There
is a particularly interesting aspect to the video that has recently surfaced, in
which Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, gloats over Iran’s
success in
coopting European negotiators to keep the Iranian nuclear program on track in
the mid-2000s, in spite of pressure from the United
States.
The
video clip, from an Iranian news-program interview of Rouhani in Farsi, was
published by Reza Khalili. Ryan
Mauro highlights it at the Clarion Project, tying it to a report from 31 July in
which Mauro outlined Rouhani’s extensive history of using deception about
the Iranian nuclear program back when he was the chief nuclear negotiator for
Tehran.
The
deception and Rouhani’s gloating are important (see especially his
characterization of the top-cover he received from European negotiators); I will
let readers visit the reports and soak in the information at your leisure. What I want to focus on here is the
timeline Rouhani refers to in the video.
If he is telling the truth – and there is no obvious reason why he would
lie about the timing he refers to –
the timeline he outlines for bringing Iranian centrifuge cascades online in
substantial numbers makes a poignant contrast with the reporting of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the time.
The
contrast highlights just how in the dark IAEA was during this period, at least
about the centrifuges. (It’s also
worth highlighting, in general, the timeline of what was going on during the
EU-brokered negotiations Rouhani refers to in the video.) Certainly, many in the West had an
uneasy suspicion that, by the end of 2005, Iran may have accomplished more than
IAEA was officially aware of. But,
as late as February 2006, IAEA acknowledged the following decisive
condition:
Due
to the fact that no centrifuge related raw materials and components are under
Agency seal, the Agency is unable effectively to monitor the R&D activities
being carried out by Iran except at the [Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant],* where
containment and surveillance measures are being applied to the enrichment
process.
Rouhani’s
timeline
The
full timeline from the video develops as follows. Rouhani summarizes it between the time
hacks of 3:45 and 4:30. His overall
allusion is to the period from October 2003 to August 2005, when he was the
chief negotiator for the Iranian nuclear program.
His
initial discussion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr contains no surprises;
it is couched in the following terms:
-
First phase of Bushehr project completed – Beginning of
2004
-
Next phase completed – Fall of 2004
These
references are presumably to Russia’s completion of facility
construction,
which was noted at the time in Western reporting.
-
Project completed – March 2005
This
is probably a reference to an agreement between Russia and Iran, concluded in February 2005, under which Moscow would supply the
enriched-uranium fuel for the light-water reactor at Bushehr. (See here as well for a summary from 2006 alluding to the 2005
agreement.)
So
far, so good. Next, Rouhani speaks
of the heavy-water reactor, or the plutonium reactor at
Arak.
-
“Production” started at the heavy-water plant – Summer of
2004
Construction of the reactor was begun in June of 2004,
but Rouhani here appears to be referring to the heavy-water production plant
(HWPP), a particular component of the Arak reactor system, which reportedly
began
operation
(i.e., the production of heavy water) in November 2004.
In
this walk back through the Iranian nuclear program, it is worth recalling
what the official line was about
Arak at the
time, in the big middle of the EU-3 talks with Iran:
Iran
has started building a research reactor that could eventually produce enough
plutonium for one bomb per year, ignoring calls to scrap the project, diplomats
close to the United Nations said on Thursday. …
IAEA
chief Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran had created a "confidence deficit" by
concealing parts of its atomic program for nearly two decades and urged Tehran
to improve its transparency and cooperation with U.N. inspectors.
A concluding statement from this week's IAEA governing board meeting said the 35 members unanimously said it was "essential that Iran provide full transparency and extend proactive cooperation to the agency." …
A concluding statement from this week's IAEA governing board meeting said the 35 members unanimously said it was "essential that Iran provide full transparency and extend proactive cooperation to the agency." …
The
EU's "big three" states have offered Iran a package of economic and political
incentives if it abandons its uranium enrichment program, which could produce
fuel for nuclear power plants or atomic weapons. Tehran has temporarily frozen
most of the program but has refused to abandon it.
Iran
has, of course, continued the heavy-water reactor program at Arak in the ensuing
years, with the HWPP continuing to produce heavy water. The reactor is to be brought online in
2014, according to Iran’s projection; a circumstance the U.S. officially finds
“deeply troubling.”
(Also
worth noting about Arak is that, like many of the components of Iran’s nuclear
program, it was brought to public attention by an Iranian opposition group; in
this case, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which published its
information about the site in 2002.
NCRI provided extensive detail on activities at the site in
2002; Iran, following the usual pattern, later
notified IAEA of her intention to construct the
reactor
there, in May 2003.)
The yellowcake
break
Rouhani alludes next to the production of
yellowcake:
-
First yellowcake produced – Winter of 2004
Although there have been multiple announcements of
Iran’s first production of yellowcake, Rouhani is probably talking here about an
initial quantity of 40-50 kilograms of it, produced in conjunction with
inauguration of the Gchine uranium mine in July 2004. IAEA recorded this information in its
Safeguards report of 15 November 2004. (See here and here for later reports of Iran’s first yellowcake
production.)
As a
reminder: when Iran became able to routinely produce her own yellowcake – which
I assess to have occurred in the late-2008 to early-2009
timeframe –
it became impossible for IAEA to track how much of a uranium stock Iran
has. In the early 2000s, estimates
could be bounded by the size of Iran’s original stock of yellowcake, which had
been obtained from South Africa in the 1970s. Once a supply of indigenously produced
yellowcake came on the scene, it was impossible to account for everything Iran
might have: where all the new yellowcake was going (e.g., all of it to the official, acknowledged
facility at Esfahan for conversion; all of that to Natanz for enrichment?), and
how much enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) was coming out the other end.
Under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran doesn’t owe IAEA an accounting for her raw
uranium or yellowcake output. An
instrument called the Additional Protocol to the NPT provides for member states
to render such an accounting, but under the radical mullahs’ regime, Iran has
never agreed to abide by the Additional Protocol. So she does not give IAEA this
accounting, or allow IAEA controls to be exerted over her mining and milling
activities.
When were the centrifuges in
play?
It is
with this in mind that we should approach the final piece of Rouhani’s timeline,
concerning centrifuge cascades for uranium enrichment:
-
“Centrifuges reached 3,000” – In 2005
-
1,700 centrifuges when Rouhani left the project – that is, in August 2005, when
he stepped down as the chief negotiator for the nuclear
program
Compare those numbers and dates with
the understanding of IAEA during that period that Iran had suspended uranium
enrichment. ...
[See the rest at the
links]
CDR, USN (Ret.)
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