Thursday, April 11, 2013

Towards an end-game in Palestine - Israel - While imagining the future

the 'thinking' on the other side‏


Jeff Halper


Last September ICAHD, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, which had long argued that the two-state solution was dead, decided to bite the bullet and endorse a one-state solution. We first circulated a draft among our Palestinian partners for comment. The reaction was deafening in its silence. Either fewer of our counterparts than we thought were willing to abandon the two-state solution, the goal of their national liberation struggle these past 25 years, for one state, or they objected to our framing it within a framework of bi-nationalism. In the end we pulled back, putting out instead a position paper in which we tried to insert a critical Israeli voice into the one-state formulation. It is clear that despite the fact that most Palestinians realize that the two-state solution is gone, they have as yet to shift to a one-state solution in meaningful numbers.


While I understand the dilemma of moving from a solution that, in principle at least, is acceptable to the international community to one that has little chance of being accepted, a nagging feeling of frustration and fear has dogged me ever since. How could we be in the midst of a political struggle without a political end-game? What do we say to political decision-makers, the general public or our own activists when they ask: What is it exactly that you want? “Ending the Occupation” provides a partial answer at best. Indeed, we shifted to the one-state solution because, in our view, the Occupation will end and a Palestinian state will not emerge in that small and fragmented territory. At the same time, we fully appreciate the Palestinians reluctance to give up a national liberation struggle in favor of a struggle for civil rights, which is what a one-state solution inclusive of Israeli Jews would entail, even if it was achievable.

We are, in short, “between solutions.” We are in a state of transition from the two-state solution to something yet undefined. That is to be expected: political struggles must adapt to changing circumstances and adjust their strategies and even their end-goals accordingly. But if we are to maintain our political momentum, we must transit fairly quickly to an end-game that genuinely resolves the conflict. BDS (boycotts, divestment, sanctions) is a valuable tactic for keeping the issue alive, but it cannot replace an end-game and an effective strategy for achieving it.

This paper attempts to hasten the process of transitioning to a new end-game by making the case for a democratic yet bi-national state. Not that this necessarily “the” solution, and it certainly needs to be fleshed out, but discussing it helps clarify the issues at stake; it bring out fundamental differences of view upon which a constructive and much-needed exchanges is based. It is incumbent upon us, the grassroots civil society, to formulate solutions that, if not ideal, contain elements that progressives can support and advocate. For governments will not do this; they are not our partners. Rather than resolving conflicts, the international community, including the UN, merely manages them. And if a fellow government like Israel can subdue the Palestinians to a point where they cease to disrupt the international system, they can live perfectly well with occupation, apartheid and warehousing. It is up to us to formulate a genuine and just solution -- or at least direction – and then generate pressure from below on governments to act. That’s just the way it works. So if this paper can help crystallize the issues and catalyze discussion, it will have served its purpose.

The Range of Possible Solutions

The best place to start is to survey the various “solutions” that are out there, each espoused by a different community of interest and therefore of significance even if in the end they prove unacceptable. The range of possible solutions and their advocates goes something like this:

  • Two States (majority of Palestinians living in Palestine and, in principle, most Israeli Jews). The internationally-accepted solution to the conflict envisions partitioning the country between the two peoples so that each enjoy national self-determination – although Israel would occupy 78% of country and the Palestinian state only 22%. The two-state solution is also supported by the majority of Israeli Jews. In a Peace Index survey in 1999, before the complete collapse of the Oslo peace process, it garnered the support of 58% (only 15% favored the bi-national model, while 7.5% said there was no way out of the conflict). The number of those supporting the two-state solution rose to 78% in 2003, during the second Intifada. This was not because Israeli Jews were convinced that a two-state solution would actually resolve the conflict, explains Tamar Hermann of the Peace Index, but because they desired “separation” from the Arabs – a “divorce,” in the inimical words of Ehud Barak.

Of course, in politics one can never shut the door completely on solutions, and the same is true of the two-state solution. It could be salvaged if

  • Israel accepted the General Assembly vote of November 2012 recognizing Palestinian sovereignty over the Occupied Territories and agreed that Palestine become a full member state of the UN;

  • Israel formally acknowledged the Palestinians’ right to national self-determination within the 1967 lines (never done to date); and

  • The settlements which would fall under Palestinian rule would be integrated, Israeli residents allowed to stay in their homes as Israeli citizens living in mixed cities in Palestine, a situation in which the Occupation could be ended without having to physically dismantle the settlements, the major obstacle to achieving a two-state solution.

All this being highly unlikely, and with the US and Europe unwilling to force Israel out of the Occupied Territory, the “two-state solution” exists on paper only. Hence the necessary shift to a bi-national solution. Nevertheless, PNGO, the Palestinian NGO Network of almost 100 left-oriented associations, keeps the two-state solution alive by continuing to promote three fundamental principles for resolving the conflict:

  1. Ending Israel’s occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall;
  2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and
  3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.

     ICAHD and a number of critical left Israeli organizations accept these principles. The vast majority of Israeli Jews, even among the majority that support in principle the two-state solution, consider them, however, merely a another means of achieving a single Palestinian-dominated state.

  • Two States: Apartheid (Labor/Center-Left Israeli governments). Successive Israel governments have expressed vague support for the two-state solution, either coerced out of them by American leaders or hinted at. For Labor-led Israeli governments, the two-state solution has always meant three things: (1) separating Israelis from Palestinians (hafrada); (2) seizing control of the Occupied Territory – “East” Jerusalem, which Israel has formally annexed, the massive settlement “blocs” in the West Bank, the Jordan Valley and the country’s borders, airspace and even the electromagnetic sphere – including all its resources, from water to tourism; and (3) finding collaborators who will agree to Palestinian autonomy on as little non-contiguous land as possible without compromising Israeli security. Indeed, the settlement blocs and the route of the Wall clearly delineate a fait accompli, a truncated Bantustan on only 15% of historic Palestine. The only problem left to resolve is how to normalize it. Apartheid, ironically, is the plan of Israel’s center/(Zionist) left; it is the liberal Israeli approach to “peace.”

  • One Ethnocratic State (Hamas, right-wing Zionists, some anti-Zionist Israeli Jews and (perhaps) a growing number of Palestinian intellectuals). There is a remarkable, mirror-like correspondence between Hamas and the right-wing in Israel, the latter ranging from the Likud through the religious settler movement. Both contend that Palestine/Israel is one indivisible country that “belongs” exclusively to Palestinians or Israelis respectively, and for both the claim to exclusivity rests primarily on religion (Palestine being Islamic waqf land; the Land of Israel given to the Jews by God). Although Zionism secularized that claim, its ethnocratic nationalism continued to assert an exclusive claim over the country. Both would allow the “others” to continue living in the country, but only as second-class citizens. Hamas would permit individual Jews to continue living in Palestine, but as Jews, not a national minority called Israelis. By the same token, right-wing Zionists would tolerate individual Arabs living in Israel, but also not as a national Palestinian minority.

There are also voices among a number of prominent anti-Zionist Israeli Jews, Palestinian intellectuals and academics sympathetic to the Palestinian cause denying the very existence and legitimacy of “Israeli.” Viewing Jewishness as merely a cultural or religious identity but not a national one (or rather an “invented” and therefore fictional national one), they have gravitated to the position that Zionism was nothing but a form of settler colonialism, and that therefore “Israel” and “Israelis” are nothing more than artificial and illegitimate colonial constructs.

Finally, “warehousing,” a strategy of Likud/center-right Israeli governments, is yet another variation on the theme of one ethnocratic state. A form of imprisonment (the term “warehousing” comes from the prison world), it is never declared as policy or even mentioned; rather, it simply “becomes” by default the political reality. For Israel’s past and present Likud/center-right governments, even apartheid represents too much of a concession – after all, it requires the establishment of a Bantustan. Netanyahu & Co. say: 15% is too much of “our” land to give to the Arabs. Why should they get anything? In their view the status quo is perfect: there is no political process, the Palestinians have been pacified (to a significant extent by their own American-trained PA militias) and Israel de facto rules the entire country. Besides mild criticism, the international community stands firmly behind Israel, or at least will never sanction it. Netanyahu & Co. believe they can get away with warehousing. So why compromise on any “solution”? After the 2013 election, his government declared its goal of “a million Jews in Judea and Samaria.”

Despite a certain internal logic that might contain elements of truth (especially reference to Zionism’s settler colonial behavior), none of these options are inclusive and none, in my view, would win the support of progressives.

  • One State (Palestinians on the left). Although the contours of a solution shifted over time, one element shared by both Palestinians and Israelis of the left remained the same for a long time: whatever form peace eventually took, it would be inclusive. On one level this is expressed most explicitly in two documents: the “One State Declaration” issued in London on 29 November 2007 by the One Democratic State Group, and a similar if more detailed declaration entitled One State in Palestine, which calls for a Republic in Historic Palestine. Both were authored primarily by Palestinian intellectuals with important input from a number of Israelis and others. The principles they suggest as the basis of a single state reflected express the values and structures of liberal Western democracies. The London Declaration begins by affirming that “The historic land of Palestine belongs to all who live in it and to those who were expelled or exiled from it since 1948, regardless of religion, ethnicity, national origin or current citizenship status,” and adds: “Any system of government must be founded on the principle of equality in civil, political, social and cultural rights for all citizens.” Both documents naturally include provisions of restorative justice: the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees, of course, and their inclusion in the building of the new state, together with “redress for the devastating effects of decades of Zionist colonization in the pre- and post-state period.” 

What these declarations omit, however, is any reference to national or collective rights. Since their Palestinian signers continue to invoke their national rights, it is not clear what status Israeli Jews will in fact enjoy in this conception of a democratic state. Even if Israeli Jews are “allowed” to stay in Palestine as individual Jewish citizens, would they ever agree to stop being “Israelis”? A lot rides on this question, even if it is left unstated, and I will return to the issues of inclusivity and equality.

  • One Bi-National State Dominated by Israeli Jews, With Palestinian Autonomy (the settler movement). Committed to the idea of an indivisible Land of Israel, the Yesha (Judea, Samaria, Gaza) Council of Settlements proposed in 2003 a bi-national state divided into ten ethno-national cantons under a single federal government. But separation of Jews from Arabs and Jewish control of the entire country are also fundamental principles for the settlers. In their plan, then, only two of the cantons would be Palestinian, thus guaranteeing an overwhelming Jewish majority. Another version of federalism, advocated by Elazar and academics of the Israeli right, envision a country where the Palestinians remain but as Jordanian citizens.

  • One Democratic Bi-National State (Anti- or Post-Zionist Israeli Jews; critical Palestinian intellectuals and a good number of Palestinians in Israel and the Diaspora). In my view, the majority of anti- or post-Zionist Israeli Jews support a bi-national alternative over a unitary democracy. Although historically only the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine supported such an outcome, a majority of Palestinians would probably accept it – or at least not oppose – if only out of an acknowledgment of the political fact of Israel’s existence. The vision of a democratic bi-national state is fairly straightforward. Two peoples share a common country – the hyphen in Palestine-Israel assumes prime importance – the challenge being to find a balance between collective rights of national self-determination and equal individual civil rights. No easy task, but as Meron Benvenisti and others have pointed out, a bi-national reality already exists and functions de facto, despite official Israel efforts to contain and thwart it.

Bridging a Growing Gap: Can a Common Vision Be Achieved?

So where does this all leave us? Which alternative do we choose that is as just and achievable as possible? Any political struggle is characterized by a necessary give-and-take between ideology, analysis and justice on the one hand and political realities on the other. The absence of meaningful political movement on the Israeli/Palestinian issue over the last few years and the steady advancement of Israel’s “facts on the ground” to a point where there is no more possibility of even a small Palestinian state has destroyed that give-and-take. The shift to the “settler colonial” discourse by many of the most articulate Palestinian intellectuals and activists carries the risk of disconnecting political analysis from political reality (in which two peoples inhabit the country), thus neutralizing as a useful contribution to peace-making. Its concomitant, the withdrawal of Palestinian activists from working with even anti-Zionist Israeli activists under the rubric “anti-normalization,” is similarly self-defeating. That is not to say that an argument could not be made that Zionism was indeed a settler colonial movement and therefore Israelis do not constitute a legitimate nationality – Collins, Piterberg, Shafir and Veracini make a strong case for that – but following the inner logic of that analysis to the exclusion of political realities leads to political formulations that structurally prevent Israelis and Palestinians from arriving at a common framework of coexistence.

Indeed, an equally strong case could be made that Zionism, for all its settler colonial crimes of displacement and replacement against the Palestinian people, was in fact a genuine national movement, as least in its initial impulse. Self-determination means just that, self-determination. Say what they want, Palestinian critics of Zionism are not those who decide whether Jews are a nation, a people, a culture or just a religion, whether they have a genuine tie to the Land of Israel or whether they in fact possess the right of self-determination. This is so even if their identity and narrative are “invented,” as are all national identities, including that of the Palestinians. Settler colonial is not the only possible framework for viewing the problem; one could make just as strong a case that we are witnessing a clash of legitimate national movements. Be that as it may, I will make an assumption here that no solution will win widespread acceptance unless it conforms to human rights and international law, unless it embodies substantive justice regarding all the parties involved, unless it is inclusive. No solution that entails the forced expulsion of an entire community or their exclusion from full participation in a future polity will or should be accepted. As Khaled Mashal has said: “Our concern is to liberate Palestine, not to create more refugees.”

I am saying all this because the status of Israeli Jews in the Palestinian state envisioned by the authors of the London and One Democratic State Declarations is left unclear; indeed, the question is either ignored or fudged. True, the Declarations speak of the “creation of a non-sectarian state that does not privilege the rights of one ethnic or religious group over another,” affirming that “Any system of government must be founded on the principle of equality in civil, political, social and cultural rights for all citizens.” In this they return to the PLO’s notion of a secular, democratic state. But what of the collective national rights of both peoples? The answer is vague: “Ethnic, religious, cultural or national minorities,” says the London Declaration, “shall be protected by law but not assigned any specific rights.” Where does that leave Palestinians and Israeli Jews, neither of whom can be described as “national minorities”? Are they both being expected to renounce their national identities and rights of self-determination in order to become simply individual voters? “One should distinguish between ‘bi-national’ and ‘secular democratic’ states,” cautioned Edward Said. “These terms cannot be used interchangeably….”

And is this really the whole story? In an early discussion of the one-state solution, Nasseer Aruri argued that “A solution will require determined, systematic, and protracted struggle unifying Palestinians as a whole with Israeli Jews who wish to be neither masters of another people, privileged in an apartheid system, nor colonial settlers denying the existence of the indigenous peoples and wishing for their disappearance.” Over the past 4-5 years, however, with the rise of “Zionism-as-settler-colonialism,” the discourse of the Palestinian left has changed – and become less transparent. How does one reconcile the principle of “a non-sectarian state that does not privilege the rights of one ethnic or religious group over another” with this: “There can be no ‘inherent or acquired Jewish right to self determination in Palestine that is equivalent, even morally symmetric, to the Palestinian right to self determination’ as this would blur ‘the essential differences between the inalienable rights of the indigenous population and the acquired rights of the colonial-settler population’”? – the latter position articulated by Omar Barghouti and quoted approvingly by Ali Abunimah, both signatories to the London Declaration.

Such a view, shared though not usually articulated so clearly by many of the Palestinian left, begins to resemble the position of Hamas (or, inversely, the settlers), based though it is on anti-colonial indigenous rights rather than religion. It leaves unclear the civil status of Israelis/Jews in this one democratic but not bi-national state. At best, this would lead to an ethnocracy comparable to Israel today, with Israeli Jews possessing the unacceptable civil status suffered by “Israeli Arabs” today. Or it might take the form of Zimbabwe, where a European minority was allowed to stay but ended up with limited civil rights, or even an Algeria where the French settler colonialists were forced to leave immediately upon liberation. In short, crucial issues of collective rights in a single state have been left deliberately vague.

The urgent task before us, I contend, is to reunite our analysis with the political and sociological realities on the ground – or risk rendering ourselves theoretically correct but politically irrelevant. How can we take the disparate elements and principles contained in the various scenarios presented above (those we can consider accepting, of course) and begin formulating a common vision of a just and comprehensive peace? Permit me to offer a set of fundamental elements shared by progressives upon which, I would argue, any just and workable resolution of the conflict must be based. Following that, we can return to the various scenarios, combining the best elements they offer and fleshing them out until we begin to arrive at a program for which we can actively advocate among governments and the international public alike.

The Essential Elements of a Just and Sustainable Israeli-Palestinian Peace

What, then, are those fundamental elements upon which a just peace must be based? Building on what has been suggested in past discussions and declarations as well as upon my own analysis of what is just and achievable, I offer these seven as a starting point:

1. A just peace and the process leading up to it must conform to human rights, international law and UN resolutions in respect to both the collective and individual rights of both peoples. The Oslo process failed primarily because it was based only on power relations, and if power alone determines the outcome, Israel wins and the conflict, as we are witnessing today, becomes irresolvable. Inequality and oppression are inevitable when human rights and international law are brushed aside.

2. A just peace must accept the bi-national reality of P/I, and be inclusive of both peoples; national identities cannot be ignored or denied. A just peace must be inclusive. Two peoples reside in Palestine-Israel, and the collective as well as individual rights of both must be respected and protected. Since both peoples aspire to national self-determination, a right firmly embodied in international law, national expression must be provided for both Palestinians and Israelis. The two peoples are not merely ethnic groups in a larger national society, or simply a collection of individuals, but comprise national entities in themselves. The right to self-determination, to participation without discrimination in public affairs, to develop and advance one’s community economically, socially, culturally, and politically, has been authoritatively upheld by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 2004 Advisory Opinion: “The Court also notes that the principle of self-determination of peoples has been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) cited above, pursuant to which ‘Every  State has  the  duty to refrain  from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to [in that resolution] […] of their right to self- determination.’”  

3. A just peace must find a balance between collective rights (self-determination) and individual rights (democracy).

4. A just peace requires that the refugee issue be addressed directly. Eighty percent of the Palestinians are refugees; therefore any sustainable peace is dependent upon the just resolution of this issue. A “package” of three elements is required: Israeli acceptance of the refugees’ right of return as set down in UN General Assembly resolution 194, rather than limited “goodwill” or “humanitarian” gestures; Israeli acknowledgement of its responsibility in creating the refugee issue, a symbolic act upon which closure and eventual reconciliation between the peoples depends; and only then technical solutions involving a mutually agreed-upon combination of repatriation, resettlement elsewhere and compensation. 

5.   A just peace must be economically viable. All the inhabitants of Palestine/Israel must have equal access to the country’s basic resources and economic institutions. Here post-apartheid South Africa presents a cautionary tale: how a unitary state was created that endowed all the country’s citizens with equal political rights but economically retained a structure that has rendered much of the Black African population a permanent underclass. Once viable economic and political structures are in place, the Palestinian Diaspora can be expected to invest in the country, supporting especially in the Palestinian sector, just as the Jewish Diaspora has done. This constitutes a resource of major significance that is seldom taken into account in discussions of the Palestinians’ future or their ability to achieve parity with Israeli Jews.

6. A just peace must address the security concerns of all in the region.

7. A just peace must be regional in scope. Israel-Palestine is too small a unit to address all the issues at stake, be they refugees, water, security, economic development, environmental sustainability or others that are by nature regional. Such a broadening of any peace process is necessary if Israel-Palestine is to have a suitable regional environment in which to integrate. The almost exclusive focus on Israel/Palestine has obfuscated another crucial dimension of the conflict: its regional context.

Three Stages Towards a Just and Comprehensive Middle East Peace

Stage 1: A Bi-National State in Palestine/Israel

All proposed solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict begin with a state structure, whether one or two states. This is not because states are appropriate frameworks for resolving the conflict – in fact, states are an extremely inappropriate colonial imposition that only foment ethnic conflict; it simply reflects the fact that the international system is organized on the basis of discreet states.

One reason why states themselves are inappropriate to Middle Eastern societies has to do with their inherent hostility to the very cultural, religious and political groups of which they are comprised. States consist of central governments claiming rule over an atomized collection of individual citizens who are expected to demonstrate loyalty solely to the state itself as the exclusive repository of “national” identity. Yet the body politic is in fact made up of ethnic, national, cultural, religious, political or even class associations able to address the deeper identities, belief systems, experiences and loyalties of their adherents better than can the distant and antagonistic state. This sets up an inevitable competition that leads to the take over of the state either by political and military elites whose interests and policies stand at odds with most if not all of its citizenry or by a particular ethnic, religious or political community to the exclusion of the others. In Western Europe, unlike the Middle East, states succeeded in establishing “democratic” structures and procedures (such as elections) that largely de-ethnicized their citizens and reduced “intermediate” groupings to the margins – although this modus vivendi is being challenged by the massive waves of immigration over the past couple decades.

In the Middle East, by contrast, multi-culturalism was the norm. To be sure, Islam became the hegemonic religious/civil authority, but the other major religious communities, Jews, Christians and some others, plus ethnic communities granted the status of millets, were both legitimized and given the authority to conduct their internal affairs according to the own religious laws and customs. There was no state, and the authority of the centralized governments of empires, provinces or countries often did not reach into the more rural or distant regions. Even when states were established by European colonizers, they had to be despotic, largely militarized, regimes because they and the elites that ruled them had little claim to legitimate power. A certain measure of national identity still pertains – being Egyptian, Syrian, Palestinian or even Lebanese or Jordanian has some cachet – but it is being challenged by the rise of politicized Muslim religious movements (the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, al Quaida, Hizbollah, Sunni and Shi’ites in Iraq and others) and/or strong ethnic groups (Bedouin and Palestinians in Jordan; Christians, Muslims and Druze in Lebanon; Kurds in Iraq, among many others). If functional, peaceful, representative states or regional confederations are to have any future in the Middle East, they will have to find a balance between the traditional state structure and the multi-cultural reality of their societies.

In terms of Palestine, three political developments of the past two centuries cannot be ignored: the rise of states as the organizing framework of the international community; the corresponding rise of nationalism and its demand for a nation-state; and, much more recently, the rise of Hamas and other groups that fuse nationalism and religion. The first two provided the rationale for the two-state solution, but given the irreversible “facts on the ground” that Israel has imposed on the Occupied Territory and the rise of political Islam, that solution is dead and gone. That leaves, I would argue, one of three one-state alternatives:

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