A
new, important development has taken place in the Syrian civil war:
Western panic that the rebels are losing has replaced optimism. This has
spurred a desire to do something about the war. But how can the West do
enough to prevent the feared rebel defeat? It isn’t going to intervene
directly, nor with a big enough effort to save off a defeat. Anyway, is a
defeat imminent?
This
has been a war in which every
week somebody different is proclaimed the victor. I don’t believe that
the Syrian regime is poised for a victory but a lot of people in
Washington and other world capitals do.
What
this round has done, however, is to raise alarms, both in the West and
in the Sunni Muslim world, that the Shia Muslim side is winning, that is
Iran is emerging triumphant over the United States. What are the
implications?
Remember
some important points. Iran is not going to take over the Middle East
nor is it about to win a lot of Sunni followers. Iran’s limit of
influence is mainly in Lebanon and Syria (where its ally only controls
half the country) and to a lesser extent Iraq. Tehran can fool around in
Yemen, Bahrain, and southwest Afghanistan a bit, too. But that’s
about it. There are real limits.
Why, though, has the Iran bloc seemed to have been winning?
First,
Iran’s proxies are better organized than the Syrian rebels. They are
unified, with Hizballah and the Syrian government coherent forces and a
new People’s Army as a single militia. In contrast, the rebels are
divided into a dozen groups which may cooperate but also battle among
themselves and don’t coordinate very well.
Second,
the Iran bloc gives more support to its proxies than the Sunni bloc or
the West. Among the Sunnis, they are also divided into Islamists (Muslim
Brotherhood, Salafists, and al-Qaida) and what might be called non- or
anti-Islamists. The United States will not intervene in a big way.
Remember that in Libya, NATO had to hand the rebels’ victory by
destroying their regime enemies. Nothing like this will happen in Syria.
The Obama Administration will face a defeat rather than do so.
Third,
this also means that the United States has worse and weaker proxies
than the other side. In part, this is because the Obama Administration
accepted their destruction, as in the dismantlement of the Turkish
army’s power, the overthrow of the Egyptian regime, the subverting of
Israel’s leverage, and the failure to support moderates or non-Islamist
conservatives all over the region. Iraq has also been turned into a Shia
power. In short, Obama helped dismantle the old strategic order and
replaced it with one where enemies of America rejoiced.
So
what happens if U.S. policy exaggerates a Sunni defeat, intensified by
Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan—those who backed the Syrian
rebels--begging it to do more?
Let
me point out that once again this shows that the Arab-Israeli conflict
is unimportant in the contemporary Middle East. This idea simply doesn’t
seem to penetrate the brains of Western leaders. Perhaps Secretary of
State John Kerry has turned into a full-time “peacemaker” because he
thinks that defusing the conflict will shore up the Sunni Muslim side,
That’s
ridiculous. There’s not going to be any progress on peace—if for no
other reason the Palestinian Authority is terrified of either Islamist
or Shia
Islamist conquest of the region. Even if they wanted to make a deal—and
they don’t—they’d be scared off by thinking peacemaking is suicidal.
But
the wider issue could convince policymakers to enter an open alliance
with Sunnis—including the Muslim Brotherhood—to counter the Shias. The
Saudis and others would be pressured to get along with the Muslim
Brotherhood; Israel would be pushed not to do anything to disrupt the
grand alliance. Again, this could happen but it won’t work if it does.
There
is, however, an alternative: the United States would understand that
only Israel is just about the only reliable ally in the Middle East. It
might take another president to do that.
What other implications does an apparent Syrian government victory have?
--It
again reminds us that we are in an era characterized by two phenomena:
the battle in each country between Islamists and non-Islamists, and the
battle between Sunni and Shias. The old Arab nationalist era, extending
from 1952 to 2011, is over.
--The
United States should recognize that the increasingly repressive Erdogan
regime has led it into a mess in Syria. The White House, however, won’t
do that though there are many in the State Department who understand.
--Both Sunni and Shia Islamists are against U.S. interests
but U.S. policymakers don’t quite get this and if they do what are they going to do about it?
--U.S.
policy will probably become more favorable to the Muslim Brothers
ruling Egypt (lots more military aid) and those wanting to rule Syria.
They are becoming increasingly designated as “good guys” by the United
States even though they are becoming more repressive and unpopular.
--The
violence is growing in Iraq, where Sunnis are looking at Syria and
saying, “We thought we couldn’t win but maybe we were wrong.” That
country might also be destabilized. Ironically, the United States and
Iran are both on the same side there, for a Shia regime against
al-Qaida.
--The
(Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese) Christians, (Iraqi and Syrian) Kurds, and
Syrian Druze are going to look for a protector increasingly. But the
United States will probably ignore them.
--Internal
violence is growing also in Lebanon along Sunni-Shia lines. Perhaps the
United States should reconsider a strategy which has indirectly
supported Hizballah. Indeed, maybe it should consider covert operations
to work with the Christians and mainly moderate Sunni Muslims to subvert
Hizballah. But it won’t do that either.
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Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making
of the Modern Middle East, written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be
published by Yale University Press in January 2014. His latest book is
Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books
can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center
including The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict, The Long War for
Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in
the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports.
His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
Forthcoming Book: Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Yale University Press)
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20#.UZs4pLUwdqU
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