It’s
time, a dozen years after September 11 and following Islamist coups in
the Gaza Strip; Islamist electoral revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia,
Lebanon, and Turkey; and a probable Islamist victory during the next
year in Syria--to rethink completely our view of al-Qaida.
First,
al-Qaida wasn’t involved in any of these events and several more big
developments we could list. Second, al-Qaida hasn't disappeared,
contrary to the Obama Administration's claims. And third, the American
homeland is now demonstrably well-protected from terrorist attacks so
consequently while success on this front remains important it need not
be the top U.S. strategic priority.
So let me propose a new way of looking at things:
Aside
from being a problem of counter-terrorism—that is, of law
enforcement—al-Qaida is no longer important. It certainly isn’t
strategically important nor is it important for the biggest and most
essential U.S. national interests. That doesn't mean al-Qaida should be
ignored yet combatting it is relatively manageable.
This
alternative view is especially significant at a moment when the new CIA
director is the father—and the president, secretary of state, and
secretary of defense the avid fans—of a theory that places al-Qaida at
the center of the world stage. Basically their theory goes like this:
Al-Qaida
is terribly evil and a threat to America. It must be fought. But all
Islamism—except for al-Qaida—can be moderated and won over by a
sympathetic U.S. policy. The Islamists are the best people to handle and
defeat al-Qaida and by giving the people what they want--Islam running
the society--their desire to commit terrorism or attack America will
subside. After all, if the United States shows itself to be Islamism's
best friend, why should Islamists be angry at it? This strategy began
with Obama's Cairo speech which was a profoundly pro-Islamist statement,
and that's why he invited Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders to sit in
the front row.
In
other words, put your enemies in power and they are no longer your
enemies. Moreover, once Islamists get into power they will get entangled
in party politics, paving roads, running schools, and doing all the
other things that governments do. They will lose their radicalism and
certainly stop using violence.
Now
there’s a lot to say against this theory. It either hasn’t worked
historically on other radical ideologies—Nazism, fascism, Communism—or
at least only after a very long time in power (including millions of
victims) often mixed in with military debacles. It can be said to have
worked with radical Arab nationalism but only after 50 years and
multiple military defeats. This was also the precise theory that
underpinned the 1990s’ Oslo peace process and assumptions about Yasir
Arafat settling down to become a great and practical statesman. And that
didn’t work either.
Moreover,
it ignores the fundamental extremism, anti-Americanism, antisemitism,
anti-Christian, and anti-women tenets of Islamist philosophy, which are
rooted in reasonable (but not the only possible) interpretations of
Islam. And it also leaves out the power gained once radicals take over
institutions. Sure they’ll be running the schools but that doesn't mean
they will become entangled in planning curricula so much as to persuade
people they should grow up to be radical Islamists and jihad warriors.
Finally,
all Islamists want Islamist rule and the application of Sharia as the
law. Some will talk and do nothing; others will talk and organize;
others will use violence, and among those who organize there are those
who can seize state power—in Muslim majority countries—and those that
will fail. The Muslim Brotherhood is brilliant tactically; al-Qaida has
only one note in its orchestra, endless struggle and terrorism rather
than political maneuvering and building a mass base.
Usually,
as you can see, when I talk about this issue I stress the non-al-Qaida
side of the equation. But it’s time to reanalyze al-Qaida also.
The
importance
of al-Qaida in the history of Islamism is actually more marginal than
it might seem from the massive study and headlines it generated.
Al-Qaida had three innovations of importance:
--That
the movement be international, fighting simultaneously on all fronts.
While the Muslim Brotherhood had been an international group it had a
limited number of branches, only four or real significance. However,
this only succeeded because the organization—especially after the U.S.
destruction of the center in
Afghanistan and long before Usama bin Ladin’s assassination—was so
loose. Basically, local groups could simply affiliate with al-Qaida
without being its actual creation. Being active everywhere and not
concentrating one's forces is a formula for survival but also a recipe
for ultimate defeat.
--That
it would make the West and particularly the United States the main
target of attack, most notably in the September 11, 2001, assault. This
point, however, became less salient once September 11
happened. What are you going to do for an encore? Tighter Western
security made repeating the feat more difficult. Moreover it became
possible for al-Qaida to operate in Muslim-majority countries. As a
factor in Western psychology and policy, then, al-Qaida’s focus on the
West remained hugely important but as a political strategy it was
largely abandoned except for scattered “reminder” attack attempts.
Today, al-Qaida is mainly attacking rivals in Yemen, Somalia, and Syria.
Even in Iraq the main target wasn't the United States itself.
--That
the movement would focus on one activity, terrorist attacks, and try to
carry out a “permanent revolution.” In other words, it was always the
right time to wage armed struggle and that battle wouldn’t stop until
the movement was wiped out. Other, smaller groups had taken that road
in Egypt but had not lasted very long before being destroyed by the
government. Understandably, this approach was not a great revolutionary
strategy, especially against more sophisticated groups that built mass
bases and knew how to change gears, especially the Muslim Brotherhood
and even other Salafist groups.
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So
while Egypt had an Islamist revolution it was quite different from the
one envisioned by the 1990s' Salafists or by the al-Qaida supporters.
Indeed, it was a revolution that, contrary to the 1990s’
revolutionaries, was made with the backing of the army and, contrary to
the al-Qaida revolutionaries, was made with the backing of the United
States!
The same point applies to Syria and Tunisia as well as, in a different way, to Turkey, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.
Of
course, once the regime as overthrown and elections are held terrorism
is no longer needed. You don’t have to raid police stations for guns if
you control the military; don’t have to kill oppositionists with bombs
when you can set the police force on them; don’t need to rob banks to
raise
funds when you have the keys to the national treasury.
And
you don’t need to use terrorism to overthrow the regime if you have
already overthrown the regime. Indeed, you don’t need to use terrorism
against the regime if you are the regime. Terror, Brennan says, is
merely a tactic. He’s right. It is a way of reaching a goal and that
goal is seizing state power, fundamentally transforming the society, and
using that power to battle U.S. influence, subvert the remaining
non-Islamist regime,
and try to wipe out Israel.
Consider
this historical analogy. Once Hitler took power he dismantled the storm
troopers, even killing their leaders, because he didn’t need them any
more. The Bolsheviks wiped out the anarchists and Social Revolutionary
Party which had committed so much terrorism in earlier years. Lenin's
own brother was a terrorist who was executed by the Czarist regime. When
Lenin took power, terrorism of the old type disappeared. There was
only, as in Nazi Germany, state
repression. Now that's, according to the way the Obama Administration
sees things, real progress!
The
Muslim Brotherhood goes nowhere near that far. The Salafist groups are
still quite useful for indoctrinating citizens and intimidating
opponents. When you want Christians taught a lesson, women put down,
and an embassy stormed, or an Islamist constitution passed, the
Salafists provide wonderful and when necessary deniable service.
Here
is an important principle in studying the politics of this contemporary
era: Violence (including terrorism) is not the main measure of
radicalism. Instead, the way to judge the extremism of a group is the
organization’s ideology, goals, and seriousness in seeking total
victory. Strategic and tactical flexibility should be taken into account
but do not mitigate the threat posed by the objective toward which any
political force is striving.
Finally, the bottom line is different from what both sides of the debate have claimed:
Ironically,
the United States has a counterterrorist policy but it does not have a
national security strategy. It has a
way of reducing anti-American terrorism—let or even help Islamists
seize power—but not of anti-American regimes being far more dangerous
than a bunch of guys in caves.
If terrorism was ever merely a law enforcement issue that is certainly true today in terms of al-Qaida.
Instead, what the Obama Administration has done is like trying to reduce crime by turning over the
cities to the Mafia and letting it make the laws and also run the police and court systems.
Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, Israel: An Introduction, has just been published by Yale University
Press. Other recent books include The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636933%22
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