Doc's Talk: VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL RIFTS ON THE RISE IN LEBANON

Tuesday, July 16, 2013

VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL RIFTS ON THE RISE IN LEBANON

PolicyWatch 2100

By David Schenker

To read this article on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/18YRjwe

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Recent street battles, bombings, and political defections mark the beginning of the end of Hezbollah's relative impunity in Lebanon, potentially heralding protracted violence.

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On July 9, a car bomb detonated in Beirut's Hezbollah-controlled southern suburb of Dahiya, killing one person and injuring dozens of others, mostly Shiites. A day later, the parliamentary speaker announced that retired Christian general Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement would be leaving the Hezbollah-led "March 8" bloc in parliament. Since 2006, the FPM's alliance with Hezbollah has facilitated the Shiite militia's political dominance of Lebanon. If the new split persists, it will represent a significant shift in the country's political dynamics -- and further isolation of Hezbollah -- at a moment when Lebanese Sunnis are becoming increasingly militant.

FIGHTING IN SIDON

For more than two years, the war in Syria has been threatening Lebanon's stability. The presence of nearly half a million mostly Sunni refugees from next door has skewed Lebanon's delicate sectarian demographics, and the deaths of thousands of Sunnis at the hands of the nominally Shiite Alawite Assad regime have raised tensions to the boiling point. Most worrisome, Lebanese factions with rival combatants in Syria have been clashing at home as well. In Tripoli, for example, Sunni Salafists have been battling Alawite supporters of the Assad regime for nearly a year; Sunnis and Shiites have also been killing one another in the northern border region near Hermel.

The latest and most serious sectarian clashes, however, have occurred in the southern city of Sidon, culminating in a June 24 battle between Hezbollah militiamen and 200-300 heavily armed supporters of enigmatic Salafist cleric Sheikh Ahmed Assir. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units participated in the day-long skirmishes, including an assault on Assir's compound in the neighborhood of Abra. According to Lebanese sources, LAF soldiers fired over 400,000 rounds during the battle. By day's end, Assir's forces were routed, but eighteen Lebanese soldiers and twenty-eight other gunmen were killed.

Although there is no indication that LAF troops precoordinated their operations with Hezbollah, reports from the battle suggest that, at minimum, the militia fought alongside the military. This fact -- combined with the LAF's previous operations targeting Sunnis who support the Syrian rebels -- has only strengthened widespread suspicions that the military has a pro-Shiite bias. Meanwhile in Washington, the Abra incident may prompt questions in Congress about the continued provision of $100 million per year to the LAF.

THE NEXT SAMARRA?

On July 9, two weeks after the fighting ended in Sidon, a large car bomb detonated near Hezbollah's residential and office complex in Beirut. The incident was reportedly preceded by four other interdicted attempts to attack the neighborhood. Although it remains unclear who carried out the bombing, leading suspects include Lebanese Salafists and Syrian rebels -- no surprise given the escalating anger at Hezbollah's prominent role in killing Sunnis in Syria. The main rebel coalition, the Free Syrian Army, had previously pledged to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon, while prominent Sunni Islamist cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi declared that the so-called "Party of God" was really the "Party of Satan."

Despite this burgeoning Sunni-Shiite animosity, both Hezbollah and the Sunni-led "March 14" bloc have sought to deescalate the situation in recent days, no doubt mindful of the 2006 attack on the main Shiite shrine in Samarra, Iraq, which launched years of sectarian violence. In separate statements, Hezbollah and March 14 leader Saad Hariri blamed Israel for the July 9 bombing.

FISSURES IN MARCH 8

According to Amal Party leader and perennial speaker of parliament Nabih Berri, the FPM's July 10 departure from the March 8 bloc was based on "domestic issues," not on Hezbollah's "resistance" against Israel, which the movement still supports. Although the FPM had been politically aligned with March 8 since 2006, when Aoun signed a memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah, the party experienced a series of very public disagreements with the militia in recent months. In particular, Aoun opposed Hezbollah's call for an eighteen-month extension of parliament and an extended term for LAF chief of staff Jean Kahwaji, who is due to retire shortly. Instead, Aoun pressed for an unobtainable agreement on a new electoral law and new elections, in addition to asking that his son-in-law, LAF special forces head Gen. Chamel Roukoz, be named the new chief of staff.

Aoun opposed the extension because parliament is slated to elect the next president of Lebanon in 2014; as the legislature is currently constituted, he would stand little chance of winning that office. At the same time, if Kahwaji remains chief of staff, precedent suggests he would quickly emerge as the consensus frontrunner for the presidency.

Aoun and Hezbollah also appear to differ on the composition of the government currently being formed by Prime Minister Tammam Salam. Until recently, the twenty-four-member cabinet was to be allocated evenly between the March 14 bloc, the March 8 bloc, and ministers selected by the premier and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Under the complicated proposed formula, March 8 Shiites would have received five cabinet seats while the FPM and the bloc's Armenian Christians would have divvied up just three seats. Aoun, it seems, was pushing for the FPM to receive five of the cabinet's twelve overall Christian seats.

With the FPM now gone, the contours of the new government are even more uncertain. March 14 was already unsure about consenting to sit in a cabinet with Hezbollah for fear of alienating its Sunni supporters. Whatever the outcome, the new government will almost certainly be even less effective and decisive than its moribund caretaker predecessor.

IMPLICATIONS

While the disagreements between the FPM and Hezbollah are clear, Aoun's calculus for leaving March 8 -- assuming it was even his choice -- is more difficult to understand. In Beirut, some say the Saudis have been pressuring Aoun as part of their efforts to undermine the Assad regime, threatening to expel his financial supporters from the kingdom if he continues to partner with Hezbollah. Aoun had dinner with the Saudi ambassador to Beirut earlier last week, further fueling the rumors. At the same time, the general may simply be using such meetings to leverage political concessions from Hezbollah; after all, many of his constituents fear the implications of a Sunni takeover in Syria and thus have little problem with Assad remaining in power.

In any case, the benefit of Aoun going solo is unclear -- March 14 is no more likely to support his presidential candidacy than before, or even to allow him to retain control of key assets such as the Ministry of Energy. One possibility, however unlikely, is that he may be hedging his bets, attempting to better position Lebanon's Christians for an eventual Sunni victory in Syria. Or perhaps the eighty-year-old politician is hoping for a detente with March 14, to make one last bid for the presidency.

For Hezbollah, too, the loss of Aoun is problematic. Although the endemic corruption in FPM-controlled ministries was an albatross for the militia, Aoun's party was still the Christian face of March 8. Without it, Hezbollah and Amal revert to a narrowly Shiite bloc at a time when Syria-related sectarian strife is spiking in Lebanon. Yet given Hezbollah's deteriorating regional stature, stubborn commitment to Assad, and dominant military posture in Lebanon, the militia may believe it no longer requires Aoun's Christian cover, particularly if a sympathetic Kahwaji becomes the presidential frontrunner. Hezbollah also likely calculates that if Assad wins, its prospects will be buoyed, while if the rebels triumph, Aoun and Lebanon's other Christians will be predisposed to pursue an alliance of minorities with the Shiites against the Sunnis.

The longer-term consequences of Aoun's defection remain to be seen. If Lebanese politics were functional, his departure from March 8 would constitute a real shakeup of stagnant parliamentary dynamics. Given the new government's limited mandate, however, the change may have little or no effect at all, barring an unlikely FPM shift toward March 14.

Equally consequential for the country's future trajectory is the Dahiya attack, which marks the beginning of the end of Hezbollah's relative impunity. For years, the militia has been intimidating and periodically attacking its political enemies, including Sunnis. Yet the Syrian uprising has emboldened Hezbollah's domestic opponents at a time when it appears to be losing political allies, and Lebanon will likely see increased sectarian violence as a result. And if the LAF continues to be viewed as supporting one constituency over another, it could face mounting stresses and casualties.

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David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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