Strafor
Europe
· Global trend: The global recession and Europe
The Europeans felt some of the worst effects of the global economic crisis in the second quarter, with banks and governments crashing across the Continent. The financial crisis that befell the United States and threw the global financial system into turmoil in 2008 revealed the underlying problems with Europe’s economic fundamentals — problems that would have surfaced eventually, no matter what the rest of the world was facing. Europe’s downturn has been more severe than the United States’ — particularly in the European Union’s export-dependent economies. Overall, the European Union depends on exports for more than 40 percent of its GDP. The only bright spot in Europe’s economic outlook is that demand for European exports should in fact increase as the United States recovers. However, Europe as a whole is not as export-driven as Asia. Europe actually has consumption-based economies, but those economies are hostage to Europe’s banking crisis — an issue that Europe has just begun to consider seriously addressing.
Going into the third quarter, European countries were deciding how to pay for their stimulus packages and 2009 budget deficits. The choice before these states was to either put off dealing with the crisis, or bite the bullet now and instate harsh austerity measures. The larger countries like the United Kingdom, France and Germany decided to defer any spending cuts for domestic political reasons (Berlin had to consider upcoming elections, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s popularity was slumping) but also because they had more flexibility than the smaller states by being able to borrow on a large scale on the international bond market. Smaller states — like the various countries in the Balkans and Baltics, Romania, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Hungary — have all been forced to take the latter option and start planning for austerity measures, mainly because unlike the larger states, they are at the mercy of international investors and some are also at the mercy of IMF loan conditions.
Image removed by sender. map: europe quarterly locator
The questions for the economies that must make cuts is where they will find the money to deal with rising budget deficits, and to what extent the European Union can sort out this mess as spending balloons across the continent. The third quarter is when these questions will begin to be answered. Options include canceling pensions, social programs and military veteran benefits (the last option is a particularly touchy issue in the Balkans). It is this situation that will lead to social unrest.
· Regional trend: The ‘Summer of Rage’
The economic crisis has already collapsed governments across Europe, and protests are frequent in some European states, especially France, the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland in particular), Hungary, Greece and the Balkans. As the governments begin implementing their austerity measures and the populations begin to feel the cuts, this will fuel the rage seen across the continent, creating some uncontainable situations and possibly collapsing more governments. The states to watch closely for continued large-scale protests are France, Ireland, the Baltics, the United Kingdom and Hungary, with government changes possible in Hungary and Estonia.
It may be in the Balkans, however, where the most change occurs. Greece, a veteran EU member state, is under a lot of pressure due to its poor economy and an already serious security situation with rising anarchy and domestic terrorism. Meanwhile, the Croatian prime minister recently resigned amid rumors that he simply did not want to deal with the mess that was his country’s budget. His counterparts in the former Yugoslav states may begin to envy him soon. Fortunately for the Balkans, the states in the region are exhausted from various wars and are in no position to stir the geopolitical pot on their own. However, the economic crisis could certainly destabilize the Balkan states’ fragile internal social dynamics, especially with climbing social welfare costs for retirees and military veterans.
· Regional Trend: EU leadership struggle
At the beginning of the year, STRATFOR forecasted that France would move into the leadership position on the Continent — at least for the duration of 2009 — due to a weak EU president (the Czech Republic) and a period of German introspection stemming from impending elections and the economic crisis. While Paris did take the helm on most decisions for the European Union, STRATFOR underestimated the speed with which Germany would ascend to a leadership role in Europe. In the second quarter, Berlin did not act as Europe’s leader, but it did position itself to take on that role in the third quarter largely by strengthening its relationship with the other Eurasian heavyweight, Russia. It is this shift, along with the new Swedish EU presidency (which is relatively anti-Russian), that will make an interesting third quarter.
Sweden took over the EU presidency from the Czech Republic on July 1, and it intends to focus all of its attention on deepening EU (and Swedish) influence in the Baltic region. Swedish banks are heavily exposed to the Baltic states, and Stockholm wants to ensure that its financial and deeper strategic investments are ensured in the long term. This means not only bailing out the troubled states, but also eroding Moscow’s geopolitical influence in the region. This will put it on a collision course with Paris, which wants nothing to do with what it sees as Stockholm’s pet project. As far as Paris is concerned, Stockholm’s obsession with the Baltic region is a waste of EU resources, which could be spent on the much more geopolitically significant — from Paris’ perspective, at least — Mediterranean.
At the tail end of the quarter, Germany’s elections will be over and Berlin will be back to center stage, where it will have the opportunity to use its position as the European Union’s most powerful economy to fashion a “European” exit strategy from the crisis that will benefit itself. And since Germany’s view of Russia is in stark opposition to Sweden’s, the friction will be high.
Middle East
Image removed by sender. map: middle east quarterly locator
· Global trend: The global recession and the Middle East
Most of the Persian Gulf’s oil economies are coping relatively well with the global economic slowdown and the resulting slump in oil prices. Smaller Gulf states with more limited cash reserves are struggling more in balancing their budgets and maintaining infrastructure growth, but regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia is well on the way to recovery and is using its windfall revenues from 2008 to move ahead with strategic development projects, such as expanding the country’s refining capacity which will allow it to move up the value chain and secure more reliable income. Iran, under the weight of sanctions and diplomatic isolation, lags far behind its Persian Gulf counterparts in developing its energy industry, but the country’s economic ailments are unlikely to induce any meaningful shifts in Iranian foreign policy in the near term.
Though Turkey’s financial sector was relatively insulated from the global financial turmoil, the Turkish economy has taken a beating from a slump in exports to the country’s main trading partners in Europe (half of Turkey’s exports are sold to the EU states). Considering that the Europeans are just now realizing the depth of their banking crisis, Turkey is unlikely to see much economic relief in the next quarter.
· Global trend: The Russian resurgence and the Middle East
The Russian-Iranian relationship will thus need to be closely monitored in the next quarter. As long as the United States refuses to budge on Russian demands regarding U.S. military assistance to Poland, the Russians will have little reason to cooperate with Washington over Iran and will ensure that any Western threats of stringent sanctions will remain toothless. More importantly, the Russians could choose to use their relationship with Iran to pressure Washington, perhaps by giving Iran more assistance on its Bushehr nuclear power plant or by following through with a long-standing threat to sell Iran S-300 strategic air defense systems. How far Moscow goes will depend on the trajectory of U.S.-Russian negotiations over the next quarter, but as long as Iran can rely on Moscow’s backing, any attempt at negotiations with Iran that Washington makes this quarter will fail.
· Regional trend: U.S.-Iranian negotiations
The United States will run into a number of hurdles in dealing with Iran this next quarter. STRATFOR forecasted last quarter that no matter the winner of Iran’s June presidential elections, the Iranians would continue to skirt around serious talks with the West. Despite Obama’s efforts to solidify Arab support and engage diplomatically with the Iranians, Tehran feels little compulsion to negotiate on issues like the country’s nuclear ambitions, Iraq, and Hezbollah when these are the very things that provide the regime with regional leverage and when the United States has few options in getting Tehran to bend.
Obama now has an even bigger problem on his hands in the wake of the Iranian elections. Tehran will exaggerate allegations of foreign meddling in street protests and Baloch rebel activity in order to avoid talks and shun any deadlines set by the West to come clean on its nuclear program. The Iranian regime will become more insular as it tries to sew up deep rifts within the clerical establishment that were exposed during the election fallout. This is a power struggle that bears close watching, but is unlikely to seriously threaten the stability of the regime in the near term. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a refreshed political mandate to uproot his rivals, but powerful members of the old clerical elite, including former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, are more likely to work within the system to try and keep the president’s ambitions in check. Between refereeing behind-the-scenes political sparring and mopping up the remnants of protests in Tehran’s streets, the regime will be too distracted and internally insecure to think about serious talks with the West.
Meanwhile, in Washington, both sides of the U.S. political spectrum are attacking Obama’s strategy to talk to Iran and demanding forceful action against what they see as a repressive regime run by a fraudulently elected leader. Israel, already quite unenthused by Obama’s negotiating strategy, will waste little time in ramping up its psychological warfare efforts to nudge Washington into taking a tougher stance against Iran and to keep Tehran off balance.
The Americans are reviewing their strategy and intelligence on Iran. In the past, STRATFOR made the assessment that American threats of military action are just that — threats used to shape talks at the negotiating table. After all, why would Washington want to risk destabilizing a region in which it has committed nearly 200,000 combat troops? But recent changes in political leadership in the United States, the events surrounding Iran’s June elections, rising U.S.-Russian tensions and other developments are forcing Washington to reevaluate. An attack may still not be in the cards, but such a statement is no longer a given.
· Regional trend: Turkey’s rise
Turkey is continuing along its ascendant path, in line with STRATFOR’s expectations. The priority for Turkey is to expand its power in the Middle East, beginning with Iraq, where the United States is taking a step back from day-to-day security operations and where Turkey is taking a step forward in managing the country’s rival factions.
The Turks are counting on Iraqi energy to boost Ankara’s profile in the region as a major east-west energy transit hub. But with Iraq bogged down in sectarian feuds, Turkey has its work cut out in trying to bring its own version of order to the country. The Turks will continue building relations with key Iraqi politicians, but will also take a more nuanced approach in dealing with the Kurds, using less military coercion and more political and economic persuasion. By playing on Kurdish fears of encirclement by Iraqi Arabs, the Turks will aim to persuade the Kurds that Turkey can guarantee Kurdish political and economic security, as long as the Kurds play by Turkey’s rules — which include abandoning any separatist ambitions.
Recognizing the problems the United States is encountering in its Iran strategy, the Turks will be careful to maintain a healthy relationship with Tehran. The time may not be ripe for Iran to seriously engage the West, but Turkey is positioning itself to become a mediator in this long-standing dispute.
Once Turkey reaches beyond the Middle East, the road gets rougher. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party is attempting a complex balancing act between the East and West in trying to create the geopolitical space for Turkey’s expansion. Ankara sees itself as an independent player and has no interest in becoming a pawn in the ongoing U.S.-Russian struggle over Eurasia. Thus, Turkey must flirt with multiple options and act as unpredictably as possible in conducting its foreign affairs so that it does not permanently breach relations with either side. To this end, Turkey will entertain deals on non-Russian energy routes like the Nabucco pipeline and push for EU membership to keep one foot in the West, but will also work closely with the Russians on energy and defense deals to avoid trouble with Moscow and keep its Russian-chaperoned negotiations with Armenia alive.
Turkey is likely to encounter the most resistance to its resurgence in former Soviet territory. The Turkish government continues to push a pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic agenda to raise its profile among Turkic-speaking peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but a number of these post-communist regimes — Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, in particular — are extremely wary of Turkey’s intentions and increasingly Islamist branding. This simmering backlash could give Russia additional leverage in countering Turkey’s regional rise.
· Regional trend: Israeli-Syrian normalization
The Israeli-Syrian negotiations are unlikely to gain much traction in the coming quarter. The Israeli government is too fractured to form a coherent policy on the issue and will focus its attention on the Iranian threat while it has an opportunity to nudge the United States into taking a harder line on Tehran. Before Israel commits to any negotiations with Syria, it will first want to see what comes out of Syria’s diplomatic engagements with Washington and Riyadh.
Syria will have its hands full in the coming quarter. Damascus laid the intelligence groundwork last quarter to reassert its influence in the newly-elected Lebanese government. The Syrian regime created a diplomatic opportunity from Lebanon’s elections by carefully balancing its support between the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition and the Western- and Saudi-backed March 14 coalition. Syria does not mind if Hezbollah is limited to being in opposition. In fact, it gives Syria a chip it can use with Washington and Riyadh: that Damascus deserves hegemony in Lebanon since it can demonstrate Hezbollah’s (and by extension Iran’s) political containment. Saudi Arabia and the United States are cautiously pleased with how Syria handled the Lebanese elections and will send their ambassadors back to Syria in the next quarter to give Damascus the diplomatic recognition it so earnestly seeks. Syria conducts such negotiations in piecemeal fashion, however, and will resist pressure to make any definitive moves, such as breaking publicly with Iran and Hezbollah. Syria’s slow-going rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the United States will nonetheless add a great deal of strain to Syria’s already rocky relationships with Tehran and Hezbollah.
Latin America
Image removed by sender. map: latin america quarterly locator
· Global trend: The global recession and Latin America
The decline in demand for goods and evaporation of credit markets brought about by the global recession have hit every Latin American economy hard, but the states with populist leaderships face the greatest challenges in coping with the economic pain and side effects. Despite positive signs in the U.S. economy and global credit markets, any worldwide economic upturn will have delayed effects in Latin America.
Venezuela’s populist government is continuing its efforts to solidify control over the economy. Should oil prices continue to increase, the government will have more resources to help in its struggle to integrate nationalized sectors — including legions of workers from the energy sector — into the state apparatus while maintaining high levels of social spending. Hardship in the Venezuelan economy poses potential political challenges to the government of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, giving the opposition a chance at gaining a foothold in public opinion. A number of issues are sure to spark outcry within Venezuela’s opposition during the third quarter, but it will take a lot more time and work for this movement to coalesce into a real threat to the regime.
Argentina will likely fail its test in economic management in the third quarter. Now that legislative elections are out of the way, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s government will have to meet the global downturn that has exacerbated Argentina’s already noticeable political decline head-on. Despite her allies’ second-quarter defeat at the polls, Fernandez has shown no willingness to compromise on her policies so far. Argentina’s options remain limited, as all Argentine politicians rely on the economically damaging populist policies for political support, and modest (at least by Argentine standards) attempts at reform in the third quarter will not bear significant fruit.
Mexico also continues to suffer from the economic crisis, albeit for different reasons. Mexico’s proximity to the United States is the main driver of its economic downturn, and Mexico is unlikely to see a major turnaround in the third quarter. Brazil and Chile have well-diversified economies and large domestic credit reserves, enabling them to continue coping with the effects of the economic crisis. However, Chile’s reliance on the export sector and need to maintain employment has made its management of the crisis more challenging. Peru likely will see positive signs of growth, but increasing domestic unrest led by indigenous groups will have a destabilizing effect beyond the third quarter.
· Regional trend: Mexico’s cartel violence
The pace of the cartel war in Mexico has held steady throughout 2009 so far and there is little to suggest that there will be major changes in the third quarter. At the current rate, cartel-related deaths for the year are on track to reach close to 7,500 — 1,500 more than in 2008. The cartels controlling Mexican drug trafficking are at war with the government and each other. Alliances and rivalries among the cartels remain highly unstable, and the degree of volatility in these relationships makes it difficult to predict the course of the violence.
Since 2006, the Mexican military has been pushed into a wide range of counternarcotics operations normally conducted by law enforcement agencies, such as drug eradication, maritime and airborne interdiction, signals intelligence operations, local security patrols, raids and arrests. In the third quarter, Mexico will reexamine the appropriateness of these roles for the Mexican military, which did not traditionally perform these functions. The debate is unlikely to reach a conclusion by the end of the quarter, but it is one that is well worth watching as the outcome could change the way the cartel war is fought.
The months ahead also likely will shed more light on the shifting geography of cartel operations. Central America’s rising importance as a drug trafficking route will make the Mexican border with Guatemala increasingly important to the cartels and will continue affecting the security situation in the region.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Image removed by sender. map: africa quarterly locator
Related Links
· The Geopolitics of South Africa: Securing Labor, Ports and Mineral Wealth
· Angola: Net Assessment
· Global trend: The global recession and Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will be sluggish in the third quarter, hindered by constrained global demand for Africa’s resources and a scarcity of investment from the United States, Europe and Asia. To contain social tensions and finance stretched budgets, governments fortunate enough to have oil will be forced to dip into their reserves. Others will have little choice but to petition at global summits, including the G-20 summit in September, for the world’s markets to remain open to African exports, and that any remaining development and budgetary assistance continue to flow.
· Regional trend: Niger Delta militancy
Attacks in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region will continue apace this quarter and will be driven at least partly by the government — and specifically the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which will be largely occupied in the third quarter with laying out its campaign strategy ahead of 2011 national elections. An amnesty program aimed at militants in the Niger Delta region that will be conducted in the third quarter is the PDP’s first big step in coordinating with the various gangs and Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta factions in the oil-rich area on a political intimidation strategy based on militant tactics. The strategy, which will use tactics ranging from kidnappings and assassinations of opposition politicians to pipeline sabotage and illegal bunkering activities, is meant to ensure that all Niger Delta inhabitants vote for the PDP in 2011. The PDP, which dominates Nigeria’s federal, state and local governments, will use the third quarter to begin to identify friendly and hostile politicians vying for elected and appointed positions.
· Regional trend: South Africa begins to function
In the third quarter, South African President Jacob Zuma will begin moving from a domestic focus toward reasserting South Africa’s influence abroad. Zuma will likely begin mediating among factions in Zimbabwe’s coalition government in order to shape that country’s eventual transition from a Robert Mugabe presidency. Zuma also will likely make a state visit to Angola as both countries work to shape their relations as they compete for influence in southern and central Africa. Business interests will also drive Zuma’s itinerary this quarter; on his trips to Angola and Zimbabwe, he is likely to be accompanied by representatives of prominent South African businesses interested in deepening their involvement in the Angolan and Zimbabwean economies. Although Angola and Zimbabwe want South African investment, they will also compete for other foreign investment (by offering bids to the Chinese, the Russians and the Americans) in order to not only bid up the price of investment, but also counter South Africa’s attempts to expand its influence over southern Africa and its mineral wealth. Other regional players cannot rival that influence without assistance from an outside power.
· Regional trend: Somali civil war
In Somalia, Ethiopia and the United States will provide covert support in the form of financial aid and small arms to the fledgling Somali government that continues to struggle in its fight against an Islamist insurgency. The United States will carry out special operations actions against high-value targets in Somalia, using U.S. forces based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and will help the African Union expand its peacekeeping force in Somalia — currently about 4,300 strong — that has been unwilling or unable to directly engage the Islamists. The war between the Somali government and the Islamists will continue, as no side possesses sufficient forces to fully displace the other.
East Asia
Image removed by sender. map: asia quarterly locator
· Global Trend: The global recession and East Asia
Export-reliant Asia has experienced the worst pain from the global recession, and lagging factors like wages and unemployment mean the risks for political and social instability will linger throughout the third quarter. China’s economy is stabilizing, but growth is unlikely to be sustainable for the long run as it is based primarily on government stimulus spending and record bank lending. China’s stimulus and bank lending are continuing to drive growth, and helping others in the region stay afloat, but for the whole of East Asia, much still depends upon the speed and scope of a U.S. recovery.
Meanwhile, social instability risks remain. In the third quarter, China continues preparing its security forces for potential social unrest leading up to the remaining anniversaries in 2009, the most significant of which is the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1. Despite some improvements, Chinese exports have yet to recover, and as many as 30 million migrant workers remain jobless. Localized protests and unrest triggered by wage disputes, corruption and social and ethnic tensions continue. While they are sometimes costly to placate, these pockets of turmoil are neither collaborating across regional boundaries nor presenting a significant challenge to the government.
Related Links
· The Recession in China
· China: Rural Consumption and Real Estate Sales
· Geopolitical Diary: The 20th Anniversary of Tiananmen Square
· China: Ethnic Tension as a Threat to Beijing
· Australia: A Resignation’s Larger Significance
· The Recession in Japan, Part 1: Lost Decade Revisited
· China, U.S.: A Naval Incident and Wider Maritime Competition
· China: A Loan Surge as the Only Option
· Japan: Delaying Budget Deadlines
· China: Beijing Strengthens its Claims in the South China Sea
Raising concerns for Beijing this quarter are the emerging trade battles with the United States and Europe, as domestic lobbies, national recovery policies and economic nationalism across the world contribute to a rise in trade tensions. China may back down on some of its more protectionist policies toward specific commodities or products, but Beijing will become even more adamant about using tools like the World Trade Organization to push its own economic interests.
Trade tensions and the recent outbreak of violence in Xinjiang will dominate the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue set for late July. This forum is shaping up to be one where critical bilateral issues — from military competition in the South China Sea to negotiations over green technology and climate change to the U.S. budget deficit and China’s concerns over the safety of its dollar-denominated assets — will be raised. While the talks may offer some room for cooperation, they will also expose areas of disagreement. Late July may also see the emergence of a trilateral U.S.-China-Japan dialogue, something Tokyo has been promoting as Washington engages more closely with Beijing.
The setbacks China’s foreign acquisition strategy suffered in the second quarter have left Beijing rethinking its methods. The failure of the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal and the detention of an Australian national accused of espionage in China are testing Beijing-Canberra ties. China is also having to give in on negotiations over iron ore prices, having taken too aggressive a stance in negotiations with Australia and Brazil. Beijing will take a different tack in the third quarter, seeking lower-profile resource deals, working on joint ventures or investments rather than outright acquisitions, and focusing more on places like Central and Southeast Asia and Africa than on Australia or Western countries.
Severe pre-existing economic pain, coupled with institutional problems, has made Japan one of the worst-off countries during the global recession. A U.S. recovery is the only thing that can pick Japan back up, but deflation could still dampen domestic recovery. The burdens of public budget deficits and debt on the private sector are bigger than ever, and these will continue to grow as the government attempts to shield the population from harmful economic changes.
While waiting for a U.S. recovery to lift its severely ailing economy, Japan likely will hold elections for the lower house of parliament. The vote will largely favor the opposition, likely worsening the impasse in Japanese government. High drama in parliament could make Japanese policymaking appear confused, but top priorities (like the economy or the redefinition of military policy) will not be affected.
South Korea will be in a more advantageous position than the other big Asian economic powers, having shown consistently the ability to shift and adjust faster than its neighbors. Industrial output is rising on the back of falling inventories, and exports are falling less than expected, contributing to large trade surpluses. But recovery still depends upon export markets, and Seoul will spend the quarter working hard to finalize various free trade agreements to help widen its markets.
· Regional trend: Maritime competition
China shows every sign of continuing to advance policies, administrative reforms and military capabilities in pursuit of greater influence in its maritime surroundings. This is attracting greater attention throughout the region — particularly from Japan — to issues of maritime territoriality. The next quarter will see increased discussions and disagreements about maritime territory, as well as increased patrols, which will open up the possibility of more confrontations in Asia’s waters.
From China’s maritime activities to North Korea to piracy in Africa, Japan’s concerns will push along an ongoing military review that carves out a greater role for the country’s Self-Defense Forces in Japanese policymaking.
· Regional trend: North Korean negotiating tactics
North Korea will complete its latest round of missile tests and potentially another nuclear test this quarter. The threats and tests are part of Pyongyang’s preparation for the fourth quarter, when we expect the regime to change tack and once again entertain negotiations with the United States. In the meantime, these tests are intended to gain knowledge and experience about systems and bulk up domestic support for the regime in preparation for a leadership transition down the road.
Former Soviet Union
Image removed by sender. map: FSU quarterly locator
· Global trend: The global recession and the former Soviet Union
The global recession has hit Russia very hard . In the second quarter of 2009, the outlook for Russia was bleak. Rising unemployment, falling industrial production and foreign investment flight all put a deep dent in Russia’s massive currency reserves (which dropped from $650 billion to about $400 billion in a year) as Russia resorted to public spending to prop up its economy. Other former Soviet states, like Kazakhstan and Ukraine, felt the same economic pain. Each country put its own political spin on the crisis; Russia locked down economically, Kazakhstan began nationalizing key industries and Ukraine ignored the problem as it began feeding into Kiev’s routine political turmoil.
As the third quarter begins, there are only glimmers of light at the end of the tunnel for Russia. However, things in Russia should be much worse than they are.
In the past 12 months, Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell 9.5 percent, while the U.S. GDP fell 2.6 percent and the European Union’s fell 4.4 percent. This means that Russia has fallen further than any other major economy during the current recession. Statistically, the economic decline in Russia is comparable to the United States’ Great Depression.
Such a drop should have devastated the country economically, socially and politically. According to the norms for other countries, the drop should be obvious inside Russia, with massive unemployment — much more than its current 11 percent — along with riots in the streets and a penniless government. But Russia has rarely followed the norms, and none of this has occurred, most likely due to the government’s ability to control both industries and people. Moscow has an uncanny ability to keep its house in order against great odds.
So even though Russia has sustained a financial blow that would have taken most countries to the verge of collapse, Moscow does not appear to be losing its ability to rule its own country or to strike out with extensive — and expensive — plans to increase its influence abroad.
No comments:
Post a Comment