Doc's Talk: 6:3 Israeli Jews say two state deal won’t end conflict for Palestinians

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

6:3 Israeli Jews say two state deal won’t end conflict for Palestinians

Just another forgotten peace summit
By Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann Haaretz December 10, 2007

The optimism of the leaders was lost on the Jewish Israeli public, whose pessimism stems from its belief that a two-state solution wouldn’t appease the Palestinians Many assume that if the Israeli decision-makers were to openly change their position on the conflict and its resolution, the public would throng after them en masse and support an agreement. The present survey, like earlier surveys we conducted, shows that this assumption is very flimsy and that people are not hurrying to get on the Olmert government’s peace train.

And apparently, despite the wide media coverage of the Annapolis conference and the prime minister’s proclamation that it marked a political turning point of historic importance, the Jewish Israeli public’s level of interest remained quite low; as in the period before the conference, the majority did not follow it with any regularity. Furthermore, notwithstanding the joint statement and the positive final spirit, the overall public sentiment was negative, particularly regarding whether the conference achieved a basic clarification of the disagreements between Israel and the Palestinians, or advanced chances of peace. People were more likely to remain skeptical, or
not change their opinion about the chances of reaching a lasting peace with the Palestinians, than to be encouraged by the event and more optimistic about the chances for peace.

Not surprisingly, the public believes almost unanimously that both the Israeli government and the people genuinely want peace with the Palestinians. Surprisingly, today there is also a majority, albeit a small one, that thinks the Palestinian Authority genuinely wants the same, while views regarding the Palestinian people are divided, with a very slight advantage for those leaning to the positive side. Moreover, a considerable majority of the Jewish public sees the Palestinians’ demand for an independent state as just, and thinks Israel can agree to the establishment of such a state.

The source of the Jewish public’s skepticism - and even pessimism - is apparently the widespread belief that a peace agreement based on the “two states for two peoples” formula would not lead the Palestinians to end their conflict with Israel. This distrust of the Palestinians’ intentions is also evident in the Jewish public’s clear, ongoing preference for a closed border without free passage, even if the two-state solution were to be implemented.

However, the Jewish public does not think this desirable solution is within reach; the prevailing view is that without Hamas’ agreement, there is no chance of reaching a peace treaty, and that the sides will have difficulty overcoming their disagreements on the core issues.

As in the past, this time, too, we found that the main issues on which the public thinks the sides will have trouble reaching a compromise are (in this order) Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees’ right of return, though compared to the late 1990s, less weight is now ascribed to Jerusalem and considerably more is given to the refugee issue.

Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey that was carried out on Monday and Tuesday, December 3-4.

Public detachment

According to what the interviewees themselves said, despite the heavy media coverage, less than one-quarter of the Jewish Israeli public (24 percent) regularly followed what happened at the Annapolis conference, 47 percent followed the events only “sometimes,” and 26 percent not at all. This division is almost identical to those we found two months and a month before
the conference.

In other words, the positive attitude that the Israeli, Palestinian, and American decision-makers showed toward the gathering was not shared by the public, most of which remained skeptical or pessimistic. That detachment is evident in assessments of the outcomes: 63 percent think the conference did not bring about a basic clarification of the disagreements between Israel
and the Palestinians, and a similar percentage say it did not increase the chances of a peace settlement.

This skepticism apparently also explains the segmentation of views on whether the positions Prime Minister Ehud Olmert expressed at the conference were too tough (only 8 percent), too conciliatory (31 percent), or appropriate (32 percent). Twenty-eight percent had no opinion on the matter, unlike past conferences, when the public showed great awareness and strong
opinions about the positions that the Israeli representatives presented.

The responses as to how the conference influenced interviewees’ optimism or pessimism about chances for peace also reflect a low degree of public involvement: 29 percent said they were more optimistic, 38 percent they were more pessimistic, and 33 percent did not change their attitude, had not heard of the conference at all, or did not know.

As in the past, the dominant view in Israel is that the Israeli government and people are interested in peace - 78 and 80 percent, respectively. Surprisingly, though, now there is also a majority - albeit a small one - that says the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas also wants peace (55 percent). Regarding the desire for peace among the Palestinian
people in general, the opinions are divided, with a very slight lead on the positive side: 48 percent think the Palestinians want peace, while 45 percent think they do not.

Notwithstanding all the events in recent years, a majority of the Jewish public also views the Palestinians’ demand for an independent state as justified - 62 percent (compared to 34.5 percent who see it as unjustified). As in the past, there is also a majority - 58 percent - that is sure or thinks Israel can permit the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (32 percent think or are sure it cannot, and the rest do not know).

No faith in the Palestinians

However, despite the positive attitude toward the two-state solution both in terms of justice and pragmatism, a large obstacle is the widespread belief among the Jewish Israeli public that even if a peace agreement is signed along these lines, it will not end the conflict with the Palestinians. Whereas 61 percent hold this pessimistic assessment, only 31 percent believe an agreement on two states would end the conflict from the Palestinians’ standpoint.

Furthermore, a large majority - 71 percent - believe it is impossible to reach a peace settlement with the Palestinians without Hamas’ consent, with only 21 percent claiming the opposite. Given the perception of Abbas’ weakness, it is clear why this assessment also contributes to the lack of faith in the feasibility of a peaceful solution.

All this apparently explains the belief of the majority of the Jewish Israeli public - 53 percent versus 26 percent - that, even if an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is signed based on the “two states for two peoples” formula, the border between the two states should remain closed
(5 percent prefer it be closed to Palestinians and open to Jews; 1 percent, open to Palestinians and closed to Jews; and 15 percent do not know).

In light of the upcoming resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we asked the interviewees what they see as the most difficult issues blocking an agreement between the two sides. Out of a list of six issues, the question of Jerusalem came out on top (39 percent).

Yet, compared to the findings of the November 1999 Peace Index, it appears there has been a significant decline in that assessment, which was then 57 percent. There has been, however, a considerable increase in the importance ascribed to the refugee question, which has come to be perceived as the most important obstacle, from 5 percent in 1999 to 32 percent today. Other matters of dispute - the borders, the settlements, the independent Palestinian state and water - lag far behind, in this order: borders (14 percent), settlements (8 percent), establishment of an independent Palestinian state (6 percent) and water (1 percent)
General Peace Index: 48.1 (Jewish sample - 45.6); Oslo Index: 36.9 (Jewish sample - 34.5); Negotiation Index: 50.7 (Jewish sample - 47.7)

The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies and the Evans Program for Conflict Resolution Research of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. The telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on December 3-4, 2007, and included 592 interviewees who
represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is 4.5 percent. For the survey data see: www.tau.ac.il/peace .
Posted by Ted Belman @ 11:47 am |

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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