Doc's Talk: The Dangerous Denial of Jihad's Threat

Thursday, October 18, 2007

The Dangerous Denial of Jihad's Threat

On October 12, Taliban leader Mullah Omar declared that it had reached a "success point" in its "jehad" (sic) against the Karzai government, and called upon other Jihadist organizations to finish the job in the Taliban's attacks on US and NATO forces, and to overtake the Afghan government. UK predictably responded today by standing behind Karzai's efforts to negotiate with the Taliban who seek to overtake the Karzai government, with the belief that it can "split" the Taliban, disregarding the Taliban's Islamist constitution and shared Islamist beliefs of the Taliban ideology, as the UK/UN/NATO/US State Department goal's remain focused on "stabilization" of Afghanistan.

In the United States, also on October 12, U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney issued an advertisement stating that his concerns regarding "Jihadism - violent, radical Islamic fundamentalism... [and] Their goal is to unite the world under a single Jihadist caliphate. To do that, they must collapse freedom-loving nations like us."

These comments on Jihad were met with mockery, laughter, and scorn by elements in the mainstream media, blogs, and a spokesman for the Democratic National Committee. Newsweek mocked Romney's concerns about Jihad, the Atlantic called such concerns "ridiculous", bloggers issued text and video mocking comments about the concerns, and Democratic National Committee spokesman Damien LaVera stated that Romney's comments on Jihad showed "no understanding of the threat facing our country".

On October 13, Steven Emerson appeared on FOX cable news and was roundly condemned by Alan Colmes for his "offensive" use of the terms "Islamic Jihad", "Islamic militant", and "Islamic extremist." Two weeks prior, Alan Colmes similarly mocked the Investigative Project's (IPT) concerns about ex-Virginia immigration commission member Esam Omeish speeches calling for "the Jihad way" as nothing more than "conservative political correctness". The Washington Post reported Esam Omeish's justification for "the Jihad Way" as merely calling for "struggle", and reported condemnations of the IPT revelations about Omeish as coming from "a small group of right-wing anti-Muslim bigots."

This continuing dangerous denial of the threats of Jihad, its ideology, and refusal to debate the issues of political Islamism represents yet another fault line in America's national security. When concerns about Jihad and Islamism are a source for mockery by American media and political organizations, then clearly the Jihadists and the Islamists are winning the War of Ideas.

Jihad is not a joke. Its ideology embracing death and causing violence is demonstrated every day throughout the world. Those mocking discussion of the threat and ideology of Jihad continue to undermine the War of Ideas in the United States, and undermine the efforts of moderate Muslims to fight Islamism and Jihadists. The growing denial is a bi-partisan problem that cuts across socio-economic backgrounds and levels of education.

But the denial is indefensible, regardless of the lack of a coherent strategy on Jihad and Islamism, and such denial must be publicly and vigorously condemned. It is a national disgrace. The apologist gamesmanship with the term "Jihad" is an ongoing propaganda effort that must be addressed by American political leadership.

As pointed out by Dr. Walid Phares, an ongoing propaganda effort has been made to try to redefine "Jihad". However, as Dr. Walid Phares points out in his book "The War of Ideas", "[t]he historical reality of jihad is intertwined with the evolution of the Islamic state since the seventh century. It is emphatically not a modern, recent, and narrow creation by a small militant faction". Moreover, Dr. Walid Phares points out that "democracies cannot recognize ideologies and movements that call for warfare based on theological grounds" and that a "redefinition [of jihad] can only be effective in the wake of a reform in Islam that touches the theological level".

On October 10, 2007, the United States government issued a "National Strategy for Homeland Security". Like its predecessor September 2006 "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism", you won't find the word "Jihad" in it, nor will you find a strategy for addressing Jihad or political Islamism, because neither is addressed as within the scope of the nature of the threat to the United States. The ambiguous terms "extremist" and "terrorist" are used instead, and the result are "strategies" without a precise and agreed-upon definition of the nature of the threat, focusing on tactics and operations instead.

What is the value of such ambiguous terms as "extremist" and "terrorist"? As shown in the documentary Islam versus Islamists, Tempe Wahhabist Imam Ahmad Al Shqeirat views anti-terror Muslims like Dr. Zuhdi Jasser as an "extremist". Iran calls the CIA and the US Army "terrorists". The importance of defining Jihad and political Islamism in our national security strategies is vital.

However, despite the apologist propaganda on Jihad, and the lack of a sufficient strategy, we all share accountability for knowledge. Since 9/11, who in America, regardless of their age, background, or political beliefs, can honestly say that they have no knowledge of the threat of Jihad to this country? Who is genuinely ignorant about Jihad in the United States? Is the dangerous denial of Jihad a fear of accountability? Is that part of the monofocus on tactics, rather than ideology?

The answer to ending this dangerous denial and to beginning an effective counterattack in the War of Ideas remains the task of developing a true blueprint strategy on Jihad and Islamism. But that blueprint strategy does not begin with the disciplining of great minds and analysts, but rather with the national willpower and resolve to face the accountability for what we already know, rather than busying ourselves with distracting arguments on tactics, operations, and politics -- for an enemy that we, as a nation, fear to identify. With great knowledge, comes great responsibility. It is a responsibility that America must accept, and it is a responsibility that America must demand that its governmental leadership and its media accept.

In a subsequent article, I will focus exclusively on the blueprint aspects of our war strategy, and why a use of hybrid methodologies may be necessary to effectively deal with the complex definition and identity of the enemy and the nature of the threat, so that the war blueprint strategy provides the flexibility needed for the global war against Jihadism. Until America's political leadership defines Jihad as a military threat, and defines its position on political Islamism, the War of Ideas will continue to be lost to those who espouse this dangerous denial on Jihad's threat to America and the world... and those who live in fear of the accountability that such knowledge of Jihadism demands of them.

Sources:

October 12, 2007 - AFP: Taliban leader Mullah Omar boasts Kabul forced to bargain with insurgency

October 12, 2007 - AP: Taliban chief Mullah Omar urges Afghanistan's neighbors to help drive out foreign troops

October 15, 2007 - Guardian: UK backs plan to split Taliban from within

May 29, 2006 - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty: NATO sizes up task in southern Afghanistan

October 12, 2007 - Video of Romney Campaign Ad

October 12, 2007 - Newsweek: The Gaggle: Romney ad - You call this a jihad?

October 12, 2007 - The Atlantic: Romney Versus the Jihadists

October 12, 2007 - DNC: Romney's 'Jihad' Ad Shows Lack of Foreign Policy Credentials

October 12, 2007 - AP - Romney Launches Tough-On-Terrorism Ad

October 12, 2007 - Wonkette: Mitt Romney Launches Jihad on Jihad!

October 13, 2007 - Blogger Video Mocking Romney "Jihadist" Ad

October 14, 2007 - Newsbusters: "Colmes: Offensive to Call Terrorists 'Islamic,' Use 'Books Not Bombs' on Hamas"

October 10, 2007 - National Strategy for Homeland Security

September 2006 - National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

September 29, 2007: Fault Line on Jihad: Why the Omeish Reaction is Important - Jeffrey Imm

September 29, 2007 - Washington Post - Va. Muslim Activist Denies Urging Violence

September 17, 2007 - 9/11 and the Inconvenient Truths about Jihad and Islamism - Jeffrey Imm

July 18, 2007 -- Family Security Matters: Preventing the West from Understanding Jihad -- Walid Phares

The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy by Walid Phares, February 20, 2007, pages 201-202, 205-206

October 15, 2007 05:45 PM

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk