Institute for Contemporary Affairs,
founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation
Vol.
14, No. 9 April 10, 2014
- In March 2014, Saeb Erekat, the head of the Palestinian negotiating team, prepared a 65-page document that surveys the diplomatic process and offers a list of recommendations for the PA to achieve Palestinian sovereignty in the territories demarcated by the 1967 lines. PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has recently implemented some of these recommendations.
- The recommendations include submitting a request to immediately join the Geneva Conventions; declaring the impossibility of extending the negotiations after the end of the nine-month period on April 29, 2014; and opposing the Israeli proposal that the settlement blocs become part of Israel in any final agreement.
- The plan also includes activating bilateral committees with Russia, the EU, and the UN, and cooperating with the monitoring committee of the Arab Peace Initiative, to muster support for the Palestinian anti-settlement position; urging the states of the world to uphold the European Union’s guidelines regarding settlement activity; and escalating the peaceful popular struggle against settlements and the [security] fence.
- The PA’s latest moves reflect the long-term strategy Abbas has been implementing, which involves using diplomatic means to obtain international recognition of a sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 lines without the Palestinians having to make concessions on the fundamental issues of the conflict, particularly the refugee issue and what is called the “right of return.”
- The signing of the 15 international conventions is part of a gradual Palestinian move to statehood which, unlike a unilateral declaration of statehood, does not occur with one move. Abbas has previously made political moves in defiance of the United States and Israel without fearing the pressures and threats directed at him, as in his November 2012 appeal to the UN General Assembly for an upgrade of the PLO’s status to UN nonmember observer state. Now, too, he feels confident in his ability to take unilateral steps without incurring serious damage.
- The Palestinians believe they can use the diplomatic-legal arena to overcome Israel’s power and gradually subject it to diplomatic and economic pressures to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank in a way similar to Israel’s unconditional withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.
The Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic
process encountered a crisis and a dead-end with the unilateral announcement on
April 1, 2014, by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), chairman of the Palestinian
Authority, of Palestine’s application to join fifteen international
institutions and conventions, most notably the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The Palestinians’ Dramatic Turnabout
Abbas, who refers to himself as
“president of the state of Palestine” and also holds the titles of head of the
PLO and leader of Fatah, explained the decision in terms of Israel’s reneging
(so he claims) on its promise to free the fourth batch of Palestinian
prisoners, which was supposed to include 26 prisoners, on March 29, 2014. As
Abbas put it:
We said that if they [the prisoners]
are not released we will begin applying for membership to 63 international
organizations, agreements, and conventions, and it was decided by consensus
that we will sign several agreements that make possible the joining of the
organizations and conventions.
Regarding the applications to join the
fifteen conventions (including the Fourth Geneva Convention), Abbas said he did
not “think we need approval for this, we can join these immediately.”1
The Israeli Reaction
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu accused the Palestinian Authority of fundamentally violating the
understandings that were reached in the negotiations under U.S. mediation, and
warned the Palestinians against unilateral moves that would constitute a
double-edged sword for them. At a meeting of the Israeli cabinet on April 6,
2014, Netanyahu said:2
In recent months the State of Israel
has conducted negotiations with the Palestinians in order to reach a peace
agreement. Israelis expect peace, a genuine peace, in which our vital national
interests are assured, with security first and foremost. During these talks we
carried out difficult steps and showed a willingness to continue implementing
moves that were not easy, in the coming months as well, in order to create a
framework that would allow for putting an end to the conflict between us.
Just as we were about to enter the
framework for the continuation of negotiations, Abu Mazen rushed to declare
that he was not prepared to even discuss recognizing Israel as the nation state
of the Jewish people. He did this even though he knows that there will not be
an agreement without recognizing the State of Israel as the nation state of the
Jewish people – something which the U.S. president and other world leaders also
made clear.
Unfortunately, later, a moment before
we were to reach an agreement to continue the talks, the Palestinian leadership
quickly moved to unilaterally join 15 international conventions, thus
fundamentally violating the understandings that were reached with American
involvement.
The threats of the Palestinians to turn
to the UN will not influence us – the Palestinians have a lot to lose from such
unilateral action. They will only get a state via direct negotiations, not
empty declarations or unilateral moves. These only push a peace agreement
further away and unilateral moves by them will be met with unilateral moves by
us. We are ready to continue the talks, but not at any price.
Feverish efforts by the U.S.
administration to return the Palestinians to the negotiating table and refrain
from unilateral steps have so far failed. The Palestinians’ next target date is
April 29, 2014, when the nine-month negotiating period, as decided at its
inception, comes to an end.
A Preplanned Palestinian Strategy
In March 2014, Saeb Erekat, a member of
the PLO executive committee and head of the Palestinian negotiating team,
prepared a 65-page document that surveys the developments in the diplomatic
process and offers a list of recommendations for the PA, some of which Abbas
has recently implemented.3
Erekat outlined the dangers entailed by
Israel’s policy:
Despite the intensive efforts by the
U.S. administration and the other members of the Quartet to sustain the
negotiations on a final-status agreement between the two sides, Israeli and
Palestinian, the Israeli government persisted in acts that destroy the peace
process, including an announcement on new plans for building in the
settlements, the killing of innocent individuals among the Palestinian people,
the destruction of homes, the expulsion of residents, the confiscation of
lands, and the tightening of the blockade on the Gaza Strip.
In Erekat’s view, Israel’s political
moves and concrete measures are intended to create a reality that prevents the
Palestinians from establishing a state and leaves the occupation in place. As
Erekat wrote:
The Israeli government has demonstrated
through its actions that its agreement to renew the negotiations does not
entail a change in its strategy of preserving the status quo, which means:
1. Leaving the Palestinian Authority
without governmental powers.
2. Leaving the Israeli occupation in
place without any price being paid.
3. Removing the Gaza Strip from the
Palestinian domain.
4. Blaming the PLO for refusing to
conduct negotiations.
5. Preventing the PLO from continuing
to apply for membership to international institutions, conventions, and
contracts after having become an observer state on November 29, 2012.
In the section on recommendations,
Erekat set forth the steps the PA must take to achieve the goal of applying Palestinian
sovereignty to the territories demarcated by the 1967 lines:
1. Submit a request to immediately join
the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
accompanying protocols of 1977. Upon receipt of the request to join, the
president of the Swiss Federation will announce the acceptance of the state of
Palestine as a member that has signed these conventions.
2. Declare to the U.S. administration,
the European Union, Russia, and the UN the impossibility of extending the
negotiations after the end of the nine-month period on April 29, 2014.
3. Oppose the Israeli proposal that the
settlement blocs become part of Israel in any final agreement, as this [the
Israeli proposal] is regarded as adding insult to injury [literally: the excuse
is more repellant than the sin], since it is included in the framework of
conditions and not in the negotiations.
4. Emphasize that the release of 104
prisoners will not be linked to negotiations or to settlement activity, but to
the Palestinian side’s refraining from applying for membership to the
international institutions during the nine-month period.
5. Activate the bilateral committees
with Russia, the European Union, and the UN, and cooperate with the monitoring
committee of the Arab Peace Initiative, as ways of mustering support for the
Palestinian anti-settlement position; announce an international campaign whose
title is: “Settlement Destroys the Peace Process”; and urge the states of the
world to uphold the European Union’s guidelines regarding settlement activity.
6. Activate, organize, and escalate the
peaceful popular struggle against settlement and the [security] fence while
building a broader international alliance for this purpose.
7. Outline a strategy for joint action
with the Israeli peace camp and promote this in all the ways available.
In addition, Erekat recommended the
following steps:
1. Adhere to all the Palestinian
positions set forth in the letter that President Mahmoud Abbas sent to U.S.
President Barack Obama on December 8, 2013, emphasizing that these positions
express the Arab positions as presented in the announcement of the Council of
Arab Ministers on December 21, 2013.
2. In light of the Israeli government’s
insistence on continued settlement activity, and the 41 percent increase in
terrorism by settler groups during the second half of 2013, as well as the
ongoing acts of cold-blooded killing of members of our people, the destruction
of homes, the expulsion of residents, the attacks on the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque,
and the tightening of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, we are obligated to apply
to join the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
additional protocols of 1977.
3. Act to remove the blockade on the
Gaza Strip in all its forms, and intensify efforts to achieve a Palestinian
rapprochement [with Hamas] by implementing what was agreed in Cairo and Doha,
there being no alternative but to derail the Israeli strategy, which seeks to
remove the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian domain.
4. Continue to act with the European
Union and the other countries of the world to keep implementing the European
guidelines regarding the settlements that came into force on January 1, 2014.
5. Act jointly with the monitoring
committee of the Arab Peace Initiative to implement these recommendations and
uphold the principles of international law pertaining to the Palestinian
problem.
Erekat asserted that
If the Israeli government decides to
continue its strategy of maintaining the status quo, then we must apply for
membership to the international institutions, and if it reacts by using force,
we must then:
1. Convene the Palestinian National
Council and call on the Hamas movement and the Islamic Jihad movement to join
the meeting, and subsequently elect a new executive committee that will
constitute a temporary government of the state of Palestine, in keeping with UN
General Assembly resolution of November 29, 2012, which upgraded the status of
Palestine within the 1967 lines, whose capital is eastern Al-Quds [Jerusalem],
to an observer state, and to this end [the executive committee] will launch a
genuine process of Palestinian reconciliation.
2. Thwart the Israeli government’s
strategy of leaving the Authority without powers, maintaining the occupation
without paying any price for it, and removing Gaza from the Palestinian domain,
so as to prepare to broach [by Israel] the idea of one state with two
establishments [governments], and this by applying to join the international
institutions, protocols, and conventions, particularly the four Geneva
Conventions.
3. Prepare to counteract the Israeli
campaign, which will pin the blame on the Palestinian side, by sending
Palestinian delegations to explain the Palestinian positions to the countries
of the world.
At a conference in Ramallah that
discussed the “resistance strategy” on April 5, 2014, Erekat said the PA’s
decision to join the fifteen international agreements and conventions was final
and inalterable, but the PA would delay applying for membership to 48 additional
international organizations, conventions, and agreements if Israel retracted
its decision not to release the fourth batch of prisoners. Erekat stressed that
if Israel did not release the prisoners, the PA would see itself as having no
further obligations in this regard.4
In his speech to the Ramallah
conference, Erekat called on Hamas to return to the path of national
rapprochement in line with the agreements signed in the past, and said, “I
declare to all the world, and in the name of President Abu Mazen and in the
name of the executive committee [of the PLO], that the Hamas movement is a
Palestinian movement, and that it was not and will not be a terrorist
organization.”5
Where Is the Palestinian Authority Heading?
The PA’s latest moves reflect the long-term
strategy Abbas has been implementing during his tenure as president, which
involves using diplomatic means to obtain international recognition of a
sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 lines without the Palestinians
having to make concessions on the fundamental issues of the conflict,
particularly the refugee issue and what is called the “right of return.”
On April 2, 2014, the PLO’s
Negotiations Department, under Saeb Erekat, published a document explaining its
most recent moves, including its signing of 15 international conventions.
Erekat personally sent out the document on April 5. His memo argued the logic
behind Abbas’ action:
This is the fulfillment of Palestine’s
rights and has nothing to do with negotiations or the reaching of an agreement.
As President Abbas expressed during the announcement, the Palestinian position
remains unchanged. The PLO seeks to achieve an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state on the 1967 border with East Jerusalem as its capital, with a
just solution to the refugee issue based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
The memo further explains that the
treaties that were signed “are vital to continued Palestinian
institution-building, good governance, and the upholding of human rights, all
of which form the basis for an independent and sovereign state of Palestine.”
The legal logic of such a move might be
found in Professor James R. Crawford’s The
Creation of States in International Law. Crawford, who took part in the
discussions at the International Court of Justice in The Hague over the
legality of Israel’s security fence, describes how a state might emerge through
an “accretion of powers in a local unit over a period of time” and not just
through a declaration of independence. He cites Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
who wrote that the “concluding of a treaty may be part of a process (or even
constitute the act) whereby the State not fully sui juris (possessing by itself legal standing) is becoming
so.”6 In other words, the signing of the 15 international conventions,
according to this logic, is part of a gradual Palestinian move to statehood
which, unlike a unilateral declaration of statehood, does not occur with one
move.
Abbas has previously made political
moves in defiance of the United States and Israel without fearing the pressures
and threats directed at him, as in his November 2012 appeal to the UN General
Assembly for an upgrade of the PLO’s status to UN nonmember observer state.
Now, too, he feels confident in his ability to take unilateral steps without
incurring serious damage.
The Palestinian strategy is based on
the assessment that Israel’s options are very limited. Israel, the Palestinians believe, may indeed exert heavy economic
and diplomatic pressure on the PA, but not to the point of threatening the PA’s
survival or risking a Third Intifada. The Palestinians know that the overriding
Israeli interest of maintaining security stability in the West Bank has, on
more than one occasion, led it to retract a decision to withhold tax revenues
from the PA; Israel wants to avoid tensions, violence, and terror that
sometimes have also afflicted the PA itself.
The Israeli perception of the “lack of
a moderate alternative” to Abbas’ rule also boosts the PA’s confidence, leading
it to turn to the diplomatic-legal arena where it can count on the automatic
majority of the Arab, Muslim, and nondemocratic countries. The Palestinians
believe they can use this arena to overcome Israel’s power and gradually
subject it to diplomatic and economic pressures to begin a process of
unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank in a way similar to Israel’s
unconditional withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.
Although Abbas repeats the mantra of a
“peaceful struggle” in tandem with the diplomatic campaign, in practice terror
continues, including attempts to murder both Israeli civilians and security
forces. Furthermore, the PA signals unequivocal support for terror by demanding
the immediate release of all the Palestinian prisoners, many of whom were
sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their role in terror attacks and the
murder of Israeli civilians, including suicide bombings. These terrorists are
treated as heroes by the PA, which also provides them a very generous basket of
economic and social benefits; their average salary while in prison is even
higher than that of members of the security forces.
The PA revealed its true face when it
officially requested the Islamic terrorist organizations, Hamas and Islamic
Jihad, to participate in a meeting of the Palestinian National Council, which
is supposed to elect a new Palestinian leadership to serve as a temporary
government of the Palestinian state. The PA does not view Hamas and Islamic
Jihad as terrorist organizations but, rather, as legitimate political groups
that can be part of the Palestinian government.
The PA is preparing the ground in
stages for de facto international recognition of a Palestinian state along the
1967 lines that is under “Israeli occupation,” and all that will remain is the
official declaration of the state’s establishment.
The demand for full Palestinian
sovereignty along the 1967 lines also entails Palestinian control over the
border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, with likely major
implications for the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, which has a
Palestinian demographic majority. Paradoxically, Israel’s accommodation under
the presence circumstances of the Palestinian demand for sovereignty over the
border with Jordan would likely prompt U.S., European, and, of course,
Jordanian pressures on Israel to avoid such a transfer of authority and
maintain its military presence in the West Bank.
*
* *
Notes
6. James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 349.
Publication: Jerusalem Issue
Briefs
- See more at:
http://jcpa.org/article/crisis-peace-talks/#sthash.7i97IvQy.dpuf
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