Doc's Talk: Hamas tries to take advantage of the events in Egypt and its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood to improve its standing with the Egyptian government an

Thursday, February 24, 2011

Hamas tries to take advantage of the events in Egypt and its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood to improve its standing with the Egyptian government an

The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center

Overview

1. On February 19 Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, contacted Sheikh Dr. Yussuf al-Qardawi and invited him to visit the Gaza Strip to hold prayers. He also congratulated al-Qardawi and the Egyptian people on "the victory of the revolution." Ismail Haniya expressed his personal appreciation and the appreciation of the Hamas administration for al-Qardawi's support of the Palestinian cause and for his call at the mass rally on February 18 for the lifting of the Israeli "siege" of the Gaza Strip. A Hamas website reported that al-Qardawi had accepted the invitation and promised to try to arrange a visit. He also praised the Gaza Strip's "firm stance" (Hamas’ Palestine-info website, February 19, 2011).2. The previous day, February 18, Qardawi, who was expelled from Egypt in 1997 and found refuge in Qatar, appeared at a mass rally in Tahrir Square in Cairo and delivered the Friday sermon. His speech, which dealt with the Egyptian revolution, sent a message of unity between Muslims and Christians. However, he ended his speech with a call for the "liberation" of Al-Aqsa mosque and asked the Egyptian army to open the Rafah crossing and allow convoys to enter the Gaza Strip (Al-Jazeera TV, February 18, 2011).

3. In our assessment, Hamas is trying to make political capital from the recent events in Egypt, the strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood and the return to Egypt of Sheikh al-Qardawi, the source of religious authority for Hamas (See Appendix I). That centers on bolstering Hamas' status with the Egyptian authorities, in the internal Palestinian arena (strengthening Hamas' position in its competition with Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority) and in the Arab-Muslim world. In our assessment, Hamas is especially interested in having the Rafah crossing opened ("lifting the [so-called] siege") and in having Egypt lower the profile of its security activities regarding the smuggling-tunnel industry. That would make it easier for Hamas to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip via routes which pass through Egypt, which it regards as necessary for military buildup, both its own and that of the other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.

Appendix I

Sheikh Yussuf al-Qardawi provides Hamas with religious
sanction and helps fund its civilian infrastructure

1. The Hamas movement, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, regards Sheikh Yussuf al-Qardawi, a senior Sunni cleric affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, as its most important religious authority.

2. In the past al-Qardawi issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling for jihad against Israel and Jews and sanctioning suicide bombing attacks, even if women and children were injured. His position as a leading Sunni Islamic authority reinforces the meaning of his fatwas, which legitimize Palestinian terrorism and Hamas' strategies in the confrontation with Israel as an alternative for the Palestinian Authority.

3. Al-Qardawi helps Hamas fund its civilian infrastructure (the da'wah) through the Union of Good, which he heads. The Union is an umbrella organization of dozens of Islamic "charitable funds" which raise money for Hamas and sometimes for other Islamist activities around the globe. It was declared a terrorism-sponsoring organization and was outlawed by Israel in February 2002. In December 2002 it was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. It can be assumed that the recent events in Egypt will strengthen the capabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qardawi through the Union of Good, to support Hamas.

4. On the other hand, al-Qardawi is hostile to the Palestinian Authority, which is Hamas' rival. At the beginning of 2010 he criticized Mahmoud Abbas for the PA's position on the Goldstone Report and issued a fatwa stating that Mahmoud Abbas should be stoned in Mecca. When Mahmoud Abbas demanded a retraction, al-Qardawi denied having issued the fatwa, but did confirm that during a sermon that if the accusations again "any person" in the Palestinian Authority could be proved [accusations relating to support of the cancellation of the vote on the Goldstone Report], that person should be stoned in Mecca as punishment for treason (Islamonline website, January 7, 2010). In response Mahmoud al-Habash, Palestinian Authority minister of religion and endowments, said that his ministry had instructed all the mosque preachers in the PA to attack al-Qardawi personally (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, January 18, 2010).

Appendix II

The connections between Hamas the Muslim Brotherhood

The ideological sphere

1. The Hamas movement is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It grew out of the Al-Mujamma' al-Islami Association of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Its ideology – in addition to motifs which are uniquely Palestinian – is based on the doctrines of Hassan al-Banna. Hamas' educational system, the mosques it controls, its preaching and welfare institutions (all of which make up the da'wah and all of which are extremely important to Hamas) are based on the Muslim Brotherhood model. Hassan al-Banna himself was turned into a role model by Hamas and his portrait decorates its posters (see below).

2. Examples of the ideological similarity between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood can be found in the Hamas charter, the movement's founding document, where its ideology is spelled out by its founders.1 The charter is based on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's radical Islamic worldview, which has not changed since Hamas' founding. Its position regarding Israel is uncompromising and views the Palestinian issue as religious, and the conflict with Israel as between Islam and the "infidel" Jews. The entire area of "Palestine" is represented in the charter as part of the Islamic endowment, which cannot under any circumstances be ceded because no one (including the various Arab and Muslim rulers) has the authority to do so.

3. In consequence, according to Hamas ideology, there can be no recognition of the State of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign, independent country, an uncompromising jihad ("holy war") must be waged against it, and there can be absolutely no agreement or arrangement which recognizes its right to exist. At the beginning of the charter there is a quotation attributed to Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood founder and a member of the Hamas pantheon of shaheeds, which reads "Israel will arise and continue to exist until Islam wipes it out, as it wiped out what went before."
A quotation attributed to “the imam and shaheed Hassan al-Banna”
A quotation attributed to "the imam and shaheed Hassan al-Banna" on page three of the Qalqilya edition: "Israel will arise and continue to exist until Islam wipes it out, as it wiped out what went before."

Ahmed Yassin, Hamas founder who shaped the movement's charter, on the front cover an edition printed in Qalqilya in 2004.
Ahmed Yassin, Hamas founder who shaped the movement's charter, on the front cover an edition printed in Qalqilya in 2004.

The practical sphere

4. In recent years the links between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have been manifested in the following ways:

1) Political and propaganda support: The Muslim Brotherhood has given political, ideological and propaganda support in its media to Hamas and opposed the policies of the Egyptian government when it considered them anti-Hamas.

Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip meets with Dr. Muhammad al-Baltagi
Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip meets with Dr. Muhammad al-Baltagi, secretary general of the Muslim Brotherhood faction in the Egyptian People's Assembly. Al-Baltagi led the Egyptian delegation aboard the Mavi Marmara.

2) Deep involvement in the various land and sea convoys to the Gaza Strip: The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is deeply involved in the various land and sea convoys to the Gaza Strip (including through the Egyptian doctors' association, which it controls). The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain and other European countries plays an important role in the convoys (by joining radical leftist groups). Two Muslim Brotherhood members of the Egyptian People's Assembly and Muslim Brotherhood activists from Jordan participated in the Mavi Marmara convoy.

3) Financial aid: Interviewed in 2006, senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure Azzam al-Arian confirmed both the Muslim Brotherhood intention to give Hamas financial aid and its commitment to support the Palestinian people. According to the Egyptian media, after Operation Cast Lead the Muslim Brotherhood established a fund for the rebuilding of the Gaza Strip with the objective of raising $50 million for Hamas. It is unclear if the commitment was fulfilled.

5. Hosni Mubarak's regime was seriously concerned about the links between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. It was also concerned about the Hamas military takeover of the Gaza Strip (called "an Islamic emirate" by the Egyptian media), its military buildup (which it accomplished by smuggling arms into the Gaza Strip through Egypt) and the Islamization of the Gaza Strip. The regime was afraid the Gaza Strip would export terrorism, subversion and extremist Islam to Egypt, which would be a danger to Egypt's national security. As a result, the Egyptian regime sought to limit the links between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as far as possible. In our assessment, following Mubarak's ouster the Muslim Brotherhood will try to change those policies.
A Hamas gift for Eid al-Adha
A Hamas gift for Eid al-Adha, part of its da'wah activity. Left and right the figures are of Hassan al-Banna and Ahmed Yassin. The Hamas emblem is in the lower right-hand corner.

A poster of Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin.
A poster of Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin. To his left, pictures of admired Hamas figures. From top to bottom, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Hassan al-Banna and Abdallah Azzam.

1 For further information see the March 21, 2006 ITIC bulletin, "The Hamas Charter (1988): Overtly anti-Semitic and anti-West, radical Islamic in outlook, it stresses Hamas’ ideological commitment to destroy the State of Israel through a long-term holy war (jihad)" at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_charter.pdf

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

Doc's Talk