In their second act, will Benjamin Netanyahu
and Barack Obama find happiness, and cooperate on policies that will
best serve both Israeli and American interests?
The answer does not depend on psychology or
individual personalities. Serious leaders leave their private likes and
dislikes behind when it comes to serious issues – Churchill, Roosevelt
and Stalin did what they had to, despite the deep animosities. And Sadat
and Begin did not need to play golf in order to negotiate peace.
Instead, the friction between Netanyahu and
Obama over the past four years was rooted in their very different
perceptions of international politics in general, and the Middle East in
particular. The Israeli leader is a hard core Realist, (or pessimist),
who sees the dangers of what Thomas Hobbes (1588 -1679) described as
“war of all against all” in the anarchy of international politics. In
this framework, Israel stands out as a solitary and vulnerable Jewish
state in a dangerous and highly unstable Middle Eastern environment. For
Netanyahu, leaders and frameworks that involve corrupt international
bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Council or that use the
façade of judicial standards without the substance.
Obama, in contrast, is a liberal Democrat with
an Idealist (or optimistic) inclination to conflict, and like Immanuel
Kant (1724 – 1804), believes in the power of international law and
dialogue to bring peace. For Obama, the use of military force is an
undesirable last resort, reserved for use against a few sociopaths like
Bin Laden and Taliban terrorist leaders. He invested major and largely
unrequited efforts towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and
ending America’s military role in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama’s idealism
is also reflected in many of his key appointments, and in the renewed
US participation in the Human Rights Council, justified by lofty
principles, as opposed to the immoral and destructive reality.
This basic
contrast is central to understanding the differences between the two
leaders on how best to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Obama stressed negotiations, dialogue and engagement. In his recent
State of the Union address, Obama again declared that “the leaders of
Iran must recognize that now is the time for a diplomatic solution…”
In contrast,
Netanyahu, as a Hobbesian realist, dismisses hopes for change in Iranian
policy without a clear and effective threat of force, declaring “Words
alone will not stop Iran. Sanctions alone will not stop Iran. Sanctions
must be coupled with a clear and credible military threat if diplomacy
and sanctions fail.” Netanyahu’s realism also reflects the history of
antisemitism and Jewish vulnerability. In his 2011 address to a joint
session of the US Congress, Netanyahu declared “Less than seven decades
after six million Jews were murdered, Iran’s leaders deny the Holocaust
of the Jewish people, while calling for the annihilation of the Jewish
state.”
On these and
other issues, Netanyahu’s natural allies in the US are security-based
Republicans (and a dwindling group of like-minded Democrats) who
identify with Israel as a democratic society under extraordinary and
unique threat, and have a detailed understanding of the security
environment.
Political
Realism also explains Netanyahu’s caution regarding the Palestinians.
Tangible security assets — territory and strategic depth to reduce
vulnerability to attack — are to be carefully protected, and
expectations of breakthroughs towards stable peace are minimal. Most
Arab leaders are viewed as ideologically committed to a zero-sum
framework, unchanged since 1947 and the violent rejection of the UN
framework that included a Jewish state, regardless of boundaries. In
addressing the Knesset in May 2011, Netanyahu declared: “What were they
yelling in Gaza yesterday? They were shouting that they want to return
to Jaffa. ….What did the leader of Hamas say yesterday? ‘We want to see
the end of the Zionist agenda.’” Any accommodation would require a
realization on the part of the Arab leaders and societies that the goal
of destroying Israel is out of reach, and that their own vital interests
are best served by an end to conflict, as in cases of Egypt and Jordan.
On this basis,
Netanyahu’s negotiation strategy is based on reciprocity, in contrast
to unilateral concessions that are counterproductive and do not bring
peace. Four years ago, in response to intense pressure from Obama,
Netanyahu declared support for a “two-state solution”, marking the first
time that a Likud prime minister had accepted the principle of a
Palestinian sovereignty. Netanyahu also agreed to a ten month freeze on
settlement construction activity. In return, he demanded Palestinian
recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, in order
to create a stable foundation for negotiations. But when Palestinian
leader Mahmoud Abbas repeatedly rejected this and other expressions of
reciprocity, the freeze ended and four years passed without change. And
Obama obtained nothing from the efforts to force Netanyahu to move
according to the American perceptions of international negotiations.
As Obama
prepares to visit Israel for the first time as President, there are
indications that he and Netanyahu have found common ground. Netanyahu’s
new government will include voices that see the dangers in the status
quo on the West Bank, and will push for change (in the framework of
reciprocity). And the American optimists have been confronted with the
evidence of Hobbesian realism, from North Korean to Iran, and from the
riots in Egypt to the killing fields of Syria. As serious leaders
dealing with serious issues, Obama and Netanyahu should be able to now
work together to protect the vital interests of both nations.
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