We’ll
be hearing a lot more about ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (also
rendered Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) – in the coming days. ISIS overran the major Iraqi city of
Mosul in the last week, and is close to establishing
itself in control of western Iraq, and Iraq’s major water supplies
from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.
The
leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, is a shadowy figure who doesn’t make public
appearances and doesn’t even reveal his face to most of his own fighters. This is presumably in part because he’s
an ex-U.S. detainee (not of the Guantanamo facility but of the Camp Bucca prison
in Iraq), who was released by the U.S. in 2009, but who now has a $10 million
price on his head. He takes
stringent precautions to avoid capture.
But
it’s also a measure to cultivate a mystique, in my opinion. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has big plans for
the region. Up to now, the stated
goal of ISIS has been uniting Iraq and Syria (part of the territory of
“al-Sham,” or “ash-Sham”*) in a great sharia state.
Recently, ISIS has proclaimed an
intention to invade and
conquer Jordan as well (with a specific
threat to slay King Abdullah). This
is a natural progression, and Lebanon and Israel can assume they are in ISIS’s
target sights as well. (Regarding
Israel, ISIS and al-Baghdadi have been relatively demure, not loudly emphasizing
Israel as a target. But as
indicated here, a recent proclamation from ISIS in early 2014 alluded
to jihad in Gaza. This theme will
inevitably become more important in the future.)
The
rhetoric common in ISIS videos – and in particular of a video (below) which is
represented as a sort of manifesto by al-Baghdadi – has a combination of
regional, territorial, and global allusions. It depicts a growing movement,
implicitly on a path to political power, which is consolidating territorial
gains and building a pyramid of loyalty from both local peoples and jihadhi
fighters, the latter of whom come from different parts of the greater Middle
Eastern region.
In
the meantime, ISIS has now announced its intention to
seize Baghdad. Not that
we didn’t see that coming, but the speed and seeming hubris of the announcement
are an indication of al-Baghdadi’s confidence, and apparent contempt for the
staying power of the Maliki government.
If
Iran or perhaps Russia doesn’t intervene, there is in fact a good chance the
Iraqi government forces, under a sustained assault over time, will be unable to
hold the approaches from Mosul and Ramadi to Baghdad. My prediction is that one or both of
Iran or Russia will intervene at some
level (not necessarily by deploying their own troops, although it’s quite
possible that they would send paramilitary forces to Iraq. But certainly by supplying the Maliki
government).
Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi
In
the meantime, a little about Baghdadi.
He’s a Sunni, described as a long-time Salafi, who was born in Samarra,
Iraq (in the center of the so-called “Sunni Triangle”) in 1971, and educated in
Islamic history and culture. The
Western public knows little about him, but he was reportedly put in detention in
2005 during the U.S. occupation because he was cruising the countryside in the
area northwest of Baghdad “trying” and executing whole extended families. At one point he was known as al Qaeda’s
top man in the city of Qaim, on the border with Syria. The border area between Qaim and al
Bukamal, in Syria, served as Baghdadi’s ISIS redoubt prior to the 2013
“breakout” in which ISIS seized Ramadi and Fallujah in the Euphrates
corridor.
The
sketchy timeline on Baghdadi suggests that he was affiliated for a period of
time with al Qaeda, but was not “grown” from the beginning as an al Qaeda
asset. He’s an Iraqi Sunni
extremist with a grand vision of his own for an Iraq-centered sharia state. Most readers will be aware of the widely
reported fact that al Qaeda actually
repudiated ISIS several months ago.
The
Western media have characterized this move as evidence that ISIS is “too
extreme” even for al Qaeda, but I disagree with that assessment. It’s far more likely that al Qaeda
dissociated itself from Baghdadi because Baghdadi is a rival with a very
specific territorial goal, one that is in direct conflict with the general,
long-term vision of the Muslim Brotherhood. Baghdadi has no intention of being
subsumed in a broader caliphate under someone else’s banner. Nor does he plan to wait for political
timing or supernatural manifestations.
He’s his own Alexander, if you will, bent right now on conquering
territory and carving out a state that he plans to be in charge
of.
Where
things go after ISIS consolidates “Iraq and al-Sham” isn’t entirely clear. But the specificity of the current
vision suggests that Baghdadi and his inner circle are already thinking about
it.
One
analytical comment about Baghdadi and his methods. Remaining shadowy and unseen will only
get him so far. At a certain point,
this posture will set limits on the scope of his ambitions. In order to achieve a lasting political
impact, he will have to have a mode of strategic communication – with subjects,
with opponents – and project a personality to the world. I suspect he understands that. What we do see from him is studied,
“educated,” and steeped in systematic narrative. He may be holding back on the
personality projection until he has secured enough territory to avoid being
easily dislodged from it.
Attaching a personality to the strategy of ISIS will
nevertheless be a requirement at some point, if Baghdadi wants to go
further. It will be informative to
watch in the coming days to see how or if that happens.
ISIS announces its presence with
authority
With
this in mind, the following is a selection of videos. Baghdadi himself appears in none of
them, so don’t look for him. We are
given to believe that the first video is narrated by Baghdadi. His cadence is that of the accomplished,
devoted Muslim cleric, and if it is Baghdadi, it shows him as the “scholar” of
Islam and regional history that he is reputed to be. It has subtitles in English, and is
clearly meant for an English-speaking audience, given the professional
appearance of the translations.
There
are several things of note about the first video, but I’ll highlight just two.
First, Baghdadi refers to Nouri al-Maliki as the “Safavid,” a historical reference to Shias which is common in
Iraq (less so, but still seen, in the rest of the Arab world), and which is
emphasized as a way to disparage Shias and stir up animosities from the past
against them. The Safavids were
invaders from the Persian (modern-day Iranian) Safavi dynasty in the early 16th
century, who captured Baghdad and held onto it in a series of back-and-forth
wars with the Ottoman rulers over the next 100 years. They imposed Shia Islam on what are now
modern-day Iraqis. But some Iraqis
resisted Shia conversion, remaining Sunnis and continuing to fight alongside the
Ottomans for control of the territory around Baghdad. Eventually, the yoke of the Persian
Safavids was thrown off entirely.
This
resentment from 500 years ago is part of Baghdadi’s political call to
supporters, and is, of course, reminiscent of the old resentments infesting the
cultural and religious divisions in the Balkans, Turkey, and elsewhere in the
larger region.
Warning to
America
The
other notable aspect of the video is its warning to America, which starts around
14:40, near the very end. Here is
the warning in its entirety:... [See rest at link]
CDR, USN (Ret.)
Hemet, CA
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