If there’s big news in the arcane world of naval operations, it might be that the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has supposedly departed the Mediterranean to head for home.
Regional postures
Then again, it might not. The Aviationist reports that there are still Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) effective in the Western Med that indicate an area where Kuznetsov plans to conduct flight operations. The NOTAMs are in effect through 26 April – although Russian media reported on 18 April that Kuznetsov had completed her mission in the Med and was heading home. It’s not clear why the Russians would have reported the carrier’s movements deceptively. (NATO navies know where Kuznetsov has been throughout this period.) It could be that they just changed their minds.
There are several things to say about Kuznetsov’s presence, and you can decide for yourselves what the import of the move is. For one thing, Russia’s ability to keep the carrier deployed forward is bounded by the limitations of Russia’s basing and support arrangements in the Med. Kuznetsov has been deployed since December, and her deployments since she began going to the Med again, in 2008, have typically been of about the same duration. They are much shorter, in other words, than the deployments of U.S. aircraft carriers. (USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75), for example, was deployed from July 2013 until this past Friday, 18 April.) America has a far more extensive network of shore-based support capabilities than Russia has in the Med.
For another thing, however, the U.S. hasn’t been keeping a carrier in the Med. What the U.S. hasn’t been doing, in fact, is the main factor affecting the decisions of Russia and other countries in the “Great Crossroads” area, at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
At the operational level, Kuznetsov’s combat power and utility are minimal for any true military purpose, in Russia’s major foreign-policy concerns in the region right now, Ukraine and Syria. (Kuznetsov could, in any case, be gotten into the Black Sea only by breaching the Montreux Convention – and Turkey wouldn’t sit still for that.) The carrier’s presence in the Eastern Med, where she was for nearly three months, is certainly not meaningless. But it’s politically demonstrative rather than militarily decisive. And if there’s no U.S. carrier prowling the Med, the need for demonstration can be accorded a lower priority.
At the geopolitical level, U.S. passivity is equally important, if not more. There are no new patterns developing in any of the hot spots around the Great Crossroads. There’s nothing new about the method by which Russia is engulfing eastern Ukraine; the Russian tactics there are just Bolshevism with cell phones. Bolshevism “works” not because it’s uniquely effective in terms of methods or tactics, but because it attacks where it’s most likely to go unopposed by a stronger power.
That’s exactly what’s happening in Ukraine. The decisive factor isn’t anything the Russians are doing. It’s the lack of opposition from the U.S. and NATO. Even the shaky interim government in Kiev could, and probably would, be doing more to defend its territory if it knew it had backing from NATO against the conventional power Russia can bring to bear. But it doesn’t.
The same dynamic is in play in Syria, and it’s in this overall context that all Russian moves have to be seen. If Russia is sending the carrier home now, it’s because it’s convenient – it keeps her navy and its budget on schedule – and nothing constrains her to do otherwise.
The Black Sea
USS Donald Cook (DDG-75), which had the encounter with the Russian Su-24 Fencer on 12 April, has just departed the Black Sea. Her departure is unrelated to the incident with the Su-24; the U.S. and France are rotating combatants through the Black Sea to maintain a demonstrative NATO naval presence there. The frigate USS Taylor (FFG-50), which had the unfortunate event with the propeller shaft grounding in the Black Sea in February, has just reentered the Black Sea, and the French frigate FS Dupleix (D641) is declared for an inbound transit of the Bosporus on 26-27 April. (The NATO navies will be restricting their ships’ visits to the Black Sea to 21 days or less, in compliance with the Montreux Convention.)
The NATO warships represent the highest level of excellence for their kind, of course. Nevertheless, claims that they signify a big military build-up by NATO are vastly overblown. There is virtually no maritime character to the Ukraine conflict, and the three ships are not militarily useful for projecting power ashore, in any way that would be meaningful. They are there to demonstrate NATO’s political interest, not to counter military moves by Russia (a purpose for which they are unsuitable).
Is it wise to signal political interest using military assets that have little to no military utility in the context they’ve been deployed in? We report, you decide.
Turkish Maritime Task Group
The ships of the Turkish Maritime Task Group continue their progress in circumnavigating Africa, something the Turkish navy hasn’t done since 1866, when it was the Ottoman navy. So far they have visited Tunisia, the Canary Islands, and Senegal (see here), Mauritania, The Gambia, Ghana, and Benin.
They’ve also visited Nigeria, and will pull into Namibia for a port visit at the beginning of May. During the Nigerian visit, the Turks reportedly “donated” a warship to the Nigerian navy. I can find no record of which warship (i.e., what type it was), but I assume it was a smaller patrol craft. Interestingly, in mid-March, unconfirmed reporting suggested that arms had been shipped to unknown recipients in Nigeria via Turkish Airlines, a claim vigorously rejected by the Erdogan government. An airline spokesman later said that the arms had been part of a legitimate shipment to the Nigerian navy. Which doesn’t fit with the protestations from the Turkish government, so you see the conundrum here.
In conjunction with the visit to Nigeria, the Turkish warships participated in a multinational naval exercise as well, Obangame Express 2014. This exercise series, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and the host nation, focuses on joint maritime security and antipiracy training. The 2014 iteration saw the Turkish navy’s first at-sea participation with its own warships.
The Iranian enigma
Many readers are no doubt aware of the Iranian navy’s announcement last week that its previously proclaimed plans to send warships to the Atlantic were on hold. The “29th Fleet,” of which – depending on the report – the two formerly Atlantic-bound ships formed either all or part, would not be going to the Atlantic after all.
It remains the case that Iran is not being forthcoming about this, and that her ships have probably been somewhere other than where the Iranian navy has suggested they were. Once again, a few days ago, the Iranian navy announced that the two ships in question, the frigate Sabalan and the replenishment ship Kharg, were conducting a port visit in the region. This time, the port was supposedly Muscat, Oman. And once again, there has been no independent evidence that the ships were there.
Iran has intimated vaguely that the antipiracy mission ended up taking precedence for the 29th Fleet over the planned voyage to the Atlantic. But in three months of deployment, there has been not a single scrap of evidence that the Iranian warships were in the antipiracy patrol area in the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea. With ships and reconnaissance planes from multiple NATO countries, along with the forces of China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, plying the same waters, it is simply not credible to propose that the Iranian warships, which were supposed to be in the Atlantic, were in the Horn of Africa instead for three months, but went unnoticed and unreported.
The latest Iranian announcement is timed to account for an on-schedule return to the ships’ home port of Bandar Abbas. What have the ships been doing? There is little to go on. The ships have apparently been in an area or areas where they were very unlikely to be photographed or reported on. Highly trafficked and better-wired locations around the Indian Ocean are unlikely stowaway spots: Sri Lanka, the Seychelles, the Maldives, the Mozambique Channel (where South Africa and Mozambique run a joint antipiracy operation of their own, Operation Copper). Moving from one place to another, meanwhile, is more likely than remaining in a single place.
Presumably, the ships’ mission was related to Iran’s highest policy priorities. Among those, her nuclear program and her arms shipments to terrorists might obviously benefit from the transshipment services of naval vessels (which cannot be stopped on the high seas except as a belligerent act). As discussed here, Iran has been caught out, over the past decade, in increasingly elaborate transshipment schemes to get arms to Hamas and Hezbollah. Perhaps some shipments are worth exceptional furtiveness and misdirection. Securing uranium from African sources might also warrant such operations, or importing highly sensitive items from North Korea, via multiple interim stops.
We aren’t likely to know any time soon. But we do have the prospect of repeating this whole drama in the near future, with Iran’s promise that the 30th Fleet (see link above) really will go to the Atlantic.
Russian – and Japanese – ships do Pakistan
File this one with the growing pile of “firsts.” Ships of the Russian navy arrived in Karachi, Pakistan over the weekend for the first such port visit in modern history. It reportedly included an at-sea drill between the navies, along with the usual diplomatic events. The three-ship task group, which includes Udaloy-class destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov, a naval tanker, and a salvage tug, is from the Pacific Ocean Fleet and left Vladivostok in March.
On the way to Pakistan, the Russian group participated in Exercise Komodo 2014, hosted by Indonesia, along with ships from 15 other nations, including the U.S., China, India, and Japan.
The Japanese warships visiting at the same time were two destroyers, Samidare (DD-106) and Sazanami (DD-113). They’re on the way home from antipiracy ops off Somalia – and we are right to read something into the mutual comfort of the three nations with each other’s company.
Pakistan’s sudden wild popularity has a lot to do with Asian alarm about China – Pakistan’s longstanding patron – but is also connected with the long view of where Asian relations are going in a post-Pax Americana world. In less than a year, U.S. forces will be all but gone from Afghanistan, and the meaning of the American presence in the Persian Gulf, as well as U.S. relations with Pakistan, will inevitably change. By January 2017, we will not be living in the same world.
Russian tug saga off U.S. coast
Speaking of the Russian navy, remember the Nikolay Chiker? She’s the large-capacity, ocean-going Russian navy tug that was lurking off the Florida coast in March, before heading down to Curacao. She’s been lurking again. She was detected sitting off St. Eustatius in the Caribbean 5-6 April, and in port Havana 20-22 April. Between times, Nikolay Chiker meandered around off Canaveral. Her latest position on the 24th puts her south of western Cuba.
It bears repeating that the big tug is not outfitted for intelligence collection against rocket and space launches. There may have been interesting events in these categories while she was there, in either March or April, but there’s nothing Nikolay Chiker can do about them. If she has been fitted with equipment for special collection of some kind, it’s more likely to be underwater collection.
New agreement among Asian-Pacific nations on sea encounters
Members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) came to a landmark agreement this week on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which – at a very basic level – will regularize the behavior expected on both sides in routine, unplanned maritime encounters between the member navies.
The U.S. and 20 other nations (including Russia and China) are members of WPNS, a non-treaty consultative body which held its first symposium in 1988. The CUES agreement is non-binding, and, again, is very basic. It is not an “incidents at sea” (INCSEA) type agreement, like the one signed by the U.S. and former USSR in 1972. An INCSEA agreement of some kind is what many observers have been advocating for relations in the South China Sea, especially in the flurry after the Chinese navy’s incident with the cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63) in December 2013.
But it’s something. The final text of the CUES agreement has not been made public yet, but you can view some of its provisions as reported in Chinese (English-language) media here. (China hosted the symposium this past week.)
It remains to be seen how much of an achievement CUES is as a measure to promote stability, security, and peace. I have a strict policy of not sneezing at these earnest, hard-negotiated conventions. But they tend to proliferate when storm clouds are gathering, without damping down the underlying reasons for confrontation. Procedure isn’t a substitute for policy or will.
Regional postures
Then again, it might not. The Aviationist reports that there are still Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) effective in the Western Med that indicate an area where Kuznetsov plans to conduct flight operations. The NOTAMs are in effect through 26 April – although Russian media reported on 18 April that Kuznetsov had completed her mission in the Med and was heading home. It’s not clear why the Russians would have reported the carrier’s movements deceptively. (NATO navies know where Kuznetsov has been throughout this period.) It could be that they just changed their minds.
There are several things to say about Kuznetsov’s presence, and you can decide for yourselves what the import of the move is. For one thing, Russia’s ability to keep the carrier deployed forward is bounded by the limitations of Russia’s basing and support arrangements in the Med. Kuznetsov has been deployed since December, and her deployments since she began going to the Med again, in 2008, have typically been of about the same duration. They are much shorter, in other words, than the deployments of U.S. aircraft carriers. (USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75), for example, was deployed from July 2013 until this past Friday, 18 April.) America has a far more extensive network of shore-based support capabilities than Russia has in the Med.
For another thing, however, the U.S. hasn’t been keeping a carrier in the Med. What the U.S. hasn’t been doing, in fact, is the main factor affecting the decisions of Russia and other countries in the “Great Crossroads” area, at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
At the operational level, Kuznetsov’s combat power and utility are minimal for any true military purpose, in Russia’s major foreign-policy concerns in the region right now, Ukraine and Syria. (Kuznetsov could, in any case, be gotten into the Black Sea only by breaching the Montreux Convention – and Turkey wouldn’t sit still for that.) The carrier’s presence in the Eastern Med, where she was for nearly three months, is certainly not meaningless. But it’s politically demonstrative rather than militarily decisive. And if there’s no U.S. carrier prowling the Med, the need for demonstration can be accorded a lower priority.
At the geopolitical level, U.S. passivity is equally important, if not more. There are no new patterns developing in any of the hot spots around the Great Crossroads. There’s nothing new about the method by which Russia is engulfing eastern Ukraine; the Russian tactics there are just Bolshevism with cell phones. Bolshevism “works” not because it’s uniquely effective in terms of methods or tactics, but because it attacks where it’s most likely to go unopposed by a stronger power.
That’s exactly what’s happening in Ukraine. The decisive factor isn’t anything the Russians are doing. It’s the lack of opposition from the U.S. and NATO. Even the shaky interim government in Kiev could, and probably would, be doing more to defend its territory if it knew it had backing from NATO against the conventional power Russia can bring to bear. But it doesn’t.
The same dynamic is in play in Syria, and it’s in this overall context that all Russian moves have to be seen. If Russia is sending the carrier home now, it’s because it’s convenient – it keeps her navy and its budget on schedule – and nothing constrains her to do otherwise.
The Black Sea
USS Donald Cook (DDG-75), which had the encounter with the Russian Su-24 Fencer on 12 April, has just departed the Black Sea. Her departure is unrelated to the incident with the Su-24; the U.S. and France are rotating combatants through the Black Sea to maintain a demonstrative NATO naval presence there. The frigate USS Taylor (FFG-50), which had the unfortunate event with the propeller shaft grounding in the Black Sea in February, has just reentered the Black Sea, and the French frigate FS Dupleix (D641) is declared for an inbound transit of the Bosporus on 26-27 April. (The NATO navies will be restricting their ships’ visits to the Black Sea to 21 days or less, in compliance with the Montreux Convention.)
The NATO warships represent the highest level of excellence for their kind, of course. Nevertheless, claims that they signify a big military build-up by NATO are vastly overblown. There is virtually no maritime character to the Ukraine conflict, and the three ships are not militarily useful for projecting power ashore, in any way that would be meaningful. They are there to demonstrate NATO’s political interest, not to counter military moves by Russia (a purpose for which they are unsuitable).
Is it wise to signal political interest using military assets that have little to no military utility in the context they’ve been deployed in? We report, you decide.
Turkish Maritime Task Group
The ships of the Turkish Maritime Task Group continue their progress in circumnavigating Africa, something the Turkish navy hasn’t done since 1866, when it was the Ottoman navy. So far they have visited Tunisia, the Canary Islands, and Senegal (see here), Mauritania, The Gambia, Ghana, and Benin.
They’ve also visited Nigeria, and will pull into Namibia for a port visit at the beginning of May. During the Nigerian visit, the Turks reportedly “donated” a warship to the Nigerian navy. I can find no record of which warship (i.e., what type it was), but I assume it was a smaller patrol craft. Interestingly, in mid-March, unconfirmed reporting suggested that arms had been shipped to unknown recipients in Nigeria via Turkish Airlines, a claim vigorously rejected by the Erdogan government. An airline spokesman later said that the arms had been part of a legitimate shipment to the Nigerian navy. Which doesn’t fit with the protestations from the Turkish government, so you see the conundrum here.
In conjunction with the visit to Nigeria, the Turkish warships participated in a multinational naval exercise as well, Obangame Express 2014. This exercise series, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and the host nation, focuses on joint maritime security and antipiracy training. The 2014 iteration saw the Turkish navy’s first at-sea participation with its own warships.
The Iranian enigma
Many readers are no doubt aware of the Iranian navy’s announcement last week that its previously proclaimed plans to send warships to the Atlantic were on hold. The “29th Fleet,” of which – depending on the report – the two formerly Atlantic-bound ships formed either all or part, would not be going to the Atlantic after all.
It remains the case that Iran is not being forthcoming about this, and that her ships have probably been somewhere other than where the Iranian navy has suggested they were. Once again, a few days ago, the Iranian navy announced that the two ships in question, the frigate Sabalan and the replenishment ship Kharg, were conducting a port visit in the region. This time, the port was supposedly Muscat, Oman. And once again, there has been no independent evidence that the ships were there.
Iran has intimated vaguely that the antipiracy mission ended up taking precedence for the 29th Fleet over the planned voyage to the Atlantic. But in three months of deployment, there has been not a single scrap of evidence that the Iranian warships were in the antipiracy patrol area in the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea. With ships and reconnaissance planes from multiple NATO countries, along with the forces of China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, plying the same waters, it is simply not credible to propose that the Iranian warships, which were supposed to be in the Atlantic, were in the Horn of Africa instead for three months, but went unnoticed and unreported.
The latest Iranian announcement is timed to account for an on-schedule return to the ships’ home port of Bandar Abbas. What have the ships been doing? There is little to go on. The ships have apparently been in an area or areas where they were very unlikely to be photographed or reported on. Highly trafficked and better-wired locations around the Indian Ocean are unlikely stowaway spots: Sri Lanka, the Seychelles, the Maldives, the Mozambique Channel (where South Africa and Mozambique run a joint antipiracy operation of their own, Operation Copper). Moving from one place to another, meanwhile, is more likely than remaining in a single place.
Presumably, the ships’ mission was related to Iran’s highest policy priorities. Among those, her nuclear program and her arms shipments to terrorists might obviously benefit from the transshipment services of naval vessels (which cannot be stopped on the high seas except as a belligerent act). As discussed here, Iran has been caught out, over the past decade, in increasingly elaborate transshipment schemes to get arms to Hamas and Hezbollah. Perhaps some shipments are worth exceptional furtiveness and misdirection. Securing uranium from African sources might also warrant such operations, or importing highly sensitive items from North Korea, via multiple interim stops.
We aren’t likely to know any time soon. But we do have the prospect of repeating this whole drama in the near future, with Iran’s promise that the 30th Fleet (see link above) really will go to the Atlantic.
Russian – and Japanese – ships do Pakistan
File this one with the growing pile of “firsts.” Ships of the Russian navy arrived in Karachi, Pakistan over the weekend for the first such port visit in modern history. It reportedly included an at-sea drill between the navies, along with the usual diplomatic events. The three-ship task group, which includes Udaloy-class destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov, a naval tanker, and a salvage tug, is from the Pacific Ocean Fleet and left Vladivostok in March.
On the way to Pakistan, the Russian group participated in Exercise Komodo 2014, hosted by Indonesia, along with ships from 15 other nations, including the U.S., China, India, and Japan.
The Japanese warships visiting at the same time were two destroyers, Samidare (DD-106) and Sazanami (DD-113). They’re on the way home from antipiracy ops off Somalia – and we are right to read something into the mutual comfort of the three nations with each other’s company.
Pakistan’s sudden wild popularity has a lot to do with Asian alarm about China – Pakistan’s longstanding patron – but is also connected with the long view of where Asian relations are going in a post-Pax Americana world. In less than a year, U.S. forces will be all but gone from Afghanistan, and the meaning of the American presence in the Persian Gulf, as well as U.S. relations with Pakistan, will inevitably change. By January 2017, we will not be living in the same world.
Russian tug saga off U.S. coast
Speaking of the Russian navy, remember the Nikolay Chiker? She’s the large-capacity, ocean-going Russian navy tug that was lurking off the Florida coast in March, before heading down to Curacao. She’s been lurking again. She was detected sitting off St. Eustatius in the Caribbean 5-6 April, and in port Havana 20-22 April. Between times, Nikolay Chiker meandered around off Canaveral. Her latest position on the 24th puts her south of western Cuba.
It bears repeating that the big tug is not outfitted for intelligence collection against rocket and space launches. There may have been interesting events in these categories while she was there, in either March or April, but there’s nothing Nikolay Chiker can do about them. If she has been fitted with equipment for special collection of some kind, it’s more likely to be underwater collection.
New agreement among Asian-Pacific nations on sea encounters
Members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) came to a landmark agreement this week on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which – at a very basic level – will regularize the behavior expected on both sides in routine, unplanned maritime encounters between the member navies.
The U.S. and 20 other nations (including Russia and China) are members of WPNS, a non-treaty consultative body which held its first symposium in 1988. The CUES agreement is non-binding, and, again, is very basic. It is not an “incidents at sea” (INCSEA) type agreement, like the one signed by the U.S. and former USSR in 1972. An INCSEA agreement of some kind is what many observers have been advocating for relations in the South China Sea, especially in the flurry after the Chinese navy’s incident with the cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63) in December 2013.
But it’s something. The final text of the CUES agreement has not been made public yet, but you can view some of its provisions as reported in Chinese (English-language) media here. (China hosted the symposium this past week.)
It remains to be seen how much of an achievement CUES is as a measure to promote stability, security, and peace. I have a strict policy of not sneezing at these earnest, hard-negotiated conventions. But they tend to proliferate when storm clouds are gathering, without damping down the underlying reasons for confrontation. Procedure isn’t a substitute for policy or will.
Read more at http://libertyunyielding.com/2014/04/25/naval-round-peace-continues-break/#mMqg63ShRhldxFts.99If there’s big news in the arcane world of naval operations, it might be that the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has supposedly departed the Mediterranean to head for home.
Regional postures
Then
again, it might not. The Aviationist reports that there are still Notices
to Airmen (NOTAMs) effective in the Western Med that indicate an area where
Kuznetsov plans to conduct flight
operations. The NOTAMs are in effect through 26 April – although Russian
media reported on 18 April that Kuznetsov
had completed her mission in the Med and was heading home. It’s not clear
why the Russians would have reported the carrier’s movements deceptively.
(NATO navies know where Kuznetsov has
been throughout this period.) It could be that they just changed their
minds.
There are
several things to say about Kuznetsov’s
presence, and you can decide for yourselves what the import of the move
is. For one thing, Russia’s ability to keep the carrier deployed forward
is bounded by the limitations of Russia’s basing and support arrangements in
the Med. Kuznetsov has been
deployed since December, and her deployments since she began going to the Med
again, in 2008, have typically been of about the same duration. They are
much shorter, in other words, than the deployments of U.S. aircraft
carriers. (USS Harry S Truman
(CVN-75), for example, was deployed from July 2013 until this past Friday, 18
April.) America has a far more extensive network of shore-based support
capabilities than Russia has in the Med.
Admiral
Kuznetsov anchored off Limassol, Cyprus in April 2014 (Image via defencenet.gr)
For
another thing, however, the U.S. hasn’t been keeping a carrier in the
Med. What the U.S. hasn’t been doing, in fact, is the main factor
affecting the decisions of Russia and other countries in the “Great Crossroads”
area, at the juncture of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
At the
operational level, Kuznetsov’s combat
power and utility are minimal for any true military purpose, in Russia’s major
foreign-policy concerns in the region right now, Ukraine and Syria. (Kuznetsov could, in any case, be gotten
into the Black Sea only by breaching the Montreux Convention – and Turkey
wouldn’t sit still for that.) The carrier’s presence in the Eastern Med,
where she was for nearly three months, is certainly not meaningless. But
it’s politically demonstrative rather than militarily decisive. And if
there’s no U.S. carrier prowling the Med, the need for demonstration can be
accorded a lower priority.
At the
geopolitical level, U.S. passivity is equally important, if not more.
There are no new patterns developing
in any of the hot spots around the Great Crossroads. There’s nothing new
about the method by which Russia is engulfing eastern Ukraine; the Russian
tactics there are just Bolshevism with cell phones. Bolshevism “works”
not because it’s uniquely effective in terms of methods or tactics, but because
it attacks where it’s most likely to go unopposed by a stronger power.
That’s
exactly what’s happening in Ukraine. The decisive factor isn’t anything
the Russians are doing. It’s the lack of opposition from the U.S. and
NATO. Even the shaky interim government in Kiev could, and probably
would, be doing more to defend its territory if it knew it had backing from
NATO against the conventional power Russia can bring to bear. But it
doesn’t.
The same
dynamic is in play in Syria, and it’s in this overall context that all Russian
moves have to be seen. If Russia is sending the carrier home now, it’s because
it’s convenient – it keeps her navy and its budget on schedule – and nothing
constrains her to do otherwise.
The Black Sea
USS Donald Cook (DDG-75), which had the encounter
with the Russian Su-24 Fencer on 12 April, has just
departed the Black Sea. Her departure is unrelated to the incident
with the Su-24; the U.S. and France are rotating combatants through the Black
Sea to maintain a demonstrative NATO naval presence there. The frigate
USS Taylor (FFG-50), which had the
unfortunate event with the propeller
shaft grounding in the Black Sea in February, has just reentered
the Black Sea, and the French frigate FS Dupleix (D641) is declared for an inbound transit of the Bosporus
on 26-27 April. (The NATO navies will be restricting their ships’ visits
to the Black Sea to 21 days or less, in compliance with the Montreux
Convention.)
The NATO
warships represent the highest level of excellence for their kind, of
course. Nevertheless, claims that they signify
a big military build-up by NATO are vastly overblown. There is
virtually no maritime character to the Ukraine conflict, and the three ships
are not militarily useful for projecting power ashore, in any way that would be
meaningful. They are there to demonstrate NATO’s political interest, not
to counter military moves by Russia (a purpose for which they are unsuitable).
Is it
wise to signal political interest using military assets that have little to no
military utility in the context they’ve been deployed in? We report, you
decide.
Turkish Maritime Task Group
The ships
of the Turkish Maritime Task Group continue their progress in circumnavigating
Africa, something the Turkish navy hasn’t done since 1866, when it was the
Ottoman navy. So far they have visited Tunisia, the Canary Islands, and
Senegal (see here),
Mauritania,
The
Gambia, Ghana,
and Benin.
They’ve
also visited Nigeria, and will pull
into Namibia for a port visit at the beginning of May. During the
Nigerian visit, the Turks reportedly
“donated” a warship to the Nigerian navy. I can find no record of
which warship (i.e., what type it was), but I assume it was a smaller patrol
craft. Interestingly, in mid-March, unconfirmed reporting suggested that arms
had been shipped to unknown recipients in Nigeria via Turkish Airlines, a
claim vigorously rejected by the Erdogan government. An airline spokesman
later
said that the arms had been part of a legitimate shipment to the Nigerian
navy. Which doesn’t fit with the protestations from the Turkish
government, so you see the conundrum here.
Turkish
frigate TCG Gediz, an ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate, hosts
Mauritanian guests in Nouakchott on 2 April 2014 (Turkish navy image)
In
conjunction with the visit to Nigeria, the Turkish warships participated in a
multinational naval exercise as well, Obangame Express
2014. This exercise series, sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and the
host nation, focuses on joint maritime security and antipiracy training.
The 2014 iteration saw the Turkish navy’s first at-sea participation with its
own warships.
The Iranian enigma
Many
readers are no doubt aware of the Iranian navy’s announcement last week that
its previously proclaimed plans to send warships to the Atlantic were
on hold. The “29th Fleet,” of which – depending on the report – the
two formerly Atlantic-bound ships formed either all or part, would not be going
to the Atlantic after all.
It
remains the case that Iran
is not being forthcoming about this, and that her ships have probably been
somewhere other than where the Iranian navy has suggested they were. Once
again, a few days ago, the Iranian navy announced that the two ships in
question, the frigate Sabalan and the
replenishment ship Kharg, were
conducting a port visit in the region. This time, the port was supposedly
Muscat, Oman. And once again, there has been no independent evidence
that the ships were there.
Iran has
intimated vaguely that the antipiracy mission ended up taking precedence for
the 29th Fleet over the planned voyage to the Atlantic. But in three
months of deployment, there has been not a single scrap of evidence that the
Iranian warships were in the antipiracy patrol area in the Gulf of Aden or Red
Sea. With ships and reconnaissance planes from multiple NATO countries,
along with the forces of China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, and Singapore, plying the same waters, it is simply not credible
to propose that the Iranian warships, which were supposed to be in the
Atlantic, were in the Horn of Africa instead for three months, but went
unnoticed and unreported.
The
latest Iranian announcement is timed to account for an on-schedule return to
the ships’ home port of Bandar Abbas. What have the ships been
doing? There is little to go on. The ships have apparently been in
an area or areas where they were very unlikely to be photographed or reported
on. Highly trafficked and better-wired locations around the Indian Ocean
are unlikely stowaway spots: Sri
Lanka, the Seychelles, the Maldives, the Mozambique Channel (where South Africa
and Mozambique run a joint antipiracy operation of their own, Operation
Copper). Moving from one place to another, meanwhile, is more likely
than remaining in a single place.
Presumably,
the ships’ mission was related to Iran’s highest policy priorities. Among
those, her nuclear program and her arms shipments to terrorists might obviously
benefit from the transshipment services of naval vessels (which cannot be
stopped on the high seas except as a belligerent act). As discussed here,
Iran has been caught out, over the past decade, in increasingly elaborate
transshipment schemes to get arms to Hamas and Hezbollah. Perhaps some
shipments are worth exceptional furtiveness and misdirection. Securing
uranium from African sources might also warrant such operations, or importing
highly sensitive items from North Korea, via multiple interim stops.
We aren’t
likely to know any time soon. But we do have the prospect of repeating
this whole drama in the near future, with Iran’s promise that the 30th Fleet
(see link above) really will go to the Atlantic.
Russian – and Japanese – ships do Pakistan
File this
one with the growing pile of “firsts.” Ships of the Russian
navy arrived in Karachi, Pakistan over the weekend for the first such port visit in modern
history. It reportedly included an at-sea drill between the navies,
along with the usual diplomatic events. The three-ship task group, which
includes Udaloy-class destroyer Marshal
Shaposhnikov, a naval tanker, and a salvage tug, is from the Pacific Ocean
Fleet and left Vladivostok in March.
On the
way to Pakistan, the Russian group participated in Exercise
Komodo 2014, hosted by Indonesia, along with ships from 15 other nations,
including the U.S., China, India, and Japan.
The Japanese
warships visiting at the same time were two destroyers, Samidare (DD-106) and Sazanami (DD-113). They’re on the
way home from antipiracy ops off Somalia – and we are right to read something
into the mutual comfort of the three nations with each other’s company.
Pakistani
navy musters a reception contingent in Karachi for JDS Sazanami, a Japanese
destroyer, in April 2014 (Pakistani navy image)
Pakistan’s
sudden wild popularity has a lot to do with Asian alarm about China –
Pakistan’s longstanding patron – but is also connected with the long view of
where Asian relations are going in a post-Pax Americana world. In less
than a year, U.S. forces will be all but gone from Afghanistan, and the meaning
of the American presence in the Persian Gulf, as well as U.S. relations with
Pakistan, will inevitably change. By January 2017, we will not be living
in the same world.
Russian tug saga off U.S. coast
Speaking
of the Russian navy, remember the Nikolay
Chiker? She’s the large-capacity, ocean-going Russian navy tug that
was lurking
off the Florida coast in March, before heading down to Curacao. She’s
been lurking again. She was detected sitting
off St. Eustatius in the Caribbean 5-6 April, and in port Havana 20-22
April. Between times, Nikolay
Chiker meandered
around off Canaveral. Her latest position on the 24th puts her south
of western Cuba.
It bears
repeating that the big tug is not outfitted
for intelligence collection against rocket and space launches. There may
have been interesting events in these categories while she was there, in either
March or April, but there’s nothing Nikolay
Chiker can do about them. If she has been fitted with equipment for
special collection of some kind, it’s more likely to be underwater collection.
New agreement among Asian-Pacific nations on sea
encounters
Members
of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) came to a
landmark agreement this week on a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
(CUES), which – at a very basic level – will regularize the behavior expected
on both sides in routine, unplanned maritime encounters between the member
navies.
The U.S.
and 20 other nations (including Russia and China) are members of WPNS, a
non-treaty consultative body which held its first symposium in 1988. The
CUES agreement is non-binding, and, again, is very basic. It is not an “incidents at sea” (INCSEA) type
agreement, like the one signed by
the U.S. and former USSR in 1972. An INCSEA agreement of some kind is
what many observers have
been advocating for relations in the South China Sea, especially in
the flurry after the Chinese navy’s incident with the cruiser USS Cowpens (CG-63) in December 2013.
But it’s
something. The final text of the CUES agreement has not been made public
yet, but you can view some of its provisions as reported in Chinese
(English-language) media here.
(China hosted the symposium this past week.)
It
remains to be seen how much of an achievement CUES is as a measure to promote
stability, security, and peace. I have a strict policy of not sneezing at
these earnest, hard-negotiated conventions. But they tend to proliferate when
storm clouds are gathering, without damping down the underlying reasons for
confrontation. Procedure isn’t a substitute for policy or will.
J.E. Dyer is a
retired Naval Intelligence officer who lives in Southern California, blogging as
The Optimistic Conservative for domestic tranquility and world peace. Her
articles have appeared at Hot Air, Commentary’s Contentions, Patheos, The Daily
Caller, The Jewish Press, and The Weekly Standard.
More by J.E. Dyer
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