Doc's Talk: A primer on Palestinian statehood-misleading piece

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

A primer on Palestinian statehood-misleading piece

A. Bell

What do the Palestinians want the United Nations to recognize?

The Palestinians want to become a "member state" of the United Nations. This requires winning votes in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Since the Palestinians can't win in the Security Council if the US vetoes, they are apparently going to aim for one or both of two secondary options: either a non-binding resolution in the General Assembly "recognizing" a state of Palestine and its territorial sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank and east Jerusalem or, alternatively, an upgrade of the observer status of the “Palestine” delegation from being the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the representative of the "non-member state of Palestine." Each of these secondary options requires votes only in the General Assembly, which the Palestinians can win handily.

What’s the legal process for becoming a state?

Under customary international law, there is no fixed procedure for becoming a state. International law recognizes a state when it has the required ingredients of territory, a permanent population, a government with effective control and the capacity to carry on international relations. UN recognition is not part of a legal process for becoming a state. Although the Palestinians appear not to have the requisite ingredients, more than one hundred states in the world already recognize the “state of Palestine.”

The UN has a legal procedure for becoming a member, assuming one is a state. Membership requires a recommendation by the Security Council (which is subject to veto by the permanent members), and then a two-thirds vote by the General Assembly

Is there a way for the Palestinians to overcome a U.S. veto?

There is no way to get around a US veto in the Security Council. The Palestinians’ two options for UN votes that don't require Security Council approval — a non-binding "recognition" and upgrade of observer status — are immune from a US veto, but mainly symbolic in effect. Incidentally, the Palestinians have already won "recognition" of the state of Palestine in the General Assembly in the past.

Is there any benefit short of full statehood recognition that the Palestinians can obtain at the United Nations?

Yes, but none connected with the "statehood" initiative.

The Palestinians already have all the non-member rights that are possible, and will not gain any additional rights in the UN even if the observer status is now attached to a "non-member state" rather than an organization. The Palestinians already enjoy generous financial and political support from the United Nations, including dozens of non-binding anti-Israel resolutions every year, and the services of organs of the UN such as the UN Division of Palestine Rights that put out anti-Israel propaganda. The UN already reflexively adopts Palestinian political positions, and it treats the Palestinians as having sovereign territorial rights to the West Bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem.

The Palestinians can use their automatic super-majority in the General Assembly to add new anti-Israel resolutions to the annual list, such as ones calling for legal, economic and other sanctions against the Jewish state. Irrespective of the procedure used for proposing and adopting the resolutions, the resolutions would be non-binding.

Additionally, the Palestinians can use their effective control over UN bodies to create new anti-Israel “fact-finding” and other investigative missions, like the Goldstone Mission. And the Palestinians can use their majority in the General Assembly to request new anti-Israel advisory decisions from the International Court of Justice.

The Palestinian aim appears to be a symbolic victory that can be used in its ongoing diplomatic, legal and political warfare against Israel.

Why are the Palestinians seeking statehood recognition from the United Nations rather than negotiating directly with Israel?

The Palestinians have explained that they do not see the UN move and negotiations as either-or propositions.

The Palestinians pulled out of negotiations with Israel after Abbas received Prime Minister Olmert’s peace offer in 2008, in anticipation of elections in Israel and the United States. In light of Abbas’s rejection of Olmert’s offer, Palestinian President Abbas explained to a Washington Post interviewer shortly after President Obama’s inauguration in May 2009 that the Palestinians have little to gain from direct negotiations with Israel considering that Obama is likely to pressure Israel for unilateral concessions, and life is otherwise fairly good for the Palestinians. Other than a brief surrender to American pressure in September 2010, when Abbas agreed to negotiations for a few weeks on the eve of the expiration of Israel’s unilateral 10-month settlement freeze, Abbas has been true to his word; as he promised the Washington Post, he has refused even to “begin negotiations” or help “confidence-building measures” unless Israel meets several new preconditions.

The UN-Palestinian statehood initiative was born during those few weeks in which Abbas agreed to negotiate. In September, 2010, President Obama announced in the General Assembly that “when we come back here next year [in September, 2011], we can have an agreement that will lead to a new member of the United Nations – an independent, sovereign state of Palestine, living in peace with Israel.” The Palestinians subsequently adopted the idea of seeking membership in the UN as a state by September, 2011. President Abbas explained in an op-ed in the New York Times that the goal of the UN statehood initiative is “the internationalization of the [Palestinian] conflict [with Israel] as a legal matter, not only a political one.”

What tools does Israel have to respond to the Palestinian bid?

The Palestinians have long enjoyed an automatic majority in the General Assembly, so Israel has no way to block any anti-Israel or pro-Palestinian initiative in that body. By contrast, US vetoes of anti-Israel resolutions in the Security Council are not guaranteed, so Israel has to continue lobbying the Obama Administration for the requested vetoes. In addition, Israel is lobbying other states in order to reduce the symbolic victory for the Palestinians in the General Assembly by increasing the minority of votes in favor of Israel’s position.

Israel and allies of Israel have also considered steps outside the General Assembly for responding to the Palestinian initiative. Israel has considered sanctioning the Palestinian Authority in some manner, though the Israeli government has not pointed yet to any specific steps. The U.S. Congress has threatened to ban financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority if it pursues recognition of statehood at the United Nations in violation of its commitment to resolve outstanding disputes with Israel in direct negotiations.

What’s the plan for the day after the U.N. vote?

If Israel or the Palestinians have a concrete plan, they have not revealed it.

Among steps that the Palestinians have publicly considered are diplomatic and political steps to encourage European states to impose economic and political sanctions on Israel, legal measures against Israelis in courtrooms in Europe, and large-scale civil unrest. Israelis have worried that the civil unrest might quickly devolve into violence and terrorism, like previous Palestinian campaigns. However, recent reports suggest that the Palestinian Fatah leadership itself fears civil unrest lest it turn into a popular uprising against the corruption of the ruling Fatah authorities.

Israel is reported to have prepared for potential Palestinian violence, and the potential for sympathetic disturbances along the Syrian and Lebanese borders. There is little indication that Israel is prepared for the internationalized legal and political warfare promised by Abbas.

No comments:

The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk