Doc's Talk: The Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli Triangle

Sunday, May 11, 2014

The Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli Triangle

The Palestinian-Jordanian-Israeli Triangle
INSS Insight No. 547 Oded Eran .
SUMMARY: On one level, less covered in the media, Jordan and Israel are
developing a relationship based on shared economic interests and the need to

cope with political and security constraints resulting from the turmoil in
the region over the past three and a half years. At the same time, because
of developments anticipated in the wake of the freeze of Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations, the internal Palestinian political process, the continued
struggle in Syria, and the possible implications of a crisis with regional
dimensions in the context of the Iranian nuclear program, the political
leaderships in Jordan and Israel are likely to face difficult challenges an
will need to demonstrate great restraint in their conduct. Israel's effort
to preserve its relationship with Jordan 92s political-military leadership is highly important. As such, Israeli reactions to various actions and comments
by Jordanian officials, even if they are justified, should be grounded in a
comprehensive strategic view of Israel=92s regional interests.

The separation in 1921 by mandatory Britain of the east bank of the Jordan =
River from the area from the river to the Mediterranean did not eradicate =
longstanding communal allegiances, which continue to surface and evolve =
according to political developments. Over the years there has been a very =
wide range in the various positions on the Jordanian-Palestinian connection=
, =
from Jordan=92s annexation of the West Bank in 1950, which remained under t=
he =
control of the Arab Legion after the war in 1948, until the complete break =
of 1988. Nonetheless, Jordan=92s interest in events on the western side of =
the =
Jordan River continues, particularly in connection to Jerusalem. Jordan=92s =
demographic reality =96 more than half of Jordan=92s citizens are of Palest=
inian =
origin =96 in itself creates a need for Jordanian involvement. However, the =
issue of Jerusalem gives the Hashemite Kingdom a special status in the Arab =
world, although not on the same level as the status Saudi Arabia enjoys by =
virtue of its control of Mecca and Kaaba.
Jordan expressed its practical interest in Jerusalem in two main documents. =
Article 9 of the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel states: =93Isr=
ael =
respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in =
Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status =
will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic =
role in these shrines.=94 A Jordanian-Palestinian parallel of sorts can be =
found in the agreement signed on March 31, 2013 between King Abdullah II as =
=93the Custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem=94 (without distinction bet=
ween =
Muslims and Christians) and Mahmoud Abbas as =93president of the State of =
Palestine.=94 According to Article 2 of the agreement, the Jordanian king =
affirms =93that all Muslims, now and forever, may travel to and from the =
Islamic holy sites and worship there=94 (in the agreement, there is no such =
promise given to Christians). The King will =93administer the Islamic holy =
sites and=85maintain them=94 and will =93represent the interests of the hol=
y sites =
in relevant international forums.=94 He will also =93oversee and manage the =
institution of Waqf in Jerusalem and its properties in accordance with the =
laws of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.=94 This agreement likewise provide=
d =
Palestinian affirmation of Jordan=92s claim that its guardianship of the ho=
ly =
places in Jerusalem is based on a Palestinian appeal from 1924 (Haj Amin =
al-Husseini and then-Jerusalem mayor Raghib Nashashibi to Sharif Hussein, =
father of King Abdullah I).
In recent months, tempers have flared on a number of issues on the =
Israeli-Jordanian leg of the triangle, first and foremost on Jerusalem. The =
discussion has been conducted on the parliamentary level: Jordanian members =
of parliament called for a freeze on the peace treaty between the two =
countries and the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador (after a Jordanian =
citizen was killed at the Allenby Bridge), and MK Moshe Feiglin initiated a =
discussion on Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount. In both cases, in =
Jordan and in Israel, the political leadership acted to end the discussions =
without decisions that could have caused serious political damage.
Despite this intervention, the debate has spilled over into the diplomatic =
realm as well. The ambassadors of Israel and Jordan recently released =
statements on events in Jerusalem. On April 2, 2014, Prince Zeid Ra=92ad, =
Jordan=92s ambassador to the United Nations (who has since announced his =
resignation), stated in the UN Security Council (of which Jordan is a =
non-permanent member for 2014-15) that actions by right wing members of the =
Israeli government and the Knesset =93are a challenge and threat to Jordan.=
=94 =
Among the actions he mentioned were =93regular incursions into the compound=
,=94 =
=93illegal and intrusive excavations,=94 and renovation of =93parts of the =
wall of =
the al-Aqsa Mosque without the approval of the Jordanian side.=94 In his =
response to the UN secretary general, Ron Prosor, Israel=92s ambassador to =
the =
UN, mentioned Article 9 of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and described =
Israel=92s efforts to restore calm on the Temple Mount.
On one level, less covered in the media, Jordan and Israel are developing a =
relationship based on shared economic interests and the need to cope with =
political and security constraints resulting from the turmoil in the region =
over the past three and a half years. The agreements on water and natural =
gas signed in recent months by Israel, Jordan, and companies in both =
countries are an important trend, and they show the ability of the two =
countries=92 political leaders to separate political interests from =
provocative attempts to harm this fabric of relations. Cooperation is =
increasing on the issue of security as well, especially in light of the new =
challenges created by the situation in Syria and the heavy burden it impose=
s =
on the Jordanian defense establishment, which is attempting to seal its =
common border with its northern neighbor.
The freezing of the negotiating process between Israel and the Palestinians =
could have a detrimental effect on relations with Jordan. In an April 28, =
2014 article in the Jordan Times, former Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamal =
Abu Jaber virulently attacked Israel while using a quotation from Hitler=92=
s =
Mein Kampf, and accused Israel of causing the failure of mediation efforts =
by US Secretary of State John Kerry. Indeed, the Jordanian regime is highly =
sensitive to changes in the relations between Israel and the Palestinians =
and the lack of a peace process. If the political stalemate deteriorates =
into violence, this would certainly arouse anxiety in Amman. Officially =
Jordan has not been enthusiastic about the reconciliation agreement between =
the Palestinian factions, and the Prime Minister merely commented on =
television that his country supports the agreement. Jordan=92s complex =
relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, and especially its Jordanian faction=
, =
dictate caution and restraint, but circumspection cannot hide the Hashemite =
regime=92s preferences, and it can be assumed that Jordan will continue to =
act =
behind the scenes to help Abu Mazen and his Fatah movement.
Because of developments anticipated in the wake of the freeze of =
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the internal Palestinian political =
process, the continued struggle in Syria, and the possible implications of =
a =
crisis with regional dimensions in the context of the Iranian nuclear =
program, the political leaderships in Jordan and Israel are likely to face =
difficult challenges and will need to demonstrate great restraint in their =
conduct. Israel's effort to preserve its relationship with Jordan=92s =
political-military leadership is highly important. As such, Israeli =
reactions to various actions and comments by Jordanian officials, even if =
they are justified, should be grounded in a comprehensive strategic view of =
Israel=92s regional interests.
________________________________________
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on A=
rab-Israeli relations
Website: www.imra.org.il

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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