Doc's Talk: Sadr’s Setback

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Sadr’s Setback

Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
4/10/2008

Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Bill Roggio, the editor of The Long War Journal who has embedded in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is the president of Public Multimedia Inc., a non-profit seeking to improve coverage and understanding of the Long War. FP: Bill Roggio, welcome to Frontpage Interview.

Roggio: Hello Jamie, and thank you for inviting me.

FP: There were various news reports that stated that U.S. and the Iraqi Security Forces' Basrah offensive against Sadr was a failure. I would like to discuss with you how accurate those reports were. But first, tell us what this offensive was about and against whom. There are illegal Shia militias and criminal gangs operating in Basrah right? And all of this is further complicated because this present confrontation is Shia vs. Shia, correct?

Roggio: The Iraqi government clearly was attempting to take on the Mahdi Army and the Iranian-backed Shia terror groups in Basrah, as it has done elsewhere in the South. There are certainly political rivalries at play in the intra-Shia conflict, but the fact is that the Mahdi Army conducts attacks on Iraqi and US forces and Iraqi civilians. Its Mahdi Army operates outside the law, and was attempting to fill the security void in Basrah. There will always be a level of corruption and criminal activity in Basrah, but the Mahdi Army exceeded the normal level of graft and moved to take control of the city.

FP: So what about the news reports that indicated that the U.S. and the Iraqi Security Forces' Basra offensive against Sadr was a failure?

Roggio: The reports of the death of the Iraqi Army in Basrah were widely exaggerated. The Iraqi Army and police met some stiff resistance in the opening days, but the media jumped to call this failure. Prime Minister Maliki did not plan well for the operation and jumped the gun on its execution by months (it was to be carried out in July). An Iraqi Army brigade fresh out of basic training was thrown into the fight and cracked - about 500 troops "underperformed or deserted" according to the New York Times, and 400 police deserted. But the other estimated 44,500 Iraqi security forces in Basrah held.

The Iraqi command rushed in reinforcements - about 1 Division or 7,000 troops, and by the weekend the Iraqi security forces began to get the upper hand. Then Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to leave the streets. By the end of the fighting, more than 500 Mahdi fighters were killed, about 1000 wounded and another 300 captured in the fighting in Basrah, Baghdad, and the great South, where the military performed well against the Mahdi Army.

FP: Tell us a bit about the confusion in the Mahdi/Sadrist ranks.

Roggio: By the weekend, my sources in Southern Iraq as well as Time Magazine were reporting the Mahdi Army in Basrah were running low on munitions and other supplies, and were beginning to be demoralized. These factors must have played a role in Sadr's calling his Mahdi Army off the streets. Then, the Maliki government made a bold move that set the Mahdi Army and the Sadrists off balance. It threatened to disallow the Sadrist movement from participating in the upcoming provincial elections if Sadr did nit disband the Mahdi Army. The Sadrists were caught flat-footed, complained about their political isolation, and began to issue conflicting statements on disbanding the MAhdi Army.

FP: Have there been any deals between Maliki and Sadr?

Roggio: The Sadrist spokesmen claim a deal was cut but Maliki and members of his staff vigorously deny this. There is no evidence a deal was cut, and the Iraqi military is still carrying out attacks on Mahdi forces.

FP: What role is Iran playing? This whole face-off revealed Iranian military intervention in Iraq to be a given, right?

Roggio: To streamline operations in Iraq, Iran's Qods Force established a unified command, called the Ramazan Corps, and split Iraq into three roughly geographical regions. I obtained a detailed description of the Ramazan Corps' command and control network, storage and distribution facilities, training camps, and ratlines – or supply lines – into Iraq last fall.

The Ramazan Corps is a military command with senior Qods Force generals in charge. They direct the flow of weapons, cash, and the deadly rockets, mortars, and explosively formed projectiles into the hands of the Special Groups working in Iraq. The Ramazan Corps also brings Iraqi fighters in Iran to train them, and runs training camps inside Iraq as well.

The Times Online just released information that the Ramazan Corps "were operating at a tactical command level with the Shi'ite militias fighting Iraqi security forces" during the recent fighting in Basrah. "Some were directing operations on the ground." This should come as no surprise to anyone following Iranian activities inside Iraq or have an understanding of the Ramazan Corps. Iran is fighting a thinly veiled, undeclared war against both the Iraqi people and the United States.

FP: So please crystallize for us the success that the U.S. achieved in this recent move.

Roggio: From a US perspective, the Mahdi Army is the premiere instrument of Iran and its Qods Force. The Mahdi Army setback is a direct blow to Iran. The US has patiently pursued a strategy to divide and conquer the Mahdi Army, and we are now seeing the fruits of that effort. Iran has lost face and has exposed itself as a supporter of the insurgency in Iraq.

FP: How big is the problem of the terrorists’ infiltration of Iraqi Security Forces?

Roggio: There certainly is an infiltration issue, but this seems to be a far greater problem with police that the Army. In Basrah, 400 of the 16,000 police either defected to Mahdi or abandoned their posts. This equates to 2.5 percent of the force. The reporting indicated the police is riddled with Mahdi influence, but the numbers don't seem to match. Conducting operations like the one in Basrah go far in exposing the level of infiltration - it is the best way to find out who exactly is loyal. The military and police must prosecute those who defected to the fullest extent of the law - make an example out of them. Maliki and his aides and military officers indicated this would happen.

FP: What is the best strategy for the U.S. and the Iraqi government to pursue now?

Roggio: The US must be sure not to draw down too quickly, as General Petraeus recommended. The Iraqi police and military still rely on the US for air support, logistics, and advisory role. US combat troops are also on the front lines. The Iraqi government should continue to isolate Sadr and the Mahdi Army and work to reign in militias. It must also work to integrate the Sons of Iraq movements into the security forces as best as possible. Many of the challenges the Iraqi government faces now are more political in nature, such as the Kirkuk issue, passing an oil law, continuing with reconciliation, etc.

FP: Your evaluation of General Petraeus’ testimony?

Roggio: General Petraeus struck the right tone in his testimony to the Senate. While Iraq has seen improvement, the gains can indeed be lost by drawing down too quickly. If the biggest news stories coming from the testimony are gaffs from Senators McCain and Kennedy, then Petraeus was successful in cementing his control of Iraqi policy and strategy until President Bush's term expires in January 2009. He is a masterful politician as well as a shrewd, intelligent general.

FP: Overall, the U.S. is winning in Iraq?

Roggio: This is a good question and given the way the Mahdi Army and al Qaeda in Iraq -- the two biggest instigators of sectarian violence, attacks on civilians, and the greatest threats to the Iraqi government and people -- are on the ropes, I'd say we are on the right track. Al Qaeda is being pushed to the fringes in northern Iraq, while the Mahdi Army is politically isolated. The key here is persistence. We have a habit of letting up just as we see some success. A constant guiding hand will be needed in Iraq for years to come before we can talk about victory.

FP: Bill Roggio, thank you for joining us.

Roggio: Thank you very much Jamie, it has been a pleasure.
Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz’s Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com..

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk