Doc's Talk: Resumption of Negotiations with the Palestinians: Illusion or Reality?

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Resumption of Negotiations with the Palestinians: Illusion or Reality?

In a press conference in Amman, Jordan on July 19, 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that Israel and the Palestinians had reached an agreement constituting a basis for renewing the negotiations on a permanent status agreement. It was agreed that within a week, a preparatory meeting for negotiations would be held in Washington with Secretary of State Kerry, Saeb Erekat for the Palestinians, and Minister Tzipi Livni and the Prime Minister's envoy Yitzhak Molcho for Israel participating. The agenda and framework of the renewed talks are to be finalized at the meeting.

By creating a delicate balance in four areas of contention, Secretary of State Kerry has succeeded in bridging the gaps regarding the conditions set by the two sides for opening negotiations and the inability to reach an agreement on the terms of reference for the negotiations.

Israel does not agree to base the negotiations on the 1967 lines with an agreed territorial swap, but the United States will make a commitment to the Palestinians that it has adopted this principle.
Similarly, while the Palestinians have not agreed to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, the United States will make a commitment to Israel that it has adopted this principle – which balances the previous commitment to the Palestinians.
Israel has not agreed to a comprehensive freeze on construction in the settlements, but there is an understanding between Kerry and the Palestinians that he will work to limit construction to the settlement blocs and tenders that have already been issued. In practice, there is already a tacit freeze on government construction in all settlements, including neighborhoods in Jerusalem beyond the Green Line.
Israel has acceded to the Palestinian request to release those prisoners serving long prison terms since before to the start of the Oslo process, all convicted of murder, except those who are Israeli citizens. According to Israeli sources, this involves 82 prisoners, while according to Palestinian sources, the number is closer to 250. The latter number suggests that prisoners from the period following the start of the Oslo process who have committed less serious offenses will also be released. The prisoners will be released gradually during the negotiations. Their release is an important issue for the Palestinian public, and the agreement about their release helped Abbas in his decision to restart the negotiations.

It was agreed that the negotiations will continue for at least nine months, and there is no binding end date. The two sides have agreed not to take unilateral action during the negotiations, which means that the Palestinians will refrain from using UN recognition of a Palestinian state to take unilateral steps in UN organizations during this period. There is also an understanding between Kerry and the Palestinians that in the initial stage, the negotiations will focus on border and security issues. It is not clear whether Israel has given up its demand that negotiations be held on all subjects at the same time.

The devil is in the details, and therefore it is important to recognize that resumption of actual negotiations has not been agreed on, and this in fact depends on the successful conclusion of the “talks about talks” in Washington. There are still likely to be many obstacles, such as a lack of agreement on the agenda and the order of topics to be discussed; a Palestinian demand that the Arab Peace Initiative serve as the basis for the talks; and possible differing interpretation of the understandings with Kerry, which could thwart the resumption of the negotiations.

The renewal of negotiations was made possible by the fact that neither side was prepared to be accused by the United States and the international community of recalcitrance and of thwarting the resumption of negotiations, or to pay the ensuing price. One of the factors perhaps influencing Israel was the European Union regulation excluding the territories from agreements signed with Israel. In spite of claims to the contrary by Israeli government spokesmen, there is reason to believe that the European move helped restart the negotiations and did not sabotage them. The Israeli government was alarmed by the possibility that the delegitimization of Israel would expand as a result of Israel’s rejectionist image.

The Palestinians were influenced by American threats to cut US financial support for the Palestinian Authority if the Palestinians persisted in their refusal, but also by the strong support given by the Arab League to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, which means that there is a regional umbrella for his moves. The Arab League delegation that met with Kerry in Amman reiterated that in its understanding, the meaning of establishing borders based on the 1967 lines, which appears in the Arab Peace Initiative, is that there may be agreed-upon swaps of territory of equal size and quality. It is also possible that the revolution in Egypt, which overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government and thereby weakened Hamas, which was counting on Egyptian support, allowed Abbas to feel stronger politically and thereby have the freedom to decide to resume the negotiations, without fear of a heavy domestic political price.

Both parties believe that the gaps between their positions are wide, and therefore, from their perspectives, there is no chance that the other party will accept an agreement that suits its minimum conditions. In fact, they were dragged into negotiations in which they have no faith. This will likely have two main effects. First, such sentiments often become self-fulfilling prophecies because they smother any motivation to exert substantive efforts. Second, the two parties will interact less with each other and more with the United States in order to convince it that the failure of the talks lies with the other party. While this might generate some flexibility, it is hard to believe that the talks will be concluded successfully when the American mediator wants them to succeed more than the parties themselves.

Setting a nine-month time frame could encourage the parties, especially Israel, to hold negotiations for the sake of negotiations, and not in order to reach an agreement, because the other side, which has committed to this time frame, cannot threaten to walk out. This could reinforce the lack of public confidence in the negotiations and the rampant cynicism on both sides, which would mean that the brewing crisis is only postponed.

One possible way to avoid a crisis at the end of the nine months would be an agreement between the parties to discuss not only the permanent status agreement, but also transitional steps toward a settlement. This means steps that will improve the situation of the Palestinian population and strengthen the Palestinians' ability to build an infrastructure for their future state and economy by expanding their powers and the territory under their control. Such an agreement would give the two sides room to continue with the discussions, demonstrating to their respective constituencies that there is actual progress.

At this stage, the agreement on a basis to restart the negotiations does not threaten the integrity of the Israeli government. Naftali Bennett's right wing Habayit Hayehudi party does not intend to leave the coalition, because its leaders do not believe that the negotiations will lead to an agreement. However, there may be crises caused by compromises in Israel’s positions during the negotiations, even before an agreement is reached. This does not threaten the survival of the Netanyahu government, because the opposition parties have pledged their support, and it is even possible that some, particularly the Labor Party, will join the coalition if Habayit Hayehudi leaves. The right wing opposition to Netanyahu within the Likud will have a hard time working against him because it has no alternative to Netanyahu. This means that there are no serious internal political constraints, certainly at this stage, on the Prime Minister’s freedom of action. Thus the international community, including the United States, will have difficulty accepting Israel’s claims that it cannot conduct effective negotiations because of internal political considerations.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk