Khalil al-Anani
Mohamed Mursi's landmark victory, which has placed a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the highest political office, is an unprecedented
turning point in the history of the organisation that was founded in
1928. It will be some time before we will see how this development will
impact on the Muslim Brotherhood, but there is no doubt that we must
begin to contemplate it in a new light and build assessments
accordingly.
The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in the opposition; it has become a
major part of the new order. This was already apparent when its
candidates won the largest share of the seats in the parliament that was
elected after the revolution and that was recently dissolved. But
Mursi's presidential victory, which carries both symbolic and political
weight, crowned this reality.
Since the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood has been pushing to
secure one political foothold after another. It has been steadfast in
this drive in the face of defamatory campaigns conducted by "remnants"
of the former regime and SCAF's manoeuvring to check its advances. For
some time the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF have been engaged in a
cat-and-mouse game in which each is trying to outflank the other. SCAF's
most recent move was to issue an addendum to the Constitutional
Declaration which saw it assume some prerogatives normally enjoyed by
the president. Issued shortly before the run-offs in the presidential
elections, the addendum followed on the heels of a Supreme
Constitutional Court ruling that effectively dissolved parliament.
But the battle is far from over yet. In fact, it is entering a critical
phase. Will the military ultimately yield to the Muslim Brotherhood? It
is
difficult to predict at this point. However, if the Muslim Brothers
group continues as it has there is good reason to expect that within a
few years it will be the major power in Egypt. For the past three
decades the Muslim Brotherhood has withstood the waves of repression and
exclusion meted out by Mubarak's authoritarian regime. It succeeded in
acclimatising, developing ways to recuperate, dodge and buffer itself
from such blows. It did so successfully enough that the regime could no
longer keep it in isolation.
As one looks back over the Muslim Brotherhood's performance since the
early 1980s, one has to recognise that its coming to power was a matter
of time. Although officially banned, the group resolved to participate
in the political process and take advantage of every opening. By the end
of the 1980s its members had infiltrated a broad range of social and
professional sectors, positioning them to win a majority of seats in key
syndicates. The Mubarak regime may have responded by arresting key
Muslim Brotherhood members and dragging them before military trials, but
that only strengthened the Muslim Brothers' resolve. They invented new
tools and strategies, and the 2005 parliamentary elections marked an
important turning point. Muslim Brotherhood candidates won close to 20
per cent of the seats in the People's Assembly and could well have won
much more had it not been for the systematic rigging of the second and
third stages of the polls. The Muslim Brotherhood had turned itself into
the largest opposition parliamentary bloc of the Mubarak era. The game
of cat-and-mouse resumed until the revolution erupted on 25 January
2011.
The revolution created an enormous political vacuum that the Muslim
Brotherhood seemed best poised to fill. It was difficult to imagine any
other political force capable of doing so in view of the absence of
identifiable leadership to the Egyptian revolution. With no groups to
play off against the Muslim Brothers, the new military rulers of the
country had little choice but to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood as the
only available partner in steering the transitional phase.
The two sides played it by ear as they took one step after the other.
The military, long excluded from the political arena under Mubarak, did
not have sufficient experience in dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Its initial tactic, therefore, was to attempt to contain the Muslim
Brotherhood by giving it a greater role to play during the transitional
period. The first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections, which were
cleaner than any in the past, were evidence not so much of the army's
commitment to democracy but of its inability to find an alternative to
the Muslim Brotherhood. That the Brotherhood would win the largest
number of seats was a foregone conclusion. Had the Muslim Brotherhood
not exercised some restraint on its ambitions it could well have come
away with an absolute parliamentary majority.
As the generals became more adept at the game they began to try to
hem in the Muslim Brothers in an indirect way. They handed the Brothers a
parliament that did not have full powers and influence. They rejected
successive bids to dismiss the government and they attempted to
intervene in the creation of the constitutional assembly.
By the time the presidential elections drew near, the confrontation
had reached a tipping point. SCAF attempted to curtail the Muslim
Brotherhood's ambitions, firstly, by disqualifying its first candidate
and then by pushing old regime figures into the race. At one stage the
prospect of a facedown between three heavyweights -- the Muslim
Brotherhood's strongman Khairat El-Shater, former vice president and
chief of General Intelligence Omar Suleiman, and Salafi preacher Hazem
Abu Ismail -- looked like such a political powder keg that the army was
forced to disqualify all three. The Muslim Brotherhood were astute
enough to have a back-up candidate ready. In response, SCAF fielded
former regime figure Ahmed Shafik, and the two sides resumed the game of
cat-and-mouse.
The ruling military was quick to seize on divisions in the
revolutionary camp, which fielded several candidates in the race and
complicated the game. So much greater was the surprise, then, when Mursi
and Shafik emerged from the first electoral round as run-off
contenders. The conflict now entered a new phase, a facedown between two
relatively weak candidates, one of whom had shed competition from
former MB member Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, the other who had left Amr
Moussa behind. Perhaps, at this stage, SCAF felt a Shafik victory was at
hand. The Muslim Brotherhood's popularity had plummeted, it was at
loggerheads with revolutionary forces and was facing a mudslinging,
scaremongering campaign in the media. However, the Muslim Brothers
quickly rallied. They reordered their playing cards and heeded some of
the lessons of the first round. They managed to get more than a million
of their supporters to the polls hours before the ballot closed.
Realising a Mursi victory was inevitable SCAF engineered the
dismissal of parliament and issued an addendum to the Constitutional
Declaration in order to forestall the Muslim Brotherhood's march to
power.
It would be wrong to assume the Muslim Brotherhood-SCAF confrontation
ended with Mursi's presidential victory. SCAF may appear to have
acquiesced for the moment, having bowed to international pressure not to
meddle with the election results and in the face of the shaky consensus
the Muslim Brotherhood has belatedly forged with some other political
forces. But the generals still possess some trump cards. Not least, they
remain in control of the institutions of what is now being referred to
as the "deep state". They can also capitalise on existing suspicions
towards the Muslim Brotherhood. It will not be long before a new round
in the MB-SCAF game unfolds.
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