Friday, March 18, 2011

US Military Strategy - Part IV Joint Force Strike Operations Lily Pad Strategy Series

Paul E. Vallely

March 17, 2011

The Inability to Plan - To date, government policy elitists in the United States have demonstrated almost complete ignorance towards forward strategic planning. While virtually every military officer and many policy “wonks” have been taught strategic planning at some level, it is obvious many have thrown away most of the lessons upon graduating. This appears more than ever in our senior Generals, Admirals, Defense and State Department political appointees. As an example proving how utterly incompetent the United States remains in lacking strategic plans, one only needs to observe the international scene and ongoing conflicts in Middle East and, particularly, Afghanistan. Since early 80s, the United States has been engaged in conflicts throughout the Middle East to include Afghanistan. From the Iranian hostage situation in 1979 to the bombing of our Marines in Beirut in 1982, to Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia to the bombing of the US Cole in Yemen to Iraq and Afghanistan, we have witnessed one debacle after another with no apparent victories for the United States. Why do the United States and its military/political leaders and strategists still languish in failed strategies since the victories of World War II to the present? Before we commit our Armed Forces into any conflict, the policy must firmly ask the question “is this enemy a threat to the United States and the American people?” There is no reason to order massive armies into the Middle East and enemy territories that require large, extensive ongoing bases requiring massive logistical support to fight the enemy on their home turf. We can strike the enemy from any of our established friendly (domestic and overseas) and seaborne “Lily Pads”. Lily Pads are established bases in safe areas where joint force operations can be launched from at any time. Based on well-established human and technical intelligence operations, we can hit any enemy target globally with decisiveness, lethality and success. We have made great and innovative technological advances in weapons systems in the air, sea and ground, communications, advanced intelligence systems and command and control systems but we must have new and adaptive strategies.

Yes, we have operational war planners at all levels of command, senior policy and politicos in the White House, State and Department of Defense, a National Security Team and a multitude of military commands positioned around the globe to guide and lead us in national security. But where are the common sense and rational senior General and Admiral Strategists that we have trained and schooled to be innovative, aggressive and win our nation’s wars quickly and decisively. It appears they are over powered and over ruled by inept politicians. I rarely hear any of them talking about the valued Principles of War that successful combat leaders in the past have used to achieve success and victory. They cannot even talk in terms of victory, winning and bringing the troops home. Or maybe, they do not want to for politically correct reasons at home. Billions of dollars and valuable human resources have been consumed and absorbed by a massive Middle East Sponge. And, I ask, for what?

Unfortunately, American leaders are increasingly trying to transform this magnificent armed force into one optimized for counterinsurgency missions (when, in fact, we are not, in my opinion, fighting insurgencies but Islamic Jihadist and a fomenting global Caliphate) with conventional war strategies followed on by long-term military occupations. Track back if you will to Korea, Vietnam, and now Iraq, and Afghanistan. However, “victory” in war appears lost in the world of political correctness and appeasement. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan — often seen as proving the necessity for COIN-capable forces as well as a commitment to nation-building — demonstrate in reality that the vast majority of goals can be accomplished through quick, decisive joint military operations. Not all political goals are achievable this way, but most are and those that cannot be achieved through conventional operations likely cannot be achieved by the application of even the most sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine either. We seem incapable of discerning between the differences in conventional and non-conventional warfare. The war against mainstream Islamic Jihadist forces and a sick ideology has been and will continue to be one requiring unconventional solutions. This is a point that the White House and the Pentagon fear to call this war against a pronounced ideology

Why can we not understand that our military is for national security, defending our country and defeating our enemies before they bring havoc and harm to our citizens? Why can we not understand how important our resources are in terms of our trained Armed Forces and assets of our country and not to drain them across the globe in futile nation building operations but to leverage the military to counter threats to our country? And, as well, to realize and understand in a profound way that you cannot Nation Build in an area of conflict until the enemy is defeated.

A fundamental challenge in devising a strategy for the use of future American military power is that the world has literally never seen anything like our capability. The U.S. today has military capabilities at least equal to the rest of the world combined. There is virtually no spot on the globe that could not be targeted by American forces, and at most a small handful of countries that could thwart a determined U.S. effort at regime change — and some of those only by virtue of their possession of nuclear weapons. This is the driving point; why are we so worried about what others think? Did these so-called allies not have to be bailed out numerous times for their failed thinking?

As a consequence, the U.S. must adopt a national military strategy that heavily leverages the core capability to break enemy states, target and destroy and destroy the enemy’s capability to bring harm to America. Such a strategy could defeat and disrupt most potential threats the U.S. faces.

While many believe this war is solely fought inside the confines of the Afghan borders, they are mistaken. The war in Afghanistan consists of operations throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. Those being fought understand no borders.

Our enemy is fully aware and informed of our Rules of Engagements (ROE’s). They understand that the United States will not advance into their harbored locations. They also realize that the countries which they harbor in are fully incompetent, corrupt, and oftentimes support their own cause and not the cause of the United States. Because of this fundamental knowledge amongst our current enemy, they have established bases of operations for regrouping, recovering, and reorganizing as needed.

Between the years of 2001 through early 2003, the war in Afghanistan was won by the United States. It was won because United States Special Operations Command was granted control over the country to incorporate plans of execution to rid Taliban from control of Afghanistan. The tactical and operational plans created by our Special Operatives were sound and executable proving success. They struck and operated from lily pads covertly.

With time and showing signs of success in Afghanistan, conventional forces began to flood the country in 2002. They went into Afghanistan with no clear objective and still do so today. Brigade commanders are often heard stating that their task and purpose during their tours of duty are to continuously “build and enhance their bases, hold them, and ensure their troops come home in one piece.” And yes, we are there to spread Democracy and Nation Buildng. This in itself has been a nightmare.

The thought of “winning hearts and minds” is mute pertaining to tasks and purposes. One must understand that winning hearts and minds is a tactic. This is a tactic just like carpet bombings, internment camps, enhanced interrogations, etc. Tactics are not strategic plans. They are tools used to ensure that the strategic plan is completed. Once completed, the war has reached an end state. Sadly, policy makers and military decision makers have proven their incompetence in determining their desired end state for Afghanistan. Without a clear end state fully written out, a strategic plan cannot be written out, executed, and fulfilled.

For those who have ever been taught strategic planning in any formalized military schooling know that such planning should be accomplished through a systematic methodology of “reverse planning.” This means, prior to anything written, an end state must be identified. Once the end state is identified, it is then and only then where decision makers can make a determination and written plan in achieving the overall task. This will be accomplished through smaller operational and tactical objectives with sound benchmarks and timelines.

The Inability to Execute - U.S. government intelligence and diplomatic organizations as a whole has failed in their task of predicting and understanding the conflicts areas (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Libya).

It is much easier to identify a group of adversaries than it is to understand them and their formal and or informal networks. To identify these groups, a person needs not leave the confines of Washington D.C. The United States has some of the best technical intelligence platforms known around the world. These platforms simply identify yet rarely provide enough information to truly understand. Understanding these networks is vitally crucial for executing any plan of operation.

We must be capable of unifying interagencies ensuring completeness in execution of objective end states. For example, the executions of interagency operations inside Afghanistan have been validated as completely flawed. U.S. Special Operations are rarely in sync with conventional forces. Conventional forces are rarely in sync with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s). The State Department is rarely in sync with the Non-Government Organizations. In the end, synergy amongst the numerous government and non-government entities is non-existent.

The Inability to Hold Oneself Accountable - General George Patton, arguably one of the greatest warriors in American military history, was a man who accepted full responsibility for his actions. He has been publicly ridiculed, he has been laughed at amongst the German Nazi’s due to U.S. government leaderships inept understanding towards his own leadership style, and he ultimately paid the consequences through his forced relinquish of command. Patton most likely had very few regrets in his actions. Whether they were right, wrong, or indifferent, his actions obtained the praises of the men who followed him in battle. He was identified within the political spheres of United States government as a “cowboy” who simply did not know how to get along with others. Not only do they fail to understand the enemy, they failed to appreciate the love and support from the men and women whom he commanded. Patton always held himself accountable! I suspect the current national security team holds no one accountable for our errors in strategic thinking, planning and execution.

Paul E. Vallely is Chairman of Stand Up America.





Paul E. Vallely MG, US Army (Ret)

Chairman – Stand Up America

E-Mail: standupamericaceo@gmail.com

www.standupamericaus.com

www.soldiersmemorialfund.org

www.patriotsunion.org

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