Doc's Talk: Renewal of Allegiance: Presidential Elections in Iran

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Renewal of Allegiance: Presidential Elections in Iran

Ali Alfoneh
June 10, 2009

Large voter turnout for Iran's June 12 presidential election would be a double-edged sword for the country's hardline leader, Ali Khamenei. Although Khamenei would like to maximize participation in Iran's elections, which he sees as an affirmation of the regime's legitimacy, higher turnout would likely lead to a smaller share of support for hardliners. Such was the case with Mohammad Khatami's 1997 landslide victory over Khamenei's favored candidate, a result due primarily to a larger than expected voter turnout that caught the regime off guard. Participation as a Source of Legitimacy
Although Iran's constitution allows for the direct election of the president and members of other government bodies such as the parliament, the Assembly of Experts, and local councils, the sovereignty of the people is significantly diminished by a number of factors. The constitution's concentration of power in the hands of the leader, unelected parallel institutions such as the Guardian Council, and distortions in the election process all undermine the primacy of the voters.

In such a political context, participation in elections serves as a ritual renewal of allegiance to the leader of the revolution, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and, since his death in 1989, the current leader Ali Khamenei. The Islamic Republic leadership equates the act of electoral participation with public endorsement of the regime; voter participation is seen as a source of legitimacy. On June 4, Khamenei stated that the regime is under constant attack from "enemies" trying to "spread apathy in people and deprive the regime of its strong backing, which means popular votes." According to Khamenei, participation in elections is "the religious and rational obligation . . . of anyone who is interested in strengthening the regime, Islam, and the Iranian nation."

Election Turnout
The Islamic Republic's first election was a referendum held on March 30 and 31, 1979, after the monarchy had been abrogated, in which the voters were asked, "Are you in favor of an Islamic Republic?" According to official statistics, 98 percent of eligible voters participated in the referendum, and 93 percent voted "yes." Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan called the election result "unprecedented . . . in any democratic country." Indeed, official Islamic Republic statistics have recorded significantly lower voter participation ever since.

The presidential elections break down as follows:

* January 25, 1980: 14,152,887 people voted (67.4 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the eight candidates being Abol Hassan Bani Sadr with 76 percent of the votes cast.
* July 24, 1981: 14,573,803 people voted (64.2 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the four candidates being Mohammad-Ali Rajai with 87.6 percent of the votes cast.
* October 2, 1981: 16,847,717 people voted (74.3 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the four candidates being Ali Khamenei with 94.4 percent of the votes cast.
* August 16, 1985: 14,238,587 people voted (54.8 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the three candidates being Ali Khamenei with 85.7 percent of the votes cast.
* July 28, 1989: 16,452,677 people voted (54.6 percent of eligible voters), with the winner between the two candidates being Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 94.5 percent of the votes cast.
* June 11, 1993: 16,796,787 people voted (50.7 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the four candidates being Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 62.9 percent of the votes cast.
* May 23, 1997: 29,145,754 people voted (79.9 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the four candidates being Mohammad Khatami with 69.1 percent of the votes cast.
* June 8, 2001: 28,081,930 people voted (66.6 percent of eligible voters), with the winner among the ten candidates being Mohammad Khatami with 77.1 percent of the votes cast.
* June 24, 2005: 27,958,931 people voted (59.8 percent of eligible voters), with the winner between the two candidates being Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad with 61.8 percent of the votes cast.

Other than the first referendum mentioned above, turnout has been at times even lower in elections for the Assembly of Experts, parliamentary elections, and referenda:

* August 3, 1979, election of the Assembly of Experts to finalize the draft constitution: 10,784,932 people voted (51.7 percent of eligible voters).
* December 2-3, 1979, referendum on the constitution: 15,690,142 people voted (75.2 percent of eligible voters).
* March 14, 1980, first parliamentary election: 10,875,969 people voted (52.1 percent of eligible voters).
* September 10, 1982, election of the Assembly of Experts: 18,013,061 people voted (77.4 percent of eligible voters).
* April 15, 1984, second parliamentary election: 15,607,306 people voted (64.6 percent of eligible voters).
* April 8, 1988, third parliamentary election: 16,714,281 people voted (59.7 percent of eligible voters).
* July 28, 1989, referendum on revising the constitution: 16,428,976 people voted (54.5 percent of eligible voters).
* October 8, 1990, election of the Assembly of Experts: 11,602,613 people voters (37.1 percent of eligible voters).
* April 10, 1992, fourth parliamentary election: 18,767,042 people voted (57.8 of the eligible voters).
* March 8, 1996, fifth parliamentary election: 24,682,386 people voted (71.1 percent of eligible voters).
* October 23, 1998, election of the Assembly of Experts: 17,857,869 people voted (46.3 percent of eligible voters).
* February 26, 1999, election of the local councils: 23,668,739 people voted (64.4 percent of eligible voters).
* February 18, 2000, sixth parliamentary election: 26,082,157 people voted (67.4 percent of eligible voters).
* February 28, 2003, election of the Islamic Council: 20,235,898 people voted (49.2 percent of eligible voters).
* February 20, 2004, seventh parliamentary election: 23,734,677 people voted (51.2 percent of eligible voters).
* March 14, 2008, eighth parliamentary election: 24,279,717 people voted (55.4 percent of eligible voters).

Prospects for the 2009 Election
This year's June 12 presidential election provides Iran's 46,199,997 eligible voters with a choice between only four out of the 476 presidential aspirants: incumbent president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, former speaker of the parliament Mehdi Karrubi, former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and former Revolutionary Guards commander in chief and current Expediency Council secretary Mohsen Rezai. The Guardian Council disqualified the remainder.

Khamenei could probably guarantee Ahmadinezhad's reelection through a tightly controlled election, particularly if the public evinces little enthusiasm and voter turnout is low. A less-controlled election or higher popular participation is likely to benefit Mousavi. While a close vote is likely to lead to four more years of Ahmadinezhad due to vote rigging and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij intervention, a Khatami-style landslide for Mousavi would be more difficult for the regime to manipulate. Regardless of who prevails, Khamenei will still remain Iran's ultimate authority and decisionmaker.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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