Doc's Talk: Exporting the Iranian revolution to Lebanon

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Exporting the Iranian revolution to Lebanon

IICC

Overview

1. Lebanon is a unique example of Iran 's success in exporting the Islamic revolution through Hezbollah, an organization established by Iran with Syrian assistance in the summer of 1982. That success is reflected both in the establishment of Hezbollah's extensive military infrastructure, with a proven track record of being able to hit Israel's home front, and in the strengthening of Hezbollah's political force on the internal Lebanese scene, to the point of being able to veto decisions made by the Lebanese government in the Doha Agreement (May 2008). On top of those political and military abilities, one must also consider the extensive social and cultural network established by Hezbollah, through which Iran deepens its long-term influence in Lebanon —mostly with the Shi'ite community, that country's largest ethnic group.

2. More than just a tool to expand Iran 's influence, the ideological activity conducted by Hezbollah is meant to inculcate the Lebanese society with the concept of “society of resistance” —that is, a society entirely devoted to a long-term armed struggle against Israel , with Hezbollah at the forefront. That concept was introduced during a speech recently given by Hezbollah's Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Na'im Qassem, at a ceremony held by a Hezbollah organ responsible for commemorating the martyrs of the Faculty of Science in the University of Lebanon . That speech echoed the speech of an Iranian leader on the “culture of resistance” in Iran . 1

3. In his speech, Sheikh Na'im Qassem called for the establishment of a “society of resistance”, in which everybody lives their normal lives at school, at the university, at the factory, or at the store. However, “if someone is called to the front, they will do what is required of them and then go back to their daily lives”. He said that would turn Lebanon 's entire society into a “society of resistance”, which is concerned first and foremost with its duties and then with its daily life. Qassem further noted that it would help the society of resistance organize its arms, power, and abilities for the confrontation (with Israel ). Such a society would tighten the noose around Israel 's neck and defend the Lebanese country from outside pressure. As part of that concept, Hezbollah should obviously not be disarmed but rather incorporated into a “comprehensive defense strategy” of Lebanon (Al-Manar TV website, November 20, 2008 ).

Exporting the Islamic revolution in Iran through Hezbollah

4. Hezbollah, used by the Iranian regime as the main instrument of exporting the revolution to Lebanon , is also an effective means of spreading radical Shi'ite Islamic ideology. Iran and Hezbollah operate an extensive network of religious, educational, cultural, and social institutions among the Shi'ite community in Lebanon . It is coupled with Hezbollah's media empire (which includes a satellite TV station, a radio station, websites, newspapers, libraries, and book publishing houses). All of those serve Hezbollah and the Iranian regime in the war for the hearts and minds of the Lebanese public, increasing their political and ideological influence among the Lebanese society in general and the Shi'ite community in particular. 2

5. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center has recently re-examined the activity of Iran and Hezbollah's societies and cultural centers operating in Lebanon as well as the contents of their publications. The results show once again that Hezbollah's publications, which include Iranian literature in Arabic translation, are meant to spread Iranian ideology in Lebanon and to nurture the personality cult of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the instigator of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. Those publications also inspire hatred against Israel , the US , and the West, encourage terrorism and violence against Israel (“resistance”), and commemorate Hezbollah's shahids, turning them into role models for Lebanese teenagers viewed by Hezbollah as the next generation of its military operatives.

Societies and cultural centers operating in Lebanon on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah

6. Iran and Hezbollah have established in Lebanon an extensive network of educational, religious, and cultural institutions, which they predominantly use to shape the hearts and minds of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon . 3 Those institutions "import" to Lebanon the Iranian radical Shi'ite ideology the way it is, with Hezbollah's role usually limited to that of a contractor, without making significant ideological contributions of its own. The establishment of that educational, cultural, and religious system, starting from the mid-1980s, was guided by Iran and its various proxies: the Revolutionary Guards, the cultural attaché's offices in the Iranian embassies in Damascus and Beirut , as well as Iranian-based social institutions that have branches in Lebanon . Iran 's involvement also includes significant sums of money for the establishment and operation of that extensive network of culture institutions.

7. One of the most important associations operating in Lebanon is the Cultural Islamic Al-Ma'aref Association 4 (hereinafter: Al-Ma'aref Association). Founded in Lebanon in 1996, its aim is to spread Islam in accordance with Khomeini's ideology and in accordance with the concept of the Islamic revolution in Iran, "filling a natural role in an inter-cultural dialogue or confrontation" (according to the association's website). The association has dozens of cultural centers all of which act in the spirit of the Khomeinist ideology, including the Al-Nur Anti-Illiteracy Center and women's culture centers. The association operates an extensive network of institutions and is connected with other culture centers in Lebanon that spread Khomeini's teachings and ideology (see below).

8. Al-Ma'aref Association has its own publishing house. It holds international book fairs and is associated with other cultural centers involved in spreading Iranian radical Islam. The

9. association publishes Shi'ite Islamic ideological periodicals: Baqiyyat Allah, 5 Sada al-Wilaya ("The echo of responsibility to the House of Ali") and Dawhat al-Wilaya ("The dynasty of the house of Ali").

Al-Ma'aref Association's Beirut book fair

10. In 2006 and 2007, international book fairs were held in Beirut by Al-Ma'aref Association. Taking part in those fairs were publishing houses from the Arab and Islamic world. The fair was not held in 2008, probably due to the lack of international interest in the fair held last year.

Hassan Nasrallah giving a speech at the Al-Ma'aref
Hassan Nasrallah giving a speech at the Al-Ma'aref
Association book fair (May 2006)

11. The May 2006 book fair was held in the Sheikh Abbas Moussawi (Sayyid al-Shuhada') Hall in the neighborhood of Al-Dahiya, in the southern Shi'ite suburb of Beirut (Hezbollah's stronghold). Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who sponsored the fair, gave there a speech. He mentioned the anniversary of the IDF's pullout from Lebanon ( May 23, 2000 ), saying that the victory was "a result of the resistance [i.e., terrorism]. Resistance is a product of culture, and it is a culture upon itself".

Following are some characteristics of cultural centers and publishing houses in Lebanon associated with and supported by Iran and Hezbollah, acting under the inspiration of the Shi'ite Islamic ideology of the Iranian regime:

a.The Imam Khomeini Culture Center : an institution with many branches in Lebanon , its main office is situated in the Shi'ite neighborhood of Harat Hreik (Hezbollah's stronghold) in the southern suburb of Beirut . The center is involved in translating and disseminating Imam Khomeini's ideological legacy, 6 nurturing the "culture of resistance" (i.e., culture of terrorism), and in perpetuating the personality cult of Imam Khomeini and his successor, Khamenei. The center organizes assemblies and symposiums on Khomeini's philosophy.

Back cover of a pamphlet titled ”Jihad”
The address of the Imam Khomeini Culture Center in the southern Beirut neighborhood of Harat Hreik as it appears on the back cover of a pamphlet titled "Jihad" (holy war), published in 2004 by the Imam Khomeini Culture Center )

b. Ma'had Sayyid al-Shuhada' [Lord of Martyrs Institute]: 7 an institution which publishes Shi'ite religious books, dealing primarily with the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. Parts of those books are available on the Al-Ma'aref Association website. The institute organizes assemblies and conventions to promote Khomeinist ideology. Those conventions have been attended by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures from that organization.

The logo of the Lord of Martyrs Institute
The logo of the Lord of Martyrs Institute

c. The Imam al-Mahdi Institute: established in 1990, it describes itself as an institution which publishes Islamic culture. It specializes in publishing and distributing Islamic Shi'ite literature based on Khomeinist ideology.

c. The Imam al-Mahdi Institute

d. Markaz Baqiyyat Allah al-A'zam lil-Dirasat ( Baqiyyat Allah Study Center ): a publishing house of Shi'ite religious literature which promotes the publication of books about the Islamic revolution in Iran . In particular, it publishes the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei.

Baqiyyat Allah monthly,
The cover page of the October 2008 issue of the Baqiyyat Allah monthly,
one of Hezbollah's most important periodicals

e. Dar al-Hadi Publishing: an important publishing house belonging to Hezbollah, even though it avoids formally associating itself with that organization. It publishes books about Hezbollah, religion, the legacy of Imam Khomeini, as well as anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic incitement.

The Dar al-Hadi Publishing offices in Beirut
The Dar al-Hadi Publishing offices in Beirut

f. Imam al-Mahdi Publishing (Hezbollah's youth movement): a publishing house specializing in books and pamphlets for children and teenagers, inculcating them with the values of radical Shi'ite Islam, hatred against Israel and the importance of jihad against it, as well as the personality cult of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

12. Following are examples of publications (books, pamphlets, and periodicals) published in Lebanon on the following topics:

a. The personality cult of Khomeini and Khamenei

b. The ideology of the Iranian regime

c. Jihad (holy war) according to Khomeini and Khamenei

d. Hezbollah's martyrs as role models

e. Nurturing the values of terrorism (resistance)

f. Indoctrination of children and teenagers

g. Anti-Semitic literature

h. Anti-American literature

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1 On November 15, 2008 , a memorial ceremony was held in Esfahan ; it was attended by Khamenei's military advisor and former chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Sayyid Yahya Rahim Safavi. He said that the “resistance” and the self-respect of the Iranian people during the Iran-Iraq war made the threats of war cause the growth of the “resistance culture”. He also noted that “Nasrallah considers himself a soldier of Iran 's leader [Khamenei] and Hezbollah members follow the example of the brave men and women of Iran …” ( Fars News Agency, November 16).

2 For details, see: “Hezbollah as a case study of the battle for hearts and minds” (June 2007).

3 On the establishment of that system in Lebanon , see chapter on Hezbollah and building the new Islamic society in Shimon Shapira's Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon (Hebrew), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers, Tel Aviv, 2000, pp. 134-171.

4 In Arabic: Jam'iyyat al-ma'aref al-islamiyya al-thaqafiyya. Al-Ma'aref means "general knowledge".

5 Baqiyyat Allah is a Quranic term that causes contention between Sunnis and Shi'ites. Sunnis believe that the term refers to everything left on Earth by Allah, and all the wealth he promised to his believers in the afterlife. In Shi'ite tradition, the term is another name for Imam al-Mahdi (the Vanished Imam), left by Allah to guide the believers. They believe that the verse containing the term motivates the believers to believe in the Mahdi. The term is commonly found in Shi'ite literature, and there are Shi'ite organizations and institutions that use the term as their name.

6 Iran also has an institution which publishes Imam Khomeini's works, which distributes Imam Khomeini's philosophical writings.

7 Sayyid Shuhada' al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya is the alias of Sheikh Abbas Moussawi, the Hezbollah leader who died in an Israeli targeted killing in 1992. Originally, "Lord of the Martyrs" referred to Hussein bin Ali, who was killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680 A .D. and became the most prominent Shi'ite martyr.
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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk