Doc's Talk: An Introduction to the Responsibility to Protect

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

An Introduction to the Responsibility to Protect

R2P

In this section, you will find the following topics:
1. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
2. Secretary-General Kofi Annan Promotes RtoP
3. The AU's Constitutive Act and the Ezulwini Consensus
4. The 2005 World Summit
5. Developments at the United Nations Since 2005
6. The report of the Secretary General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
7. General Assembly July 2009 Debate on the Responsibility to Protect
8. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/308 on the Responsibility to Protect

Since the end of the Second World War, an international effort has been undertaken to protect civilians in armed conflict and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In 1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the United Nations, and entered into force three years later. The Convention was the steppingstone in the international community’s attempt to ensure the horrors witnessed during the Holocaust would never occur again. However, the resounding promise of “Never Again” would prove to be hollow. The end of the 20th Century marked a change in the nature of armed conflict: large inter-state wars were replaced by violent internal conflicts, where the vast majority of casualties are now civilians. The genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia demonstrated massive failures by the international community to prevent mass atrocities. Thus, near the end of the 1990’s there was a recognized need to shift the debate about crisis prevention and response: the security of the community and the individual, not only the state, must be priorities for national and international policies.
1. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
The term Responsibility to Protect was first presented in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001. The Commission had been formed in response to Kofi Annan's question of when the international community must intervene for humanitarian purposes. Building on Francis Deng's idea of sovereignty as responsibility, the Commission addressed the question of when state sovereignty - a fundamental principle of international law - must yield to protection against the most egregious violations of humanitarian and international law, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. View a Summary of the ICISS Report.

The timing of this reports' release in December 2001 was devastating to its initial reception. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the international debate shifted away from consideration of measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocity toward measures for the prevention and preemption of terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, premised in part on an argument of humanitarian intervention, was even more destructive to the advancement of the RtoP agenda. The invasion heightened concerns that RtoP would be used to further erode the sovereignty of smaller developing countries.

However, although support for RtoP was limited in the initial period after the release of the ICISS report, ongoing humanitarian disasters, including the failure to protect the people of Darfur, signaled that more needed to be done by the international community as a whole to respond to genocide and other threats against populations.

2. Secretary-General Kofi Annan Promotes RtoP
In September 2003, the Secretary-General called for Member States to strengthen the UN to better advance development, security, and the protection of human rights. In recognition of the urgent need to address the UN's failures to respond to genocide, the Secretary-General challenged Member States to include protection from genocide as part of this UN reform agenda. The Secretary-General then formed the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to report on how the UN should confront the greatest security threats of the 21st century. In December, 2004, the High-level Panel released its report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Included in the report's 101 recommendations on strengthening the international security framework was an endorsement of an international responsibility to protect populations from grave threats.

After consultations with governments and UN officials, and with input from many civil society organizations, the Secretary-General published his own report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Similar to the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General emphasized the need of governments to take action against threats of massive human rights violations and other large scale acts of violence against civilians. He called on governments to embrace the Responsibility to Protect, emphasizing that while it is first and foremost the individual governments responsibility to protect its population, the responsibility shifts to the international community when the state is unable or unwilling to protect their citizens. He also emphasized that the international community must use a range of measures to protect populations, which could include diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, and as a last resort may include the use of military force.

3. The AU's Constitutive Act and the Ezulwini Consensus
Meanwhile, in 2000, African nations were working to enshrine the principles of R2P within the founding Charter of the African Union (AU). First, the Constitutive Act defines the promotion of peace, security and stability and the promotion and protection of “human and peoples’ rights” as core obejective of the Union. Second, it identifies “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance”, "respect for the sanctity of human life”, and “condemnation and rejection of impunity” among its core values. Most significantly, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act states that it is the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” This important clause conveys one end of the full R2P spectrum - military intervention - but the Charter shows the commitment of African Nations to protecting populations from atrocity, even if infringement on the sovereignty of its members is required.

The report, known as the ”Ezulwini Consensus”, was expressed at the African Union’s 7th Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council of 1-8 March 2005, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In its report, the AU embraced the Responsibility to Protect and recognized the authority of the Security Council to decide on the use of force in situations of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. It also insisted on the need for an empowerment of regional organizations to take action in such cases. In 2005, with RtoP as part of the proposed recommendations for improving the UN, the African Union responded by its own evaluation of th proposed reforms.

4. 2005 World Summit
As the UN debated major reforms of its human rights system, the idea of committing to an international Responsibility to Protect gained support from many governments and civil society organizations from all regions. Southern leadership at the 2005 World Summit was central. Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Rwanda, and South Africa, were some of the influential governments insisting on a meaningful commitment to the Responsibility to Protect. The leadership of these governments allowed for the support of many other members from the global South. In the end, the historic commitment was finally made at the World Summit in September 2005. In

Paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, Heads of State and government agreed to the following:

That each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. And it is also a responsibility for prevention of these crimes

That the international community should encourage or assist states to exercise this responsibility.

The international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect populations threatened by these crimes. When a state anifestly fails in its protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community must take stronger measures, including collective use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

5. Developments at the United Nations Since 2005
Since the 2005 World Summit, there have been several important normative advancements, including the Security Council's unanimous adoption of Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, which includes the first official Security Council reference to the Responsibility to Protect. The Security Council also passed Resolution 1706 authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur, which referred to Resolution 1674 and paragraph 138 and 139 on the Responsibility to Protect in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.

The new Secretary General Ban ki-Moon has also made two very important appointments: Mr. Francis Deng as Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Mr. Edward Luck, Special Adviser to the Secretary General with a focus on the Responsibility to Protect.

Unfortunately, there have also been some setbacks to the advancement of the RtoP agenda in the past three years. In January 2007, China and Russia vetoed a resolution on the situation in Burma, arguing that Burma did not pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, and that the internal affairs of the state did not have a place within the Security Council. Instead, they suggested that situation in Burma should be taken up by the Human Rights Council. The referral of the situation in Burma to the Human Rights Council raised questions about the commitment of some Security Council members in addressing mass atrocity crimes within the Security Council. Another example of resistance by Security Council members to apply RtoP in specific situations was in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which authorized the deployment a hybrid UN-AU force for Darfur. While it was an important step toward providing much needed protection to civilians, it did not refer to the Responsibility to Protect or to the Protection of Civilians Resolution. This came as another setback from earlier RtoP advances.

In addition, opposition from outside the Council came during the General Assembly's 5th Committee bi-annual budget debate late last year, where the Committee declined funding for the office of the new Special Adviser on RtoP. This was partially due to procedural matters but also because some Members argued that the Responsibility to Protect had actually never been agreed to as a norm during the World Summit. On 21 February 2008, the office of Secretary-General Ban announced the appointment of Edward Luck as a Special Adviser with a focus on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This revised title (the earlier one was Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect) reflected the resistance to his position from some Member States.

6. The Report of the Secretary General: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect(RtoP). The report is the first comprehensive document from the UN Secretariat on the Responsibility to Protect, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The Secretary General's report sets the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes a terminological framework for understanding the Responsibility to Protect and outlines measures and actors involved in implementing the hree-pillar approach, first outlined in the Secretary General's July 2008 Berlin Speech. The three pillars are:

- Pillar One stresses that States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
- Pillar Two addresses the commitment of the international community to provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
- Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity when a State is anifestly failing to protect its populations.

Importantly, the Secretary-General urges the General Assembly to consider the strategy for implementing RtoP as prescribed in the report. It also gives a particular attention to early warning, and introduces specific recommendations regarding a future proposal to create a joint-office between the Special Adviser with a focus on the Responsibility to Protect and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. See our summary of the report

7. July 2009 General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect
The General Assembly Debate on RtoP started on 23 July 2009 and continued the full two days of 24 July and 28 July 2009. The 92 Member States (and 2 observers) which spoke on RtoP demonstrated strong interest in the norm and made an important show of support for implementing the 2005 commitment to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Governments demonstrated that they were conscientiously considering the proposals in the Secretary-General’s report and also raised important issues and recommendations for the General Assembly, the Security Council, UN departments, regional bodies and governments. Many recognized the important role of civil society in preventing and reacting to these most serious international violations. (click here to view statements and media coverage on the event).   See the Coalition's report on the July Debate  and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect's assessment of the debate.

8. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/308 on the Responsibility to Protect
The first resolution on the Responsibility to Protect was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 September 2009. The resolution (A/RES/63/308) was introduced by the delegation of Guatemala and was co-sponsored by 67 Member States. The GA took note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the "timely and productive" debate in the General Assembly, and decided to continue its consideration of RtoP.   View the summary of statements on the adoption of the resolution.  

Comment: Coming to Israel sooner than later-the fix is in-more in another piece.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk