Doc's Talk: The Palestinian Authority's Alternatives To Continuing Negotiations With Israel

Wednesday, May 07, 2014

The Palestinian Authority's Alternatives To Continuing Negotiations With Israel

Introduction
Even before the current crisis in the Israeli-Palestinian talks, some Palestinians had considered the stage that would follow the talks if they were to fail altogether, and had come up with alternatives. One such alternative, turning to the UN, has already begun to take shape, as the Palestinian Authority has asked to join 15 international agreements and treaties. Another alternative – the PLO-Hamas reconciliation – is also in the works, with an agreement signed between them on April 23, 2014. Other alternatives under discussion include international sponsorship for the negotiations, dismantling the PA, ending security coordination with Israel, and a third Intifada.
This paper will review these and other options currently being discussed in the PA.

Turning To UN Institutions, Including The International Criminal Court
One alternative involves attempts to gain recognition as a member state for the PA in UN institutions, similarly to the successful bid to gain acceptance as a non-member observer state by the UN General Assembly in November 2012. Thus far, the PA has taken measured steps so as not to rock the boat, and has only requested to join 15 international agreements and treaties.
Muhammad Ishtayya, a former member of the negotiating team who stepped down, explained that turning to the UN is aimed at internationalizing the Palestinian problem and making international law the source of authority for future talks. Thus, he explained, the issue of ending the occupation would not be discussed in negotiations; rather, international law would impose a deadline for ending it.[1] Fatah Central Committee member Tawfiq Al-Tirawi claimed that the Palestinian leadership had erred by not immediately turning to the UN after it was accepted as a non-member observer state.[2]
In the meantime, the PA intends to continue joining international institutions, agreements, and treaties as it sees fit. As part of this, the Palestinians are considering turning to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and suing Israel for war crimes, among them settling citizens of an occupying country in occupied territory – i.e. the settlements. PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas said to Gilead Sher in statements recorded for the January 2014 conference of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS): "The Palestinians are entitled to join the ICC, but I hope we solve all our problems peacefully, because I want no further complications between us and Israel or between us and the world. Right now I have the right to go anywhere [i.e., to any international body], but I stopped because I want to give peace a chance."[3]
Muhammad Ishtayya said that the Palestinian leadership would appeal to the UN to judge Israel for its crimes if current talks failed, stating at a press conference: "The Palestinian side has prepared a plan to join all 63 international institutions, agreements, and treaties if the talks fail." He added, "The [Palestinian] leadership has divided [these bodies] into four groups, that it will join in four stages. Its appeal to the ICC, which is causing Israel to lose sleep, will take place in stage four."[4]
Saeb Erekat also told the Israeli delegation: "If you escalate matters, we will come after you in every international forum for your war crimes."[5]
It should be noted that turning to the ICC carries a risk for the PA, because, as it is well aware, it could be sued in that court for terrorism against Israel and its residents. The Palestinian leadership knows that it needs to carefully consider such a step.
National Reconciliation
A second alternative is an inter-Palestinian reconciliation. On April 23, six days before the date set for the end of the negotiations, the PLO and Hamas signed a reconciliation agreement, which included the following:

Honoring the previous reconciliation agreements signed 2011 in Cairo and 2012 in Doha, and treating them as a source of authority.
Steps to be taken by 'Abbas to form a national unity government within five weeks.
Simultaneous presidential, Legislative Council, and Palestinian National Council elections to be held six months after the formation of this government.
Convening the PLO activation committee within five weeks to carry out the tasks outlined in the previous reconciliation agreements.
Resumption of activity by the social reconciliation committee and the liberties committee.
Resumption of activity by the Legislative Council.[6]

It should be mentioned that many in the PA question the chances that the agreement will be successfully implemented, both because it was signed after years of schism and because the implementation of similar agreements signed since 2007 has failed.
Negotiating As Part Of An International Conference
Yet another alternative is to continue negotiations but as part of an international conference, instead of under exclusive U.S. sponsorship. The PA does not consider the U.S. a neutral broker, and thinks that it would be better off with international sponsorship. Former Palestinian minister of prisoner affairs Ashraf Al-'Ajrami, who predicted that the negotiations would fail, wrote: "We must seek alternatives that would at least protect Palestinian rights, such as an international peace summit, or a 5+1 formula – like the one used to discuss the Iranian nuclear [program] – or international arbitration on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions and the Arab peace initiative, so that talks are held under the supervision of the Security Council for a limited time of, say, six months. If they fail, an agreed-upon international panel of judges would convene, and would rule on the issues in contention."[7]
Muhammad Ishtayya called for an international conference to discuss the Palestinian issue, similar to the Geneva Conference on Syria and Iran.[8]
However, it should be noted that there is little chance that this alternative will be realized. Such a conference could only take place if Israel either wanted or was heavily pressured to participate – as Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir was pressured into attending the 1991 Madrid Conference.
Dismantling The PA
Also under discussion is the alternative of dismantling the PA and transferring responsibility for its territories back to Israel. PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas told Israeli journalists in Ramallah: "The negotiations are not a political alternative, but rather the basis of the PA's existence and the reason it was established. If negotiations fail, we will tell the Israeli government: This is the authority that you have gutted, and therefore the Palestinian leadership is peacefully transferring its responsibilities and authorities to Israel, so that the latter will be the civil and security authority in the West Bank instead of the Palestinian government and its security mechanisms."[9]
On the other hand, negotiating team head Saeb Erekat claimed that the Palestinians had no intention of dismantling the PA: "We are not talking of dismantling the PA, and nobody is talking about it being dismantled by the Palestinian side."[10] Erekat's statements reflect the common belief that 'Abbas did not actually intend to dismantle the PA, but was attempting to convey a sense of desperation both with the negotiations and with Israel's conduct and a threat that Israel would pay the price for the stagnation.
It is assessed that the PA leadership will not hasten to dismantle the PA; its members want to keep their positions and are certainly averse to the idea of the IDF returning to the West Bank. This assessment is underlined by the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the decision to hold elections in the PA.
Ending Security Coordination
Another alternative is ending security coordination, whether as a result of the dismantling of the PA or in a targeted Palestinian move resulting from the PLO-Hamas reconciliation that will not include the dismantling of the PA's civilian infrastructure.
Israel-PA security coordination has been ongoing for years, despite calls by Hamas, the PFLP, and other opposition factions for ending it. It has continued thanks to two main factors: first, the PA's fear that Hamas' armed cells will grow stronger in the West Bank, which could endanger its control, especially in light of the Hamas coup in Gaza, and second, its fear that Israel would begin to enter the West Bank daily to arrest Hamas activists, which would make the PA security mechanisms look bad.
Following the April 24, 2014 decision of the Israeli cabinet to suspend the talks with the Palestinians and impose economic sanctions on them, Fatah Central Committee member Jibril Rajoub called Israel's moves "official terrorism" and claimed that the PA would consider severing ties with it entirely – implying an end to security coordination.[11] Also, Talal 'Okal, a columnist for the official PA daily Al-Ayyam, explicitly called for ending security coordination with Israel.[12]
While the PA is unlikely to end this security coordination, the PLO-Hamas reconciliation will mean that the PA apparatus will now be less motivated to cooperate with Israeli security forces than in recent years.
The One-State Solution
A sixth alternative is the one-state solution. Every so often, the idea of a single bi-national state in all the territory between the Jordan and the sea – which would have a Palestinian majority – is brought up as an alternative to negotiations on the two-state solution. Muhammad Ishtayya called for "bidding farewell to the two-state solution" and added: "We are headed towards the one-state alternative."[13]
This option is highly unlikely since it would require Israel's agreement.
A Third Intifada
The alternative of another intifada is also under discussion; it includes two forms of resistance. One form of resistance is, like the First Intifada, a nonviolent, so-called "popular" resistance, and the second, similar to the Second Intifada, is armed resistance.
'Abbas has consistently maintained his opposition to armed resistance because he realizes that the Second Intifada damaged the Palestinian cause; as long as he remains president, he is likely to continue to oppose it. This position was also expressed by former PA prisoner affairs minister Ashraf Al-'Ajrami, who said: "The most important thing in the next campaign is to not turn to violence, towards which Israel does its best to lead us."[14] During a visit to Iran in January 2014, Fatah Central Committee member Jibril Rajoub spoke against suicide bombings inside Israel: "We have never given up our arms... The resistance is still a strategic option, and armed resistance is on the table... We want the world to accept our methods. I believe that by international law, we have the right to conduct any form of resistance, in the occupied lands and against the occupation, in order to put an end to the occupation. I'm telling you that there will not be any bus bombings, and there must not be bus bombings in Tel Aviv."[15]
However, other officials have warned against the outbreak of a third Intifada. For instance, following the March 2014 deaths of three activists from Hamas's 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad's Sarayat Al-Quds, and Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in a clash with the IDF in the Jenin refugee camp, Fatah official Hussam Khader, head of the Committee to Defend Refugee Rights, noted that "the previous Palestinian intifadas did not start with decisions by the political leadership."[16]
It should be noted that the so-called "popular" resistance is considered legitimate by the PLO and PA, even though it involves violence in the form of rock-throwing, firebombing, and more. These forms of resistance are frequent occurrences in certain parts of the West Bank, and are not an alternative to negotiations. In a conference in late April 2014, the PLO Central Committee called to expand the popular resistance activities.[17]
In sum, it appears that 'Abbas will promote the PLO-Hamas reconciliation, and possibly work in the international arena to advance the status of the PA. At the same time, he will likely keep declaring his willingness to continue negotiating on his own terms, and will choose to operate in the nonviolent arena.

*C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.

Endnotes:

[1] Alwatanvoice.com, January 22, 2014. On the possible meanings of the Palestinian UN bid, see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 742, "The Implications of the Palestinian UN Bid," September 28, 2011.

[2] Al-Ayyam (PA), January 31, 2014.

[3] Al-Ayyam (PA), January 28, 2014.

[4] Amad.ps, April 8, 2014.

[5] Maannews.net, April 3, 2014.

[6] Amad.ps, April 23, 2014.

[7] Al-Ayyam (PA), January 29, 2014.

[8] Alwatanvoice.com, January 22, 2014.

[9] Maannews.net, April 22, 2014.

[10] Elaph.com, April 22, 2014.

[11] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), April 9, 2014.

[12] Al-Ayyam (PA), January 29, 2014.

[13] Alwatanvoice.com, January 22, 2014.

[14] Al-Ayyam (PA), January 29, 2014.

[15] See MEMRI TV Clip No. 4140, Fatah Central Committee Member Rajoub to Iranian TV: Armed Resistance Is Still on the Table
February 3, 2014.

[16] Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London), March 23, 2014.

[17] Al-Ayyam (PA), April 28, 2014.

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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