Doc's Talk: Amman Warms to Hamas

Friday, August 29, 2008

Amman Warms to Hamas

Matthew Levitt and David Schenker
August 28, 2008

This PolicyWatch is the first of a two-part series on Jordan's reengagement with Hamas.

Last week, Jordan's minister of information publicly confirmed that senior Jordanian officials have been meeting with Hamas in an effort to "solve pending security issues." These talks represent a significant shift for Amman, since relations between Jordan and the Palestinian group had been frozen for two years, following the arrest of three Hamas members in the kingdom on terrorism and weapons charges. Although the decision to renew contacts with Hamas suggests that Amman remains concerned with Hamas-related activities in the kingdom, the timing also highlights domestic and regional pressures on King Abdullah and the Jordanian government.

Hamas Plans Attacks in Jordan
In April and May 2006, Jordanian security officials detained more than twenty people on charges of being Hamas operatives, and arrested a cell of three Palestinian men -- Ayman Daraghmeh, Ahmad Rabie, and Ahmad Thiyab. The cell, headed by Daraghmeh, reportedly surveilled several sites in Jordan, including the Israeli embassy in Amman, the homes of Israeli diplomats, and the offices of Jordanian companies that dealt with Israeli firms. The three men reportedly passed on the information they obtained to Hamas members abroad.

On May 11, 2006, the three appeared on Jordanian television. They confessed their Hamas affiliation and described their plots to kill senior Jordanian intelligence officials as well as to launch rocket attacks on the Israeli embassy and the ambassador's residence in Amman. Jordanian television also displayed the materials the group had amassed, which included grenades, Iranian-produced Katushya rockets, rocket launchers, and machine guns. A month later, however, the three denied any links to Hamas and retracted their confessions, claiming the statements were extracted under duress.

Two years later, the case went to trial, and on June 12, the Jordanian State Security Court found the three men guilty. Daraghmeh was convicted of "plotting to carry out terrorist attacks" in Jordan, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Rabie and Thiyab were both sentenced to five years for the "illegal possession of explosives and weapons." The verdict was denounced by Hamas, which insisted the group does not target Jordan or any other Arab country.

Echoes of 1999
Hamas has been active in Jordan for many years and maintained its headquarters there throughout the 1990s under the leadership of Mousa Marzouk and Khaled Mashal. But in 1999, Jordan expelled the leadership for engaging in operational planning from inside the kingdom.

On September 22, 1999, Mashal was arrested at Jordan's Queen Alia International Airport along with Marzouk, Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghosheh, and four other aides on their arrival from Iran. Marzouk, a Yemeni national, was the only one who was not Jordanian, and was deported to Iran. Mashal and Ghosheh were taken into custody and charged with being members of an outlawed militant Palestinian group. Mashal was also charged with possession of an unlicensed pistol. Several weeks later, Mashal and Ghosheh were indicted on additional weapons charges and for raising funds for an unauthorized association.

In retrospect, Jordan's crackdown on Hamas in Amman appears to have been related to the group's increasingly brazen and public presence there following Israel's botched assassination attempt of Mashal in 1997. As one former Jordanian official explained, Jordan's outrage over the assassination attempt -- and Amman's subsequent demand that Israel release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from prison in return for the two captured Mossad operatives -- was misinterpreted as King Hussein's tacit approval of Hamas operations in Jordan.

Hamas Resurgence in Jordan
Even after its leaders were expelled in 1999, Hamas remained popular in the kingdom. But enthusiasm for the group diminished dramatically after its January 2006 electoral victory and its subsequent takeover of Gaza in June 2007. King Abdullah and most Jordanians viewed the potential for a similar Hamas move in the West Bank with great concern.

Among Jordanian Islamists, however, developments within the Palestinian Authority reenergized the kingdom's pro-Hamas elements. In March 2006, Zaki Bani Irsheid -- a Jordanian with close ties to Hamas -- was elected secretary general of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), Jordan's most popular political party. Then, in May 2008, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood voted to replace its "dovish" incumbent leader Salem Falahat with Hamam Said, a Palestinian Jordanian known for close relations to Hamas leaders in Damascus.

The elections of Bani Irsheid and Said sparked controversy within the Islamist community, pitting Jordanian "moderate" pro-regime Islamists against their "militant" rivals of Palestinian origin. Taken together, however, these two elections constituted nothing less than the complete Hamas takeover of the leading Jordanian Islamist organizations.

Despite these successes, however, the kingdom's pro-Hamas Islamists have not yet translated organizational control to increased political power. In fact, the IAF performed poorly in the November 2007 parliamentary elections, wining only 6 of 110 seats -- down from 16 of 80 in 2004 -- and would have faired equally bad in the August 2007 municipal contest if it had not withdrawn.

Pressures to Reengage Hamas
Senior Jordanian security officials now appear confident that they have contained the Hamas terror threat in the kingdom. The confluence of Hamas's resurgence and rising economic and social pressures, however, remain a concern for Amman.

Islamist trends. The Hamas takeover of the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood suggests these two influential opposition organizations can no longer be considered "loyal" to the kingdom. These organizations used to have significant participation from East Bankers (Jordanians who are not originally Palestinian), but since these groups are now considered "Palestinian," they are far less appealing to this group. Jordanian analysts, such as Muhammad Abu Rumman, speculate that this trend could result in increased East Banker support for jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

Economic pressures. Rising prices in commodities, such as food and fuel, coupled with largely stagnant wages, are another reason for Jordanian concern with Hamas's strength in the kingdom. The Jordanian government continues to subsidize some staples, but in line with international commitments, in April the palace eliminated subsidies for gasoline. Today, for the first time in decades, Jordanians are paying true market prices for fuel -- in excess of $4 per gallon -- and are not happy. The government had also planned to end support on kerosene, but recently decided to postpone the move until the end of winter.

At the same time, economic difficulties have contributed to a widening and more pronounced gap between the Jordan's "haves" and "have nots." A study published earlier this year by the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman argued that the Jordanian middle class was disappearing. Meanwhile, in recent months, the government and the palace have become the target of considerable public anger over the controversial sales and proposed sales of government land, including the former armed forces headquarters in Amman, the King Hussein Medical Center, Aqaba port, and a tract of land along the Dead Sea slated for a casino.

Conclusion
Talking with Hamas may temporarily deflect some of the intense domestic pressure in the kingdom, and also presents Amman with the opportunity of reengaging Hamas and Israel, a role that until now had been the sole preserve of Cairo. A less optimistic explanation for Jordan's tactical change is a tacit recognition that Hamas's rule in Gaza -- and potentially in the West Bank -- is a long-term problem. Regardless of the reason, Jordan's involvement will likely tempt Saudi Arabia to press once again for a Palestinian national unity government, a development that would regrettably constitute yet another step on Hamas's road toward international recognition.

Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, and is the author of Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. David Schenker is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk