Doc's Talk: Hamas leader Khaled Mash’al has recently addressed the issue of rocket fire and of terrorism (“resistance”) in general.

Sunday, May 17, 2009

Hamas leader Khaled Mash’al has recently addressed the issue of rocket fire and of terrorism (“resistance”) in general.

IICC
Overview

1. The issue of using the strategy of terrorism (“resistance”) and, more specifically, the rocket fire policy, have recently been publicly addressed by Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mash'al. In an interview to the New York Times, geared towards an American target audience, Mash'al chose to present a “pragmatic” approach, stressing the policy of restraint Hamas has lately been following with regard to firing rockets from the Gaza Strip. However, in a speech for Hamas's supporters in the Gaza Strip, who took part in a memorial rally for two Hamas leaders killed in Operation Cast Lead, Khaled Mash'al stressed that “resistance” has been and will remain the movement's strategic option for restoring “Palestinian rights”, and that Hamas will make no concessions about the “resistance” (see Appendix for details).

2. What Khaled Mash'al said about firing rockets in the New York Times interview (even though one day later he said that he had been misunderstood) and to the participants of the rally in the Gaza Strip reflects, in our assessment, two sides of the same coin: ideologically and strategically, Hamas was and still remains committed to using violence and terrorism (“resistance”) as the preferred strategy of obtaining “Palestinian rights” (that is, the destruction of the State of Israel as a political entity). At the same time, however, it does not rule out a cessation or reduction of terrorist activities for limited periods of time, if it receives something worthwhile in exchange from Israel and when it believes that Palestinian (or its own) interests call for such a lull in the fighting.

3. In the New York Times interview, Khaled Mash'al said that Hamas operatives had for the time being ceased firing on Israel due to the “Palestinians' interest”. Similar statements attributed to Hamas have recently been published on Palestinian and Arab media. Indeed, the extent of rocket fire and mortar shelling from the Gaza Strip has dropped considerably over the past two months, since mid-March 2009. During that time, the extent of such attacks was reduced to a “trickle” of several mortar shells or rockets per week, at times even coming to a complete halt (in comparison, attacks were considerably more frequent following Operation Cast Lead, with 10 to 30 rockets or mortar shells fired per week). Over the past several weeks, the terrorist organizations' activities have focused mostly on setting IEDs and occasionally firing mortar shells at IDF patrols near the border. It is our assessment that the relative calm is a result not just of Hamas's reluctance to fire rocket, but also of its readiness to extend that restraint to other terrorist organizations, going as far as to impose some level of enforcement when necessary. 1

Rocket fire and mortar shelling since the end of Operation Cast Lead
Rocket fire and mortar shelling since the end of Operation Cast Lead

4. It is our assessment that Hamas's policy of restraint on rocket fire stems mostly from the fact that its current top priority is to undo the damage caused in Operation Cast Lead, which it perceives as a basic, fundamental interest of the movement and of the population in general. While repairing the physical damage caused to the civilian population, Hamas is hard at work on rebuilding its military infrastructure and reinforcing its control mechanisms over the population. At the same time, Khaled Mash'al and other Hamas spokesmen (who have the support of the Iranians 2) emphasize that the current policy of restraint is the result of various circumstances and consideration for the population's interests, and that Hamas's fundamental adherence to the path of “resistance” (violence and terrorism) as the strategic alternative for achieving its goals still stands. In addition, while espousing a policy of restraint in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is running an incitement campaign to encourage individuals to perpetrate terrorist attacks in the West Bank and in Israel , expecting them to eventually become an all-out military uprising, “the third intifada”. 3

Appendix

Khaled Mash'al's interview to the New York Times and reactions to the interview

1. Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mash'al has recently (and uncharacteristically) granted an interview to the New York Times, geared towards the American target audience. In the interview, given from Damascus , he addressed, among other subjects, the issue of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip at Israel , saying that Hamas operatives had currently stopped firing rockets at Israel . Khaled Mash'al also made an effort to demonstrate that Hamas was able to control its own operatives as well as operatives belonging to other organizations (New York Times, May 4, 2009). Following is an excerpt in which Khaled Mash'al addressed the cessation of rocket attacks and the reasoning behind it: “Not firing the rockets currently is part of an evaluation from the movement which serves the Palestinians' interest. After all, the firing is a method, not a goal. Resistance is legitimate right, but practicing such a right comes under an evaluation by the movement's leaders.”

2. Khaled Mash'al's statement about the rocket fire is part of his attempt to present a pragmatic approach to the American public opinion and to President Obama's new administration. Following are additional issues brought up in the interview:

a. Early in the interview, Khaled Mash'al assured the American administration and the international community that Hamas would be “part of the solution, period”. Mash'al noted that President Obama spoke positively, unlike his predecessor, but was not pleased with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, saying that her statements reflected the policies of the previous American administration.

b. According to Khaled Mash'al, there is only one enemy in the Middle East, that enemy being Israel , the existence of which he is not willing to recognize. He said that Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas gained nothing from their willingness to recognize Israel . Nevertheless, Hamas will be willing for a long-term ten-year truce with Israel, provided that its fundamental demands are fulfilled: “On the two-state solution sought by the Americans, he said: ‘We are with a state on the 1967 borders, based on a long-term truce. This includes East Jerusalem , the dismantling of settlements and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.' Asked what ‘long-term' meant, he said 10 years.”

c. Following up on his statement on Hamas's current avoidance of rocket fire (as cited above), Khaled Mash'al said that Hamas was “eager for a ceasefire with Israel ” (i.e., a new lull agreement). Hamas is also eager to exchange the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit for “many Palestinian prisoners”.

d. Khaled Mash'al confirmed that Hamas was assisted by Iran , claiming, however, that the assistance was “not conditioned” and that it did not control or affect the movement's policies.

e. Asked if Hamas was a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and if it wanted to bring strict Muslim law to Gaza and the West Bank, Khaled Mash'al answered that Hamas's priority was “ending the occupation” and “achieving the [Palestinian] national project.” As for the nature of the future Palestinian state, “it's to be determined by the people. It will never be imposed upon them” (in practice, in its day-to-day policy in the Gaza Strip, Hamas imposes the Islamic law and the Islamic code on the local population under its control).

Reactions to Khaled Mash'al's interview to the New York Times

3. The day after the interview was published, Khaled Mash'al claimed that the New York Times misrepresented his statements about Hamas's decision to cease firing rockets at present. According to Mash'al, he meant to say that the decision whether to fire or to cease fire depended on Hamas's strategic decision, made based on a variety of considerations. He stressed that Israel (“the Zionist entity”) was the one always initiating the “aggression”, and that firing rockets was a “defense measure” of the Palestinian people, used while taking into consideration the circumstances of the Palestinian people (Palestine-info, May 5).

4. Top PIJ official Nafez Azzam granted an interview in which he commented on Khaled Mash'al's New York Times interview. He said that his organization would discuss the issue of the lull in bi-lateral talks with the Hamas leadership, as well as with the other organizations. He made it clear that the PIJ refused a long-term ceasefire with Israel but it may agree to a “tactical lull for a certain period of time”, just as it agreed to the 18-month lull offered by Egypt following Operation Cast Lead, which, as he claimed, was undermined by Israel (Pal-today website, May 3).

Khaled Mash'al's statement at a memorial rally for Said Siyam and Nizar Rayan

5. On May 7, a memorial rally for Said Siyam and Nizar Rayan, two Hamas leaders killed in Operation Cast Lead, was held in the Gaza City Rashad al-Shawa Culture Center. Hamas Political Bureau chief Khaled Mash'al gave a speech from Damascus , broadcasted live to the memorial rally's participants. The rally was attended by the senior leadership of the Palestinian police in the Gaza Strip, which is an inseparable part of Hamas's military-security infrastructure.

6. In his speech, Khaled Mash'al noted that no one (referring to the Palestinian Authority) had the right to negotiate the “rights” and “principles” of the Palestinian people. Portraying Said Siyam and Nizar Rayan as model jihad warriors, he stressed that the “resistance” was Hamas's strategic option for “liberation” (i.e., the “liberation of Palestine”) and for “restoring the rights”, and that Hamas would make no concessions regarding the “resistance” under its leadership. Referring to the issue of smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip, he stressed that “resistance is a legitimate right of the Palestinian people, and no one has the right to keep the Gaza Strip from arming itself or to choke it in order to prevent weapons from coming in” (a broad hint at Egypt, which stepped up its activities to prevent weapons smuggling following the exposure of the Hezbollah network on its territory) (Palestine-info, May 7, 2009; Al-Aqsa TV, May 7; other Palestinian media).

Palestine-info, May 7, 2009
The personal belongings of Nizar Rayan, a top Hamas operative killed in Operation Cast Lead
and portrayed by Khaled Mash'al as a model jihad commander (Palestine-info, May 7, 2009)

1 Palestinian media have published reports on enforcement measures taken by Hamas, even though Hamas denied those out of internal Palestinian considerations. For example, Fatah elements claimed that the Hamas police deployed vehicle checkpoints in the northern Gaza Strip to prevent rocket fire (Pal Press, May 5). Hamas denied the reports and claimed that those were fabrications designed to tarnish the movement, adding that Hamas would not become “ Israel 's protector” (Maan, May 6). The Kuwaiti daily Al-Jarida wrote that PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah complained to Iran 's President Ahmadinejad, during the latter's visit in Damascus , about the attitude of Hamas operatives to PIJ operatives in the Gaza Strip. He complained about the detention of PIJ operatives and said that they were “intolerable”. Khaled Mash'al, on his part, talked (to the Iranian President?) about “an agreement shared by the PIJ to stop firing rockets at Israel ” so that the PIJ would not have excuses (to fire rockets from the Gaza Strip) (Al-Jarida, May 17, 2009).

2 During his visit in Damascus , Iran 's President Ahmadinejad met with the Hamas Political Bureau chief, Khaled Mash'al (May 5). Iran's Fars News Agency reported that the Iranian President stressed the importance of finding a “solution” to the problem of Palestine through “resistance” (i.e., violence and terrorism) and called upon the Islamic countries to support the Palestinian people and the “resistance” (Fars, May 6). A “top Iranian official” said that Iran would soon hold a conference for the support of the “resistance” ( Al-Khaleej , Iran , May 10).

3 An Information Bulletin on this issue will soon be published in English.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk