian areas, not embracing suicide
attacks, and not disseminating its media releases through al
Qaeda-authenticated forums, but rather through its independent website,
Facebook page, and Twitter account. Most importantly, Ahrar al-Sham is
not calling for a global Caliphate like Jabhat al-Nusra and is only
focused on establishing an Islamic State within Syria.
Aboud also claimed that while "there are no secular groups" in Syria and
while the SIF "is not a component of any joint leadership or of the
Free Syrian Army, we take part in joint operations with the FSA." He was
however scathing regarding the representative nature of the Syrian
National Coalition, which he described as "an opposition coalition
largely based abroad, which lacks internal depth or popular support."
Underlining the well-organized nature of the SIF's structure, Aboud
claimed to operate a number of training camps across Syria where
recruits are provided with both educational and military instruction, as
well as several additional "camps specializing in elevating individuals
toward being qualified commanders." Perhaps auguring further front
expansion, Aboud claimed, "we have dozens of requests from other
battalions" to join SIF.
In addition to explaining SIF's provision of "services and medical
assistance" to "the vulnerable," Aboud also outlined his forces'
involvement in multi-group policing units, "especially in Aleppo, Idlib,
and Hama." With regards to SIF's sources of weaponry, Aboud claimed,
"we rely primarily on the spoils of the military...[but we also get]
donations from individuals abroad." The most prominent donors abroad
include money received from the Kuwaiti Salafi preacher Hajjaj
al-Ajami's network, Saudi-based Syrian preacher Adnan al-'Arur, Kuwaiti
Salafi politician and ideologue Hakim al-Mutayri, as well as individuals
from Qatar.
Aboud's interview with Al Jazeera provided him with an international
stage onto which he could openly advocate the case for his group's
prominence in Syria. Combined with his appearance in Cairo and on the
Salafi al-Nas TV, it seems clear that Aboud, with some extent of foreign
backing from Sunni leadership and from regional states, is launching a
move to assume a role as an Islamist alternative to rebel groups linked
to the Syrian National Council.
The SIF appears comfortable with this new role. During the al-Nas
interview, for the first time, the SIF introduced the head of its
external affairs office Muhammad Mustafa. It is apparent what his main
role will be based off of his comments on al-Nas: "We don't need
anything from anyone except help in arming the mujahidin to be able to
free our country and take our resources into our own hands."
In addition to Aboud's interview with Al Jazeera, in the subsequent week
it has also granted 30-minute interviews to the respective leaders of
four other pivotal Islamist groups -- Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqur al-Sham,
Kata'ib al-Farouq, and Liwa al-Islam -- suggesting a general move is
underway by Qatar to present such groups as well-organized,
regionally-supported rivals to the unorganized and so-called "FSA."
Intriguingly, on June 23, Al Jazeera televised official HASI-produced
video footage of a large car bombing in Aleppo before HASI released
footage of the attack via its own channels.
This power play by Qatar and sympathetic Egyptian Salafis highlights
that even though the United States (which has never even commented on
non-FSA or JN rebel groups) and Saudi Arabia are becoming even more
involved with arming and supporting the opposition, they are not the
only actors. It also contradicts recent reports that Qatar has handed
over the Syria portfolio to Saudi Arabia, highlighting that the
competition for influence among these Gulf States is still alive. This
bidding war between Gulf rivals could further hinder the future
prospects of the Syrian opposition in a post-Assad scenario.
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Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow fellow at The Washington Institute
and maintains the website Jihadology.net. Charles Lister is a
London-based terrorism and insurgency analyst; the views expressed here
are entirely his own and do not represent those of his employer.
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