The is a sense of
justified public rage prompting the demand that Israel exact a heavy
price from Hamas, whose operatives in Judea and Samaria abducted and
murdered three Israeli teenagers, especially since after the Israel
Defense Forces entered Hebron, Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip began
firing rockets at the Negev's communities.
The terrorists' moves
have bolstered the popularity of the demand to strike them with full
force. It is natural and understandable, and it has become apparent in
public polls as well.
When Habayit Hayehudi
Chairman Naftali Bennett and Yisrael Beytenu Chairman Avigdor Lieberman
demand, during a cabinet meeting, that Israel strike terrorists, and
their comments become public knowledge almost immediately, they gain
political popularity points.
A military operation,
airstrikes and a ground incursion are roaring and resounding expression
of the rage felt by the residents of Tel Aviv and the Gaza vicinity
communities alike. In comparison, the fluctuations in the balance of
power that result from low-key moves such as re-arresting a terror
operative recently released, or seizing funds from a charity that serves
as a front for a terror group, lack the luster of a military offensive,
even if they have significant results on the ground.
Populist statements
come with a price, and while the majority of the world regards Hamas
with the utmost contempt, neighboring countries and the West alike would
rush to its defense and condemn Israel at the first sight of IDF tanks
entering the Gaza Strip. The European Union already has a statement of
censure ready and waiting in Brussels.
If the light at the end
of the tunnel indicated that there was a chance of toppling the Hamas
regime in Gaza, this risk would be worth taking. But Israel's ability to
achieve that by itself is a mirage. Toppling Hamas would require a
practical -- albeit secret -- pact with Egypt, Jordan and the
Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, and this alliance would have to
clearly define its mission. Anyone who knows how this alliance could be
formed should be invited to the next diplomatic-security cabinet
meeting.
Hamas is in dire
straits. Its coffers are empty, and the IDF's operation in Judea and
Samaria has stemmed the flow of funds from Qatar. Financial pressure can
be more effective than bombs, but it takes longer, and it is less
impressive to watch.
This does not mean that
Israel should sit idly by, and it does not. Launching Operation Cast
Lead in 2008 was the right thing to do, and 2012's Operation Pillar of
Defense dealt Hamas a massive blow; but while both were meant to
facilitate a prolonged cease-fire and the resulting calm, they could not
solve the problem completely.
Former Shas Chairman MK
Eli Yishai once suggested to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to
create a "menu" that would inform Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas PM in Gaza, of
the price Israel would exact for each type of attack against it. This
could be classic crisis management, because there is no quick fix that
could be applied to the Gaza front.
Israel has reason to
believe that Hamas is interested in bringing the current round of
violence to its ends, which most likely creates a dilemma for Hamas, as
it needs to maintain its position as an active militant group. But the
government in Gaza should not pass up the opportunity to choose reason
over violence.
Those promoting a second
Operation Defensive Shield, this time in Gaza Strip, should think about
how they might feel about it 10 days after it begins, as well as about
what they would do with this operation's results, once it is
successfully completed.
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