Samuel Tadros
Available for download as a PDF
On the 15th and 22nd of December 2012 Egyptians headed again to the polls for the eighth time[1]
since the January 25, 2011 revolution which toppled President Mubarak
and his regime. The frequency of the voting was not, however, an
indication of a vibrant democracy taking shape; rather, it has been the
result of the haphazard transition that post-revolutionary Egypt has
undergone. Nearly two years after the revolution and after seven
elections, Egypt has still not formed the institutions required to
sustain a democracy. Today, the country only has an elected president
and an upper chamber of parliament—a body which, even though it exists,
suffers from the same specter of unconstitutionality under electoral law
that haunted its lower counterpart’s existence and led ultimately to
its dissolution. However, what was at stake in the elections was far
more important than merely an elected body. Moreover, the election
wasn’t purely about approving or rejecting a proposed constitution.
Instead, the battle over Egypt’s proposed constitution is a function of
the larger battle unfolding over ownership of the 2011 revolution and
the very identity of the country.
As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, and the Egyptian
revolution is no exception. The astonishing success of the revolution in
bringing down the Mubarak regime has left political forces scrambling
to take credit for the revolution and sole ownership of its narrative.[2]
Non-Islamists, who can claim few political successes if any over the
past two years, have become nostalgic for the eighteen days of protest
in Tahrir Square which set-off the revolution. Given their lack of
anything to celebrate since the uprisings, non-Islamists are adamant on
being the sole owners of the revolution. It was the non-Islamists, they
claim, who sparked the revolution and who led its battles. In a sense,
life itself began for them on January 25, 2011 when a new Egypt was born
in Tahrir Square.[3]
At a time when the Muslim Brotherhood remained in the shadows hesitant
to join the anti-regime protests, when Salafi Shaykhs were rejecting the
popular calls for disorder, it was the non-Islamists who were on the
front lines and who fought for every yard and inch of the street.
For Islamists, however, the revolution represents the culmination of a
much longer historical struggle. Some trace the struggle back to 1954,
when the Brotherhood believed itself close to taking power but was then
ruthlessly crushed and forced underground by Nasser.[4]
Others trace it to an older battle between Islam and secularism that
began in the nineteenth century and which Muslims have fought ever since
against foreign missionaries, colonialism and Westernization.[5]
After languishing for years in Mubarak’s prisons, newly released
members of jihadist groups asserted that it was their struggles that
were the precursors to the 2011 revolution. When accused of being
latecomers to and hangers-on of the revolution, Islamists are quick to
respond that it was they who protected the revolution during its darkest
moment in the “Battle of the Camel,” when all hope seemed to be lost.
Left unsaid is the role Islamists played in the attacks on police
stations and prisons throughout the country, which arguably was the most
important factor in the regime’s collapse.
The struggle now between Islamists and non-Islamists over ownership
of the revolution is only one part of the story, however. Before the
constitutional referendum and the present-day impasse and street clashes
between the supporters and detractors of President Morsi, the battle
over the constitution and over Egypt’s future was fought not only along
Islamist vs. non-Islamist lines, but among the Islamists themselves.
Indeed, within the Islamist camp, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis
were involved in a battle over what Islamism both meant and necessitated
in post-revolutionary Egypt and how this should be expressed in the
language of the country’s new constitution. Each side approached the
question of the constitution from a different point of view, and while
they have, for the time being, managed to overcome their differences and
unite against non-Islamists, examining the past disputes between them
provides fascinating insights into their current relationships and their
prospective ones as well.
The Brotherhood’s Plan
The Muslim Brotherhood approached the constitutional writing process
with a keen eye on how to manipulate both the process and the new
document to further strengthen their power in Egyptian politics. With a
long history of political participation and organization, the
Brotherhood’s senior leadership is politically sophisticated and
shrewd. They have clearly been aware that the new constitution could
potentially give them unparalleled powers to shape the political process
in their favor. As an Islamist movement that has sought to both rule
Egypt and shape its people’s identity, no area of the new constitution
was irrelevant to the Brotherhood, and all areas represented
opportunities to enlarge the movement’s power.
The first area of attention for the Brotherhood was the political
system. Following the uprising, when the Brotherhood was still unsure of
the governing military council’s agenda and was also eager to assuage
Western and non-Islamist fears, the Brotherhood had initially promised
not to run a presidential candidate. Because of this, and since they
were also well-aware of their movement’s potential to dominate a
parliament, the Brotherhood leadership was adamant that the country
adopt a parliamentary system. In articles and press releases the vices
of a presidential system including its prospects for authoritarianism
were highlighted while the virtues of parliamentarianism lauded. The
Freedom and Justice Party’s official program stated explicitly that the
Brotherhood preferred a parliamentary system.[6]
However, changed political circumstances and dynamics, including ones
that led to the Brotherhood’s decision to contest the presidential
elections (and ultimately win them), changed the movement’s thinking
about the desired political system. Especially after the Constitutional
Court dissolved the parliament, the Brotherhood sought to give its man
in the presidential palace all the powers he needed to ensure its
domination of the political system.
After the revolution, the Brotherhood wasn’t initially convinced that
the regime had actually fallen. There was in fact disbelief over how
easily Mubarak fell. After decades of conducting its affairs secretly
under heavy state repression, the movement was sure that a “deep state”
still stood and was actively conspiring against its vision of Islamist
revival and reform. A series of court rulings dissolving parliament,
the first constituent assembly, and barring the Brotherhood candidate
Khairat El Shater from running for the presidency, while all legally
sound, only served to strengthen this conspiratorial mindset. As a
result, the Brotherhood felt driven to ensure that the sole institution
it dominated, the presidency, was more powerful and able to defeat all
others. Thus, the Brotherhood began to pay special attention to
constitutional articles that dealt with the Supreme Court and the
District Attorney, and attempted to limit their powers. Moreover, a
means to exclude former ruling party cadres from competing in future
elections was also sought.
The second focus of the Brotherhood’s attention in the unfolding
constitutional debates concerned how to co-opt its traditional
adversary, the military, so as to insure that it does not stand against
the movement’s interests and plans. To accomplish this, the Brotherhood
has publically sought to ensure that the military’s main organizational
goals and interests are protected. Since the Brotherhood shares the
military’s ultra-nationalist views and believes in the existence of an
international (and also homegrown) conspiracy against Egypt and the
Islamist movement, the Brotherhood’s decision-makers needed little
convincing to adopt the military’s point of view on the defense budget.
Thirdly, the Brotherhood was clearly aware of the potential spoiler
effect that the Salafis might have on the constitution drafting process.
Because the Salafis far outnumber Brotherhood members and have the
ability to mobilize the masses under the banner of Sharia, the
Brotherhood needed to keep them on board and make sure that the Salafis
were satisfied enough with the constitutional process. If there were
ever a chance that the constitution would be defeated, it would be
defeated by the Salafis. Thus, by all means necessary, the Brotherhood
aimed to ensure that such an outcome would not materialize.
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