AL-MONITOR
Theoretically,
the process of writing a constitution implies a state of accord between
the constituents of society in order to successfully draft road maps
for future generations. But, in reality, the process involves fierce
political, social and moral struggles among political and societal
forces that strive to put their mark on — and protect their interests
through — the new constitution.
The greater the ideological and political divide that exists between
political forces, the harder and more strenuous the process of drafting a
constitution becomes. Therefore, mistaken is he who thinks that
constitutions are mere generalized texts that emerge from nothing. In
fact, they represent the pinnacle of political struggle between all
forces.
Contrary to what some might believe, the battle to write constitutions
is harsher and more complicated in democratic countries or in countries
that have undergone popular revolutions — as was the case in the Arab
world — as opposed to what occurs in authoritarian states, where
constitutions merely reflect and serve to implement the will of the
ruler, without any participation by the people.
Now that the Islamists have ascended to power in more than one Arab country, they have become instrumental parties in the drafting of constitutionsin
the post-Arab Spring era. This fact leads to many questions, not only
to do with the content and wording of new Arab constitutions, but also
the manner in which the process of drafting constitutions is managed.
The ensuing conflict seems the more pronounced when it comes to Egypt,
the subject of this article, where a fierce battle rages between all
participating and non-participating factions in the process of drafting
the new constitution.
Away from the difficulties surrounding the process of forming the
Constituent Assembly, which the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists were
accused of trying to dominate, a real battle is underway to decide the
content and wording of the new constitution. Remarkably, the battle to
write the Egyptian constitution is not confined to the Islamists on one
end and the liberals and secularists on the other, but rages on within
the Islamists’ ranks, between the Brotherhood and the Salafists, as part
of the wider-ranging fight between the two factions that erupted at the
onset of the revolution, and which has taken numerous forms and spread
to affect society and the media, in both the public and the private
arenas.
In general terms, four main issues affect the struggle between the
Islamists and other political factions concerning the drafting of the
new Egyptian constitution. The first of these issues is the state’s
identity, which, to the Islamists — particularly the Salafists
— represents a matter of life or death; for they, like other Islamists
that came before them, entered the political arena for the purpose of
“preserving the nation’s identity.” Many of their leaders and sheikhs
justify their heavy involvement in politics with the pretext of
protecting the country from the dangers posed by secularists and liberals. This contention does not fall under the purview of this article but reflects the central concern of the Salafists.
It is a battle that seems artificial and unrealistic for a multitude of
reasons. On one hand, there is no real danger to the Egyptian state’s
identity, which has remained well established for centuries, and which
no faction, regardless of its size and influence, can manipulate or
force to conform to that faction’s narrow ideological or partisan
beliefs without risking future prospects and popular support.
On the other hand, many liberals and secularists acknowledge the Arabic
and Islamic character of the Egyptian state; in fact, some of them
express pride in belonging to this state, in a broad civilized sense,
away from any form of religious and sectarian polarization. Here, we are
not talking about the small extremist secularist minority which
disassociates itself from its cultural context, or which espouses a
narrow-minded and chauvinistic view of the national identity. We are,
rather, talking about the wider liberal movement that encompasses
factions and organizations that are proud of their national identity
without subordinating or prostrating themselves to anyone.
Paradoxically, the first Egyptian constitution of the modern era,
drafted in 1923, established the Arab and Islamic identity of the
country, and came into effect at a time when Islamist movements and
parties were nonexistent. This occurrence repeated itself again when the
1954 and 1956 constitutions were drafted.
However, it is necessary to distinguish between the position of the
Salafists and that of the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the question of
identity. The Salafists believe that the issue of identity must be
defined in the constitution in such a manner as to make any further
discussion or interpretation moot. This means transforming the
constitution from a general text that guides to one that deals with
narrow details through the use of inflexible, centralized and
unimaginative wording. The Salafists, for example, want to change the
second article of the old constitution which states that the
“principles” of Islamic Shariah law be used as the main source of
legislation, wanting to either replace the world “principles” with the
word “rulings” or completely delete the reference. This is justified by
the Salafi leadership as necessary in order to prevent any form of
interpretation of the word “principles,” which might be used by
secularists or liberals to further their agendas. On the other hand, the
Brotherhood has no qualms with the text remaining generalized,
considering it sufficient to establish the role of Shariah law in
legislation while ensuring that Christians and Jews maintain their right
to resort to their own religious teachings in matters pertaining to
personal status or family law.
The second issue pertains to the spirit of the constitution. Some
Islamists, especially the Salafists, deal with the constitutional matter
from an interest-driven standpoint — if not an opportunistic one — for
this historic chance to change it might not repeat itself. In addition
to tangential and sometimes cosmetic issues, the wording used to amend
constitutional articles points to the fact that we are witnessing the
drafting of an “Islamist” constitution in the narrow partisan sense and
not in its broad civilized sense. This would mean that constitutional
articles would become consistent with the ideological and political
vision of the Islamists as a political faction.
The danger in that lies not only in the political vision of the
Islamists — with which many would disagree — but also in the transition
from the general to the narrow focus. Considering the level of rigidity
in deciding major public matters which should have been easily agreed
upon, what will happen when it comes time to discuss matters relating to
personal and public freedoms, matters which led to the revolution of
January 25?
While the Brotherhood seems less rigid than
its Salafist brethren in this regard, its silence is caused by
either its preoccupation with matters of the state following Mohammed
Morsi’s win in the presidential elections or its desire not to be
publicly attacked or ridiculed by the Salafists regarding their
adherence to Islam, which might encourage the latter to proceed in their
attempt to change the constitution in order to make it compatible with
their religious ideologies.
The Salafists, for example, insisted that Al-Azhar religious authorities
be considered the only acceptable reference in the interpretation of
the second article of the constitution, which states that the principles
of Shariah law be used as the main source for legislation, an idea
which many intellectuals and political activists condemned and Al-Azhar
authorities rejected, while the Brotherhood had no comment on it,
despite being an idea that establishes a never before seen precedent in
Egyptian constitutional history that might have negative future
repercussions.
The third issue pertains to the form of the country’s political system
and the president’s powers. The Islamists clearly prefer that a hybrid
presidential system be adopted, wherein parliament and the presidency
hold great powers concurrently. This idea goes against the wishes of
many political activists who would rather see a traditional
parliamentarian system where the people’s will is the real source of
power and sovereignty.
In fact, there exists a difference of opinion between the Salafists and
the Brotherhood regarding this issue. While the Salafists prefer to
divide state powers between the president and parliament, the
Brotherhood tends to prefer giving the president wider-ranging powers
when it comes to the appointment of ministers and the right to dissolve
the parliament and Shura Council, as well as the right to declare war
and to amend the constitution, as was pointed out by the renowned
Brotherhood lawyerSobhi Saleh in the media recently.
The fourth and final issue revolves around matters dealing with freedoms
and public rights cited in the constitution, an issue that is supposed
to be discussed soon. The Islamists will most probably want to restrict
public and personal freedoms, or at least make them fall under the
purview of religion, thus redefining their scope, definition and content
in accordance with their own understanding and interpretation of their
meaning.
This issue will raise a lot of problems and cause a great deal of anger
among a wide swathe of intellectuals and political activists who view
these freedoms as the only real guarantee that oppression and domination
won’t be resurrected in Egypt, a country that suffered from such
behavior throughout the past three decades. As such, the difference in
opinion is great between those intellectuals and the Islamists,
particularly the Salafists, when it comes to freedoms and their scope on
a personal and public level. For, instead of being a way to reshape
political and social relations within the framework of a balanced social
contract, the process of drafting the new Egyptian constitution
becomes, as a result of the narrow-minded vision of some Islamists, a
cause of contention that preserves the state of ideological and
political polarization among Egyptians.
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