By Barry Rubin
For
all practical purposes, President Barack Obama has now recognized the
Syrian opposition group as the government of Syria. Specifically, he
called them the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.” The
European Union did the same a few days earlier. While this has move
little immediate, practical effect, it is enormously interesting for
understanding this issue. And it is also yet another signal that the
civil war in Syria is moving into the end-game.
First, the implications include the following:
--Thank
goodness that only happened after the U.S. government switched its
allegiance from the Syrian National Council (SNC). That group, basically
created by U.S. initiative (implemented by the Islamist Turkish
government) was about 100 percent controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The new group which Obama recognized, the Syrian Opposition Council, is
“only” about 40 percent controlled by the Brotherhood. That means there
is at least hope of a non-Islamist regime in Syria (see below).
[See note at end of article for an example of how U.S. policy gave behind-the-scenes support to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.]
--Let’s
take a moment to remember that despite all the talk about the problems
of backing dictatorships, the Obama Administration did back the Bashar
al-Assad dictatorship in Syria. It then easily changed sides to back the
opposition. In Egypt, too, Obama switched sides to support the
opposition.
There
are two lessons here. First, you can support a dictatorship and then
back the opposition if a big challenge happens to take place. Second,
what’s most important for U.S. interests is not whether the Americans
want to befriend an opposition but whether the opposition once in power
wants to befriend the Americans. If they are Islamists, abandon hope of
that happening.
--Ironically,
of course, the group recognized as being the true representatives of
the Syrian people was largely created due to U.S. and Western patronage
and power. While the new Council did arise from discussions among
Syrians, of course, this decision shows that as in the nineteenth
century the West—Obama Progressives as much as Victorian era
imperialist--still tries to control who gets into power in Third World
countries. Power politics is still the name of the game; the question is
whether that game is well-played.
In
the American presidential campaign, Mitt Romney made the little-noted
assertion that the United States should put the emphasis on ensuring
that moderates win in Syria. That notion is totally alien to the Obama
Administration.
--The
Syrian Opposition Council does not really represent Syrians, not only
because those within the country haven’t voted but also because this is
an external organization with little or no influence inside the country.
It also doesn’t have the guns. What it will have is control over
Western economic aid in future but this Council cannot be expected to be
the basis for a post-civil war government.
--In
sharp contrast to Libya, we know a lot about the Syrian opposition
groups and their leading personalities. The problem, however, is to
determine the relative military strength of each group. No doubt, the
CIA has a project to analyze the situation in every province and city. I
wish we could see their data but since we can’t we have to try to
figure out the balance of forces.
This
situation is made even more complex because so many groups exist and
ideology is cut across by the existence of five different
ethnic-religious sectors: Sunni Arab Muslims (about 60 percent),
Christians and Alawites (about 12-14 percent each); Kurds and Druze.
Will Alawites end up being cut out entirely because that group formed the basis for the Assad regime? Probably.
Will
Christians end up being cut out almost entirely because that group
backed the Assad regime due to fear of the Islamists who now will
probably try to cut them out? Probably.
Will
there be massacres of Alawites and Christians by a victorious
opposition, accompanied by tens or even hundreds of thousands of
cross-border refugees? Very possibly, yes.
Will
the Kurds gain autonomy for their home region in the northeast, an
autonomy they are ready to defend using armed militias? Very possibly
yes. (Incidentally, it is fascinating to consider how the Kurds in both
Iraq and Syria have succeeded on the ground with the opposite strategy
from that of the Palestinians. The Kurds have focused on practical
measures and on getting a really functioning Kurdish entity; the
Palestinians have put the priority on symbolism and total victory.)
The ultimate complication in Syria is the existence of six distinctive ideological camps:
--Salafist
groups allied with al-Qaida. There may be more than 25 such
organizations and they also include fighters from a wide variety of
European and Middle Eastern countries. These groups have no chance of
taking power or even a large share of any future parliament.
Their
threat is that they would be dangerously disruptive: attacking
Alawites, Christians, and also Kurdish autonomists; trying to attack
Israel from Syrian territory; fomenting anti-American and anti-Western
views or even waging terrorist attacks on Western people and
institutions in Syria; and attacking more secularist politicians, women
who favor modern ways, etc. But, again, they are not well organized and
will not gain any domestic political power.
--Salafist
groups not allied with al-Qaida. Everything said about the al-Qaida
linked groups also applies to them except that they might have
significant foreign backing from Saudi Arabia (which wants to subvert
Muslim Brotherhood power) and they could get a significant share of
parliamentary seats if they are able to unite. But this sector, too, is
not likely to gain state power.
--The
Muslim Brotherhood. This is the only truly united group in Syria that
has a significant national appeal, a clear agenda, and a disciplined
hierarchy. It is backed by Qatar and Turkey, while the Western countries
seem to be totally uninterested in countering the Brotherhood’s appeal
and ambitions.
Whatever
the relative size of their military forces, they are closer to being an
army than the other relatively rag-tag, ad hoc forces. Historically,
the Brotherhood has been far smaller proportionately than its fraternal
group in Egypt. A Brotherhood takeover of Syria is by no means
inevitable but if one had to bet it seems the single most likely
scenario. A key issue is whether the Brotherhood can gain hegemony among
traditionalist, pious Syrians who have never had anything to do with
the Brotherhood organizationally but would approve of a lot of its
platform regarding a Sharia-oriented state and rejecting a modern
liberal or Arab nationalist approach.
--The
moderates. There are a lot of liberal forces in Syria, especially among
urban Sunni Muslim Arabs who are intellectuals or in business. They are
far more sophisticated and skilled than their Egyptian counterparts
(sorry, Egyptian friends, but it’s true) and they could form alliances
with Kurds and Christians also. Unfortunately, the West hasn’t helped
them very much. They also have some characteristic weaknesses. These
include factionalism, a blindness toward the practical political work of
mobilizing the masses, problems in communicating with their
traditionalist fellows.
Most
of all, they lack the killer instinct. They don’t have guns or
militias, and they aren’t willing to intimidate or murder their rivals.
That can be a fatal shortcoming in an anything-goes post-civil war
Syria. Still, this group is the main alternative to Muslim Brotherhood
rule. These people are not—unlike their Western counterparts—naïve about
Islamists. Whatever compromises they will need to make they have no
illusions that the Islamists are moderate or will become so.
--Local
strongmen. This group is important even if it cannot gain power on a
national level. Such people are in real control of many areas of the
country; they have lots of guns; and they are able to appeal to
traditionalist Syrians in rural and small town areas. They are not
Islamist and don’t want Salafist or Brotherhood cadre to tell them what
to do or how to live. But they will have to form alliances to have a
wider effect and opportunism might drive them into the Brotherhood’s
camp.
--Defected
army officers. These men are the most effective military specialists.
They tend to be Arab nationalists. Yet they do not form a political
group and won’t do so. Their relevance comes from the likelihood that
they will form the leadership of the new Syrian army which, down the
road, might come to exercise some political influence or even power.
The
key to Syria’s future state, then, is between two broad blocs—Islamist
and non-Islamist—which will work together at least for a while to defeat
the remnants of the Assad regime and create a stable new government.
The
Brotherhood needs to work out something with the Salafists and to build
a broad appeal with conservative-traditionalist Syrians and perhaps
with local strongmen. The moderates have to learn street politics, win
over local strongmen; find a way to split the
conservative-traditionalist masses from the Islamists; and work out some
alliance with Christians and Kurds without being branded as traitors to
Sunni Arab interests.
Not
only does the Brotherhood have the easier task but it also can expect
more foreign support and money, even possibly from the United States.
The battle isn’t yet lost but things don’t look great.
That’s
especially true since a West that set up a new regime in Libya and
helped (albeit fairly little) the opposition overturn the Syrian regime,
suddenly freezes when it comes to helping ensure that Syria has a
pro-Western government that contributes to regional stability and is
less repressive at home.
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Note:
--The
Libyan government gave 50 percent of the funds to finance the budget of
the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council (SNC) budget. Since
Libya is very much a U.S. client, it’s reasonable to conclude that the
Obama Administration encouraged this generosity. Yet this money was
financing a Muslim Brotherhood front.
By
the same token, a lot of arms have been flowing from Libya to Hamas and
other terrorist groups in the Gaza Strip and to radical forces in
Syria. Some claim that the U.S. government was coordinating that traffic
though this has not yet been proven. But at least indirectly the U.S.
government was helping to arm the Brotherhood by overseeing Qatar and
Turkey delivering weapons to the Brotherhood's militia without making
any attempt to identify and arm moderate and non-Islamist forces
instead.
This
means the Obama Administration was using a barely disguised channel to
pay for a revolutionary Islamist movement seeking to take over Syria.
The fact that this group was also anti-American, antisemitic, and
genocidal toward Jews seems significant.
The rest of the SNC budget came from Qatar (38 percent) and Saudi Arabia (12 percent).
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
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