INSS Insight No. 537
Recent
weeks have seen a gradual erosion of the Egyptian-brokered November
2012 ceasefire that ended operation Pillar of Defense. While the first
year following the ceasefire was characterized by a significant drop in
violent exchanges between the parties, with 2014 the situation has been
progressively less stable. Nonetheless, both Hamas and Israel need to
provide mutual reassurance of their interest in returning to a situation
of controlled conflict in the south, under which Hamas will “for the
most part” keep the quiet and Israel will “for the most part” retaliate
in a calibrated and limited way. Needless to say, this signal-based mode
of conflict management is far from stable, but short of a larger
political engagement and a revision of the current policy, it is the
most plausible solution to the current instability.
Last
month’s escalation in rocket attacks against Israel originating from
Gaza began as a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reprisal operation
following an Israeli airstrike that killed three of the group’s
militants. That Israeli attack in southern Gaza was aimed at a PIJ cell
that had engaged in cross-border firing against IDF personnel.
Hamas rally in Gaza, March 23, 2014 Image Bank / Getty Images
For the purpose of achieving credible
deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, the Israeli government has been strict in
responding to any perceived violation of the uneasy state of quiet. It
considers Hamas the de facto power controlling Gaza, and thus holds it
responsible for any attack on Israel’s territory and citizens,
regardless of who is the actual perpetrator.
At the same time, Israel’s policy of
eyeing Hamas as the effective government of Gaza is accompanied by the
interest in avoiding an unnecessary escalation and yet another extensive
operation in the Strip. So far Israel has focused its attacks mostly on
PIJ targets in Gaza, or any other organization that launches rockets
and violates the ceasefire, signaling a desire to prevent an all-out
escalation an interest shared by Hamas. At the same time, the Israeli
government has been putting pressure on Hamas to control all potential
spoilers operating in Gaza, from the PIJ to the local Salafi-jihadist
factions. The threat of full reoccupation of Gaza and forcible removal
of Hamas made recently by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
should be read in this context.
For its part, Hamas must contend with
the complex problem of preserving its control over Gaza, which in turn
requires preventing extensive or frequent confrontations with Israel
while not jeopardizing its credibility as the “Islamic resistance.” A
sharp decline in credibility or popularity could indeed encourage other
actors such as the PIJ to present themselves as a better alternative to
Hamas. For these reasons, the group has alternated between a zero
tolerance policy with respect to uncoordinated attacks against Israel,
with periods when it relaxed its hold on the Strip, wary lest crackdowns
on other militant organizations damage its reputation.
Keeping internal challengers at bay is
especially important to Hamas, given its increasingly complicated
position. Since the ouster of the Morsi government, Egypt’s new
political authorities have taken an especially harsh attitude with
respect to Hamas, imposing prolonged closures of the border between Gaza
and Egypt, while cracking down on underground tunnels, which not only
serve to smuggle weapons but also play a crucial role in importing basic
commodities into Gaza. This has caused substantial economic damage to
the Hamas government, as well as to the Gaza population. In addition,
the new Egyptian government has launched an open political confrontation
against Hamas based on the organization’s historic connection to the
Muslim Brotherhood, declaring the organization illegal and accusing it
of being a terrorist group and supporting terrorism in both Sinai and
Egypt proper. While Hamas has responded to the loss of the Egyptian ally
by working on rehabilitating its relations with Tehran and investing in
maintaining Doha and Istanbul on its side, these partners cannot
compensate for the loss of the strategic relationship with Egypt. In
turn, this explains why, overall, Hamas has been extremely cautious in
formulating its policy with respect to Egypt, mindful of not worsening
the already problematic relations and repeatedly attempting to calm the
situation and restore a working relationship.
Hamas thus has even more of an
interest in not entering another round of direct military confrontation
with Israel. This then requires defusing escalations and obtaining
greater control of the Strip. Hamas continues to have conflicting
relations with a number of smaller armed factions operating in Gaza,
including the small and loosely organized Salafi-jihadist camp. In the
past year, these groups have often been behind the periodic escalations
in the form of rocket attacks, and with the increased activism of
jihadist groups in neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Sinai, and Egypt itself,
these groups may feel the desire to raise their profile in Gaza as well.
Even though their military capabilities are relatively minor, these
groups have in the past been a political nuisance for Hamas, by
attacking its governance record, criticizing its “moderation,” and
launching uncoordinated attacks against Israel regardless of the
consequences for Gaza. The relationship with the Islamic Jihad is also
potentially problematic, even though both Hamas and PIJ leaders aver
that their relationship is strong and their actions are coordinated.
However, the rise in the PIJ status and its freedom of action can become
an increasing source of friction between the two groups, which have a
history of recurrent tension. This is especially the case given PIJ’s
historical and current closeness to Iran and its interest in raising its
profile domestically at the expense of Hamas by attacks against Israel.
Hamas as such seems caught between a
rock and a hard place. On the one hand, actively intervening to prevent
the PIJ campaign against Israel in retaliation for the killing of its
own militants would have been a bad option for Hamas, resulting in
worsening internal relations and discrediting the group. On the other
hand, the current economic and political crisis makes it important for
Hamas to preserve quiet with Israel. To accommodate these competing
interests, Hamas needs to play a complex signaling game with Israel. In
this sense both parties need to provide mutual reassurance of their
interest in returning to a situation of controlled conflict in the
south, under which Hamas will “for the most part” keep the quiet and
Israel will “for the most part” retaliate in a calibrated and limited
way. Needless to say, this signal-based mode of conflict management is
far from stable, but short of a larger political engagement and a
revision of the current policy, it is the most plausible solution to the
current instability.
Another potential option for Hamas, as
it attempts to resolve these contradictions, is to try to increase its
operations in the West Bank, which it does not control directly, thus
attempting to shield itself from direct retaliation. Indeed it is
possible that the noticeable increase in Hamas activities in the West
Bank could be connected to these considerations. Israel should
accordingly maintain a good and cooperative relationship with the
Palestinian Authority, notwithstanding a possible crisis that may follow
a sour end of the negotiation period. Otherwise Hamas and other groups
may take advantage of the tension and growing frustration among
Palestinians in the West Bank, and attempt to ignite a return to armed
struggle and violence as the preferred way to engage with Israel.
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