Doc's Talk: Shelve the Shelf Agreement

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Shelve the Shelf Agreement

David M. Weinberg

Executive Summary: The newfangled "shelf agreement" concept which now serves as the basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is unworkable. The concept has no foundation in negotiation theory, especially in the history of Arab-Israeli negotiations. It incautiously assumes best case scenarios regarding the Palestinians which have no basis in reality; when in fact a durable "final status" agreement must anticipate all worst case scenarios. Furthermore, the historical record shows that even if Israel and the PA were to agree on a grand "endgame agreement," the Palestinians would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions as the price of implementation. Moreover, Israel inevitably would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on the needed governmental and security reforms even as the PA unilaterally proclaims statehood. Finally, the two-state paradigm on which the "shelf agreement" concept rests seems an anachronism in the wake of the Islamic takeover of Gaza. Thus, shelf agreement theory is strategically illogical and tactically ill-considered. A performance-based peace process remains the only sustainable model towards a durable final settlement. The Shelf Agreement Concept

The new "shelf agreement" concept, advanced by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, currently serves as the basis for Israel's negotiations with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.

Under this conceptual framework, Israel is to negotiate an "agreement in principle" on an "endgame" solution with moderate Palestinians, but then place this agreement out of their reach – high up on a "shelf" where the Palestinians can see it, but not yet attain it. Only when the Palestinians have matured and fulfilled all their "implementation" obligations will the transcendent trophy come down off the shelf.

The negotiations are predicated upon the realization that Palestinian leaders currently are completely unable to deliver on any of their obligations under the "old" road map. Consequently, parties to the conflict are ignoring the messy here and now and instead turning their attentions to the political "horizon." In the context of shelf agreement theory, the parties seek to give the Palestinians a clear picture of the big prize awaiting them in the future (the "horizon").

The novel theory predicts that Palestinians will be encouraged to play according to the rules of the game in order to attain their prize. The theory furthermore postulates that the moderates who want peace will be strengthened by a shelf agreement, and then they will be able to do the difficult things demanded of them in the accord – such as confronting the terrorists in their midst and building reliable institutions of uncorrupt government.

All this makes for nice, but seriously flawed and completely untested, theory.

Erroneously Assuming Best Case Scenarios

To begin with, the shelf agreement negotiations assume best case scenarios regarding the intentions and capabilities of a future Palestinian state. Aside from the fact that this may have no basis in reality, it is tactically counter-intuitive and strategically unwise. Endgame talks ought to take into account all worst case scenarios.

Any defense lawyer conducting a negotiation on behalf of a client will tell you that an agreement will be final and durable only if safeguards are built in that ensure the agreement's ability to withstand most performance failures. For Israel specifically, this means a wide margin of error on security matters if the Palestinian state fails to eradicate Palestinian terrorism against Israel.

But how can Israel, for example, sign a sustainable endgame shelf agreement with workable border crossing arrangements if it does not know the character or capabilities of the future Palestinian entity – and all it can do is assume the "nice" qualities of such?

The type of Israel army-police presence needed at the border checkpoints depends on the reliability and capabilities of the Palestinian partner. Since the shelf agreement approach throws the requirement for Palestinian reform and performance into the amorphous future, Israel has no way of professionally knowing now how to calibrate its minimum security needs on the borders.

To simply assume – as the current negotiations do – that the planned Palestinian state will have outstanding, professional, loyal and determined anti-terror fighting convictions, is to flirt with folly.

This is just one example. There are hundreds of similar matters that currently cannot be assessed, because Israel is negotiating against itself in a vacuum with a phantom Palestinian partner. Israel is seeking to will into existence a "moderate, stable, capable and democratic" Palestinian government – that does not yet have a foothold even in the in West Bank, not to mention Gaza.

Contrary to shelf agreement theory, it should be obvious that a final status agreement only can be negotiated the other way around: with a Palestinian partner that has proven its mettle over time. In the absence of this, it will be impossible to reach sustainable agreements even on "small ticket" technical matters – never mind the major issues.

Ignoring the Historical Record

Shelf agreement theory unhappily fails in a second critical area: it ignores the historical record. Experience attests that with the Palestinians, negotiations are never over.

Even if Israel and the PA were to grasp the fabled horizon, and royally set the grand "final status" agreement in a jeweled case high up on a shelf of honor – the Palestinians would not begin "implementation"; they would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions as the price of implementation.

For example, if Israel promises to forgo half of Jerusalem and dozens of Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria – it might still be expected to yield further concessions in order "to keep the process alive and the Palestinian moderates in power."

And thus, Washington and the world community will demand that Israel go beyond the "ultimate" sacrifices it already had made in order to secure the supposedly "final" shelf agreement.

In sum, there will be nothing "final" about an agreement with the Palestinians. They will "pocket" Israel's verbal and written concessions, then press for more as the price for "implementation" on their part, or as the price of "buying in" other Palestinian factions.

This has been the repeated pattern of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, after each of the Oslo era accords. Even Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who sought to drive a hard bargain and insist on reciprocal concessions, was forced to "sweeten the pot" for the Palestinians in order "to keep the process alive and the Palestinian moderates in power" after signing the Wye Accord with Arafat's regime.

It makes no sense, then, for Israel to offer "endgame" maximum concessions in a shelf agreement negotiation.

A Disincentive for Implementation

An additional flaw in shelf agreement theory is the notion that the "horizon" fashioned by the agreement would provide an overwhelming incentive for the Palestinians to work hard at living up to its terms; that the "horizon" would finally bring about the long-demanded Palestinian security and governmental reforms.

Unfortunately, the opposite is more likely: a shelf agreement would prove a disincentive to Palestinian implementation. The dynamic set in place by a shelf agreement would lead the Palestinians to "grab" statehood unilaterally and Israel would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on their implementation.

It seems completely predictable that at some point the Palestinians will defiantly "climb up the shelf" and independently snatch their "horizon" – without having completed the promised chores on security and government reform. The Israeli public will likely rationalize that since it already acquiesced-in-principle to the particulars of a full-fledged Palestinian state, it is not worth an ugly fight over the chores of implementation.

And thus, Israel will find itself at tremendous diplomatic disadvantage, in a situation where it will be well-nigh impossible to block the emergence of a runaway Palestinian state that has not lived up to many of its key commitments that constitute Israel's security safeguards.

This unfortunate scenario seems likely because the record of Palestinian compliance with treaty obligations is thin. How many times have "moderate" Palestinian governments promised to collect weapons, disband militias, arrest terrorists, reform government and educate for peace – yet failed to do so. Years later, Palestinian leaders make the same promises again in exchange for more Israeli concessions.

There is little basis today for believing that the current Palestinian government will have the resolve to bite the bullet on these issues – even if it is theoretically "strengthened" by the halo of a shelf agreement. There is no indication that the Abbas government, or any future PA governing coalition, will be willing to go even further and explain to its public that the West Bank and Jerusalem must be shared, or that the "right" of return must be set aside.

Indeed, the idea that weak leaders can negotiate a shelf agreement because the "concessions" demanded of them are conditional, and that in turn the agreement will strengthen them – is bizarre. There is no support for this idea in academic negotiation theory or any precedent for this in world politics.

Only strong leaders, such as Begin and Sadat or Rabin and Hussein, can make the reciprocal concessions needed to reach a genuine peace agreement; and then successfully implement them. Abbas has no ability to withstand Hamas accusations of "treason" should he concede to Israel on anything significant.

Moreover, the recent Sana'a Declaration, an attempted rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas negotiated in the Yemeni capital, places the entire strategy of "strengthening the Fatah moderates" into question. If Fatah and Hamas renew their collaboration, little room is left for Israel to build up Fatah at the expense of Hamas.

The Gaza Conundrum

Notwithstanding all of the above, the push for a shelf agreement might have validity were it to offer the theoretical possibility of a real resolution that would rope in the vast majority of Palestinians. But that is no longer the case.

With the military takeover of the Gaza Strip by the radical Islamic Hamas movement that is openly committed to Israel's destruction, Gaza has become a mini-Palestinian state unto its own, and it answers to no other Palestinian "Authority." Thus the two-state paradigm on which the "shelf agreement" concept rests seems an anachronism.

Moreover, the Hamas-Israel conflict inevitably will yet involve a significant military confrontation, a reality that will make Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement in the West Bank tenuous at best.

And finally, Israelis have little incentive to offer "endgame" maximal concessions to a Palestinian Authority that does not control Gaza and cannot guarantee quiet on that front too.

Conclusion

The impatient hunt for a "horizon" or "shelf" agreement is without precedent in world politics – and for good reason. Shelf agreement theory is academically non-existent, strategically illogical, and tactically ill-considered. It is based on faulty, and for Israel, dangerous assumptions. Contrary to the hopes of its inventors, a shelf agreement could be a disincentive to peace.

Of course, the maintenance of some sort of "peace process," no matter how flimsy, is beneficial to everybody in the Middle East. It upholds a modicum of forward momentum towards a resolution, and prevents Palestinian-Israeli relations from boiling over into large-scale conflict. It could and should beget some improvement in everyday "quality of life" both for Palestinians and Israelis. In the long run, Israel needs peace no less than the Palestinians.

However, Palestinian-Israeli relations have suffered enough from all kinds of failed experiments in negotiations. A performance-based peace process remains the only proven and sustainable model towards a durable final settlement. There is little choice but to tough it out the old-fashioned way: building confidence between the parties by measured, verifiable and concrete steps along a road map towards stability.

David M. Weinberg is director of public affairs at the BESA Center. A lobbyist, spokesman and speechwriter, he has served in executive positions for Diaspora Jewish organizations, and as a senior advisor in the Prime Minister's Office.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer Foundation.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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